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Abstract 
Networks of Transnational Tibetan Politics  
Andrew Daniel Davies 
 
This thesis examines the pro-Tibet Movement as a contemporary political movement. It 
makes a number of interventions, both empirical and theoretical. Firstly, it adds to 
literature that attempts to think through the Tibetan struggle and its associated Movement 
in an explicitly political way. It does this through applying some of the contemporary 
theoretical issues around the nature of transnational political action to the Tibet 
Movement. It theoretically develops work by various geographers on the relational and 
hybrid nature of space in arguing that reassessing political action spatially can promote 
different, less essentialised, political futures. It adopts a networked understanding of space 
that seeks to embed the idea of political struggle within the wider social realm. This 
networked understanding of space allows for a nuanced understanding of the ways in 
which politics actually occurs in and through specific sites of political action. Instead of 
taking the Tibet Movement as a social movement, it instead attempts to look at how the 
political struggle for Tibet contains many overlapping and interweaving agents, 
organisations and discourses which at once constitute the Movement.  
The thesis uncovers how the networked nature of political activity is organised and spread 
throughout the ‘Tibet Movement’. This is done by exploring the following questions: How 
do these networks actually work? What are the everyday processes that hold these 
networks together? How are these networks spatially constituted? How can we study these 
networks? What impacts does this approach have upon our research methods? Empirically, 
it takes three elements of the whole of the Tibet Issue and examines them as discrete 
themes which help to define and shape the Issue in particular ways. These are, broadly: 1) 
the constitution and actualisation of imaginative geographies of Tibet; 2) the construction 
and maintenance of the Tibetan nation in the Tibetan diaspora and; 3) the role of activism 
and political contestation in promoting the pro-Tibetan struggle. However, while these are 
treated as distinct objects, it is important to realise that they all form part of the 
interweaving connections that make up the ‘quilt’ of the Tibet Movement. As a result, we 
gain a more detailed understanding of the overlapping processes of contemporary political 
action.  
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Preface/Acknowledgements 
This PhD grew out of an initial project title of ‘Political Networks against Imperialism’, and 
while the imperialism element has dwindled somewhat in the intervening three years, the 
priorities and targets of the thesis remain broadly the same. In a time when global justice 
campaigns seem to be everywhere, from the ‘Bolivarian revolution’ of Hugo Chavez et al. in 
Latin America to the polemical bandwagons of ‘Live8’ there seem to be few days that pass 
without a reference to a project somewhere in the world which notionally claims to be 
making the world a ‘better place’. In many cases, these claims are nothing particularly 
original, deploying arguments that use strict dichotomies and seek to gain ground in an 
almost Gramscian ‘War of position’ in order to seek to gain control of civil society and thus 
hegemony. And it is from this conflict between (counter) hegemonies and oppositional 
politics that this work emerges.  
As mentioned, at the beginning of the research, this PhD was emphatically an anti-imperial 
venture. Having been lucky (?) enough to be given a topic without a specific case study 
assigned to it, I began to cast my eye around various contemporary struggles. The counter-
globalisation movement seemed too obvious, Indian Marxist party struggles seemed to 
speak to a different time and, for a time, I considered thinking about the Far-Right 
movement in Europe as a counter-hegemonic struggle. None of these seemed quite 
satisfactory as cases of imperial activity per se, and it was with some luck that I eventually 
stumbled across the topic of Tibet and the international struggle for its liberation from 
Chinese rule. Here, it seemed, was a relatively simple case of a territory being taken over by 
a foreign power and used in a way that could readily be termed imperial or colonial. This 
perspective has changed somewhat in the interim (as will become clear later in the thesis) 
as these simplistic ideas have become necessarily complicated by an immersion in the 
topic. Despite this, the Tibetan cause remains an interesting one. Tibet has been occupied 
since 1950, and effectively a part of the Chinese state ever since1, and thus ranks as one of 
the longer running struggles of today. Yet it remains very much on the periphery of 
academic literature and of everyday understanding, equated as it often is in the public 
domain with an exotic, new-age imaginary.  
                                                          
1
 This is despite the flight of the Dalai Lama not occurring until 1959. While China could probably not 
claim to have complete control over Tibet, the years 1950-59 were marked by a gradual increase in 
Chinese control over the region, and to all intents and purposes Tibet’s status (or lack thereof) in 
international law in this period meant that it was effectively seen as internal to China. 
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This choice of topic has meant a journey into a research area that was at once familiar and 
unfamiliar. Moving into and around the Tibetan Movement would not have been possible 
without a number of people. In Liverpool, the supervision dream-team of Richard Phillips 
and Dave Featherstone has been invaluable. Throughout the PhD they were both always 
open to queries and forthcoming in their opinions, and have been more kind and generous 
than I could have hoped during the past 3 and a bit years. Their opinions on due process in 
tea-making, and of future careers in the confectionary trade, have been of particular use.  
The various postgraduates and members of staff (both Human and Physical Geography-
based) in the Department of Geography, and in the wider environs of the University, have 
also been of great support during the writing of this thesis. Particular thanks must go to Ivo 
Wengraf who has had the pleasant (?!) task of being alongside me during the entire 
process, starting with our Masters prior to the PhD, so has suffered through various chats 
and talks about life, the universe and everything throughout the past four years. 
Outside Liverpool, the various communities of pro-Tibetan activists I have come into 
contact with have been nothing if not welcoming, supportive and interesting participants 
within the research process. The list of people who have been involved in this area is 
seemingly endless, and given the wishes of some to remain anonymous, I refrain from 
mentioning any particular names, suffice to say, my abiding memory of time doing research 
is the warmth and humour which permeates the political movement. 
A circle of some good friends in London, most prominently Nick, Steve and Helen, has been 
a great help. Without their willingness to let me sleep on their floors and be dragged along 
to Tibetan events across the capital, this research would not have been possible. Ben’s 
rigorous critiques of many of my ideas have always served to help me sharpen my 
argument. 
Finally, my family have always been a support during my life, but this thesis would not have 
been possible without their love and care. My Father’s patient yet bemused looks while I 
tried to work through the finer points of Michel Foucault’s juridical thought with him, 
Nathan’s respect for social science which only a Doctor of Chemistry can have, and my 
Mam’s community spirit and passion for standing up for what is right have all inspired me 
at various times. Last, but definitely not least, I would not have even made it to Liverpool, 
let alone stayed on to do this PhD, without the financial benevolence and love of my 
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Grandparents, so it is my dear Grandma, Granddad, Nanna and Grampa, with love, to 
whom I dedicate this thesis. 
  
 
 
 
 
A Note on Transliteration 
 
In general, I have tried to use standard colloquial renderings of Tibetan words into 
Romanised script. These are phonetically closer to their Tibetan pronunciation than the 
more grammatically correct Wylie system derived from the letters of the Tibetan alphabet 
and thus more suited to a general audience. In this system, Tibet becomes Pö rather than 
Bod. Similarly, I have adopted the Pinyin system of transliterating Chinese, and so Mao Tse-
Tung under the older Wade-Giles system becomes the more phonetically correct Mao 
Zedong. 
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Glossary  
 
Amban – Chinese Diplomatic Mission in the imperial era. An Amban was present in Lhasa 
for much of the period prior to 1949 
Boddhisattva – A enlightened being who has chosen to be reincarnated and remain in the 
circle of samsara to benefit humanity. 
The Buddha – The original human being who became enlightened, and, whose teachings 
are the core of Buddhism. One of the ‘Three Jewels’ of Buddhism.  
Chenresigs – Tibetan for Avolekiteshvara, the Boddhisattva of Compassion. The Dalai Lama 
is said to be his reincarnation. 
Dharma – The Tradition of Buddhist Teachings. One of the ‘Three Jewels’ of Buddhism 
Lama – A venerated, usually reincarnate, teacher of Tibetan Buddhism. Together with 
Lamaism, the term has a complex history of (mis)representation 
Mandala – Originally Hindu, but used in Tibetan Buddhism as a representation of the 
Buddhist universe. Usually either painted on Thangkas, or in drawn with sand. 
Nirvana – The goal of Buddhism. Not a place, but a perfect knowledge of how to avoid 
suffering and samsara, hence its translation into English as ‘Enlightenment’. 
Samsara – The condition of perpetual rebirth and suffering that every human being is 
trapped within.  
Sangha – The Buddhist Monastic Community. One of the ‘Three Jewels’ of Buddhism. 
Shambala – Mythic Buddhist realm, hidden high in the peaks of the Himalayas. Often taken 
as the inspiration for Shangri-la. 
Shangri-La – Imaginary valley used as the setting for James Hilton’s novel, Lost Horizon. 
Mythic roots in the legend of Shambala. Seen as responsible for many contemporary 
representations of Tibet. 
Thangka – Tibetan painted scrolls, usually showing religious imagery of a Boddhisattva or 
Mandala. 
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List of Abbreviations 
 
CTA – Central Tibetan Administration. 
GiE – Government in Exile (informal term for CTA). 
PCART – Preparatory Committee for the Autonomous Region of Tibet.  
TAR – Tibet Autonomous Region. Province level region of China, instituted in 1965 as a part 
of the 17-Point Agreement, in geographical area it roughly corresponds to the Tibetan 
region of Ü-Tsang, and therefore comprises only a third of Ethnographic Tibet. 
Tibetan NGO – An NGO that is predominantly run by Tibetan staff/members. 
TSG – Tibet Support Group.  
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A note on Sources 
Original information presented in this thesis is derived from fieldwork, the majority of 
which was undertaken from May 2006 – September 2007. Where data is referred to 
directly, I have included in a footnote a specific reference in the form 
“Researchdocuments/Type of data/Location of Data Collection/specific referent”. Thus, an 
interview conducted in Dharamsala, India with participant ‘LT’ would take the following 
form “ResearchDocs/Interviews/In/LT”.  
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Chapter 1 – Introduction 
On the 30th of March 1959, Jetsun Jamphel Ngawang Lobsang Yeshe Tenzin Gyatso, the 14th 
Dalai Lama and political and spiritual leader of Tibet, moved into exile by crossing the 
southern border of Tibet into the Indian province of Sikkim. In the following months, 
around one hundred thousand Tibetans also chose to move into exile. Every year, 
thousands of Tibetans continue to make the dangerous journey through the Himalaya to 
exile. This movement of people has created one of the most ‘resilient and successful 
refugee groups in the world’ (Bernstorff and von Welck 2003b, 1). This refugee move into 
status is inherently a challenge to Chinese rule in the wider-Tibetan region2. Associated 
with this diasporic community is a wider political movement, which incorporates both 
Tibetans and non-Tibetans who work in solidarity towards a goal of self-determination for 
the Tibetan region. Despite the fact that nearly 50 years have passed since the initial move 
into exile, the Tibet Issue remains seemingly intractable. The most recent protests which 
occurred around the pomp and ceremony of the Beijing 2008 Olympics simply highlighted 
the gap between Tibetans’ claims for autonomy/independence and Chinese claims that 
Tibet is a matter of ‘internal’ politics, not to be discussed by those outside China.  
This thesis makes a number of interventions, both empirical and theoretical. Firstly, it adds 
to the small but growing literature that attempts to think through the Tibetan struggle and 
its associated Movement in an explicitly political way. Consequently, it does this through 
applying some of the contemporary theoretical issues around the nature of transnational 
political action to the Tibet Movement. It theoretically develops work by various 
geographers on the relational and hybrid nature of space in arguing that reassessing 
political action spatially can promote different, less essentialised, political futures (Allen 
2007; Hyndman 2004; Massey 2004, 2005). It does this by adopting a networked 
understanding of space that seeks to embed the idea of political struggle within the wider 
social realm. This networked and relational understanding of space allows for a nuanced 
understanding of the ways in which politics actually occurs in and through specific sites of 
political action. Building from thinking on the role of networks as constitutive of social 
relations, instead of taking the Tibet Movement as a social movement, it instead attempts 
to look at how the political struggle for Tibet contains many overlapping and interweaving 
agents, organisations and discourses which at once constitute the Movement.  
                                                          
2
 It should be noted that the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) of China is a smaller region than 
Tibetan notions of their land, which correspond instead to areas where ethnic Tibetans reside. This 
larger, ‘ethnographic’ Tibet is roughly the same size as Western Europe. 
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As a result, the thesis sets out with the following aim and objectives:  
Thesis Aim   To uncover how the networked nature of political activity 
is organised and spread throughout the ‘Tibet Movement’.  
This will be done by exploring the following questions in more depth; 
Research Questions   How do these networks actually work? What are the 
everyday processes that hold these networks together? 
   How are these networks spatially constituted?  
How can we study these networks? What impacts does this 
approach have upon our research methods? 
Consequently, it takes three elements of the whole of the Tibet Issue and examines them 
as discrete themes which help to define and shape the Issue in particular ways. These are, 
broadly: 1) the constitution and actualisation of the imaginative geographies of Tibet; 2) 
the construction and maintenance of the Tibetan nation in the Tibetan diaspora and; 3) the 
role of activism and political contestation in promoting the pro-Tibetan struggle. Each of 
these themes forms an empirical chapter of the thesis. However, while these are treated as 
distinct objects, it is important to realise that they all form part of the interweaving 
connections that make up the ‘quilt’ of the Tibet Movement. It should then become clear 
that each chapter of the thesis has close links to the others and it is this interlinked 
networked character that this thesis is based around.  
Thus, while the three themed chapters will be the empirical heart of the thesis, it will be 
necessary to supplement these with the following structure. Firstly, and for the remainder 
of this chapter, I want to introduce Tibet, giving an account of its history which stresses not 
its isolation, but its historical connections to China, India and further afield. This 
introduction to the topic will be followed by an examination of the nature of networks and 
power in contemporary politics, with a particular focus on the geographies of these 
political relations. This section will be followed by a chapter based on how I attempted to 
uncover these networks during the research. While explaining the methodological conduct 
of the PhD, it will also attempt to work through some of the philosophical issues and 
problems raised by doing a ‘networked’ piece of research. These early chapters will lay the 
groundwork for the three empirical chapters mentioned above. Following these, I draw 
together what these four accounts mean to the wider Tibetan Movement and how they 
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shed light on the Tibet movement in more productive ways than are usually considered, 
before finally concluding the thesis. 
Tibet: Axis of Asia or remote disconnected plateau? Some historical contexts  
Tibet, as will become clear throughout this thesis, tends to be written about as something 
of an epitome of exotic distance. These are, of course, predominantly visions of a Tibetan 
‘other’ created by both Western and Chinese sources, and seem to resonate with Edward 
Said’s work as we shall see in later chapters. But despite these conflicting representations, 
it is necessary to put Tibet into a chronological history to provide some context and 
understand how Tibet came to be a part of China (see Fig. 1.1). 
The name ‘Tibet’ does not derive directly from the Tibetan language, in which it is most 
easily rendered into as bod. The English Tibet derives from Arabic and Persian origins (Behr 
1994, 559) and far from being isolated, Tibet was an important imperial power in Central 
Asia during the 7th Century CE reign of King Songtsen Gampo (French 2003, 90-91). 
Songtsen’s military expansionism effectively established Tibet as a legitimate power, while 
at the same time he standardised a written script based on the Ranjana script of Northern 
India, together with being the first Tibetan leader to propagate Buddhism amongst his 
subjects. However, as French (2003) says, Songtsen was primarily a military leader, and 
after raiding both Nepal and China, he demanded princesses from each area to marry. His 
Nepali bride built the Jokhang temple in Lhasa, still considered the holiest temple in Tibet, 
and also helped to establish the Potala palace. His Chinese bride, Wencheng, whom he 
married in 641CE, remains a much more controversial figure. Wencheng directly helped to 
establish Lhasa, the preeminent Tibetan city, in what had previously been swampy land 
surrounding the Yarlung Tsangpo river (which in India and Bangladesh becomes the 
Brahmaputra). Barnett (2006) argues that, in the Chinese perspective, it is at this moment 
that the Tibet began to be become a meaningful, civilised area. Thus, rather than with the 
ingress of Buddhism from the south, it is from the east that Tibet becomes advanced. 
Crucially, it is also at this early stage that the two histories of Tibet and China become 
intertwined, and the relationship between the two nations has never been adequately 
separated.
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Figure 1.1 Political Subdivisions of China showing the Tibet Autonomous Region as 'Xizang (Tibet)' 
Altered from map at Perry-Castañeda Library, University of Texas at Austin, available at 
http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/china_admin_91.jpg   
 
Following Songtsen’s reign, the Tibetan empire exerted its influence from Bengal in the 
south to Mongolia in the north, and Burma in the east to Afghanistan in the west. This 
growth in power led to a series of conflicts with the Tang dynasty of China as the empire 
encroached upon them. Indeed, it is important here to recognise that military prowess is 
still an important facet to one’s prestige in Tibetan culture – the ability to fight and ride 
swiftly being demonstrated at horse festivals throughout Eastern Tibet to this day. During 
the 8th Century CE Trisong Detsen, great-great-great grandson of Songtsen Gampo 
embarked on a new wave of spiritual and military adventure. Indian Buddhist teachers 
were invited, including Padmasambhava, later one of the most important figures of Tibetan 
Buddhism, who quelled mountain demons and spirits and promoted Buddhism at the 
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expense of the traditional, animistic B’on religious practices. Militarily, the Tibetan empire 
expanded to take over huge areas of present-day China, at one point occupying the 
Chinese Imperial city of Changan (Xian). This seemingly severed any notion of Chinese 
dominance over Tibet.  
However, this expansionist period was followed by a long period of decline marred by 
internecine squabbling between various factions in Tibet. This, together with the rise of the 
Genghis Khan’s Mongol dynasty meant that by 1207, Tibet had peacefully submitted to 
khanate rule (Goldstein 1997). Tibet paid tribute to the Mongol rulers, whilst they in turn 
did not interfere with Tibet’s administration, nor did they invade Tibet. The death of 
Genghis Khan threw this relationship into uncertainty, and when tribute ceased being sent, 
the new supreme Khan, Ogedai, ordered a raid into Tibet. This raid brought back 
information about the political and religious makeup of Tibetan society, and resulted in the 
summoning of Sakya Pandita, a high ranking lama of the Sakya sect3 of Tibetan Buddhism, 
to the court of Ogedai. Here Pandita negotiated a relationship that came to be known as 
‘Priest-Patron’ (Tib. cho yon), where China acted as a material guardian of Tibet in return 
for spiritual leadership from Tibet. From this point on, a confused relationship between 
Tibet and China existed, which does not conform to any Westphalian notions about 
sovereignty or territorial rule. As a result, Chinese and Tibetan provincial borders 
overlapped, and mean that the present Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) does not 
encompass all ethnically Tibetan areas (see Fig. 1.2) 
The collapse of the Qing dynasty in 1911 had led to the expulsion of any Chinese officials 
from Lhasa, and had given Tibet de jure, if not de facto, independence. However, this was 
not the most important of events that impacted upon Tibet at this time – the British 
colonial government of India began to encroach on Tibet from the south from late in the 
18th century. Although there were a variety of diplomatic missions before the 20th century, 
the Younghusband Expedition of 1903-04 and Simla convention of 1914 were both 
attempts to enforce particular European concepts of sovereign territory onto the region. 
The Younghusband Expedition amounted to one of the last British imperial invasions and, 
while nominally undertaken in order to quell border disputes on the orders of the Lord 
Curzon, the hawkish Viceroy of India, the mission was also an attempt to ‘open’ Tibet 
                                                          
3
 The four sects of Tibetan Buddhism are the Kagyu, Nyingma, Sakya and Gelug.  
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Figure 1.2 - Ethnolinguistically Tibetan regions of the People's Republic of China. Amdo, Kham and 
Ü-Tsang are the traditional Tibetan regions. Source: Shakya, 2002 
to trade, limit perceived Russian influence on the borders of British India (French 1994) and 
to maintain Tibet as a buffer zone between China, British India and the Russian Empire in 
the so-called ‘Great Game’. As a result of the Expedition, a British delegation and trading 
mission was established in the southern Tibet town of Gyantse. The Simla Convention was 
a tripartite meeting between Tibetan, British Indian and Chinese officials in order to 1) 
determine a border between Tibet and India, and, 2) the nature of Chinese suzerainty over 
Tibet. Through various drafts, the Convention resulted in the ‘McMahon line’ being 
imposed as a border. However, disagreements between the various parties meant that the 
Convention, at various times, was unsigned by either Chinese or Tibetans as each side 
claimed sovereignty over Tibet. This ultimately unsuccessful attempt to conform to 
Westphalian norms was crucial in the later 1949/50 invasion of Tibet. The continuation of 
the confusion over the ‘ownership’ of the region meant that no power was willing to 
oppose China over what essentially remained a technical issue which could be seen as 
internal policing.  
The period between 1911 and the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, was marked by his 
attempts to reform the political and military system within Tibet. Seeking support from 
sympathetic British political officers, he attempted to impose modern military tactics, 
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regimentation and equipment to the small Tibetan army, together with reforming Tibetan 
society in an attempt to establish a degree of centralised control from Lhasa upon the 
outlying regions. This included establishing radio contact with the outlying regions of Tibet 
for the first time and sending trade delegations abroad with passports issued in the name 
of an independent Tibet. However, many of the reforms attempted by the Dalai Lama were 
held up by conservative elements of the Tibetan Parliament. So, while reforms were 
undertaken, they were always limited and, after the death of the 13th Dalai Lama in 1933, 
the regency undertaken before the accession of the 14th Dalai Lama was marked by 
internecine squabbling between various factions within the Lhasa aristocracy. Effectively, 
this meant that Tibet was no nearer being recognised internationally as an independent 
state, nor was it able to defend its borders. 
It was under these circumstances that Tibet found itself confronted by a newly unified 
Communist China after 1949. With the defeat of Jiang Jieshi’s Guomindang Nationalist 
government, the Chinese Communist Party regime quickly moved quickly to establish 
control over its perceived territory. As a result, on the 7th of October 1950, while worldwide 
attention was focussed on UN forces crossing the 38th Parallel in Korea, a 40,000 strong 
detachment of the People’s Liberation Army crossed the Drichi River in Eastern Tibet 
Quickly defeating the small and poorly-led Tibetan troops stationed in the area, the 
situation led to Ngabo, the defeated military commander of Eastern Tibet, signing ‘The 
Seventeen Point Agreement’ which agreed that Tibet was and always had been a part of 
China and authorised the integration of Tibet into the new People’s Republic of China. 
Ngabo’s actions have been the subject of bitter argument amongst Tibetans ever since, as 
he was technically unauthorised to sign any documents on the behalf of the Lhasa 
Government. However, given the military situation, the Lhasa Government was relatively 
powerless to change anything once the agreement had been signed. Thus, for the next 9 
years, the Lhasa Government, led by the newly invested teenage 14th Dalai Lama, wrangled 
with the Communist Party in order to preserve Tibetan autonomy within the region.  
Growing violence amongst eastern Tibetans against Chinese encroachment into the region, 
together with increasing intolerance on the part of the Chinese meant that by 1959 there 
were growing suspicions that the Chinese were attempting to remove the Dalai Lama from 
power and replace him with the more pro-Chinese Panchen Lama4. The emergence of a 
                                                          
4
 The Panchen Lama is traditionally seen as the second ‘highest’ Lama in Tibetan Buddhism. The 
relationship is considerably less hierarchical than this suggests however, and the two posts are 
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perceived Chinese plot to kidnap the Dalai Lama in early March 1959 led to a popular revolt 
by Tibetans in Lhasa on the 10th of March, in the hope that they could protect the Dalai 
Lama and drive out the Chinese from their capital. The Dalai Lama was smuggled out, 
believing that the situation was now beyond negotiation, and having received assurances 
from Jawaharlal Nehru in India that he would be granted asylum, it was decided to make 
the move into exile. 
It was here that the lack of any serious international recognition began to affect the 
Tibetan Government. While there were limited protests in the UN, no members of the 
Security Council signed any resolutions or statements, and a general unwillingness to 
confront Communist China over what was perceived as a marginal region meant that Tibet 
was abandoned by transnational political institutions. However, at the same time, small-
scale Tibet Support Groups began to emerge in Europe and America. 
Tibet itself became fully incorporated into the People’s Republic of China (PRC) as the Tibet 
Autonomous Region in 1965. Despite its autonomous status, Tibet was as affected by the 
policies of the Great Leap Forward and Cultural Revolution as the rest of China, with 
widespread famine, the destruction of traditional monasteries and restructuring of Tibetan 
society to suit Maoist goals. These processes still remain controversial (Shakya 2002a; 
Wang 2002) and debates circulate about to what extent Tibetans were responsible for the 
destruction of their own cultural history. However, the period was also marked by a 
general disappearance of Tibet from International Relations and political studies more 
generally.  
The 1980s were a period of great change for the Tibet Issue. Hu Yaobang’s stewardship of 
the region’s political assemblies was marked by a liberalisation of Chinese policies in the 
region (Shakya 2008). These allowed for a limited amount of freedom of expression. When 
this combined with the award of the Nobel Peace Prize to the Dalai Lama, and a number of 
fact-finding missions to the region sent by the Exile Government in Dharamsala, India, a 
series of protests erupted in and around Lhasa. These protests garnered large scale media 
attention for the first time since the flight of the Dalai Lama, and a new wave of Tibet 
Support Groups emerged across the world. The upwelling of support for Tibet culminated 
for many in the Tibetan Freedom Concerts organised by a number of celebrities. However, 
the uprising and increasing popular support were met with a hardening of Chinese policies. 
                                                                                                                                                                    
generally seen as either political rivals in the power struggles between different Tibetan Buddhist 
sects or as spiritual mentors, with the elder of the two acting as teacher of the younger.  
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The region and its politics were still treated as internal affairs of the PRC, and protests were 
seen as being instigated from outside, particularly blaming the ‘Dalai Clique’ who were 
attempting to ‘split’ the Chinese Nation apart. 
This situation, where global levels of grassroots support came up against an immovable 
series of Chinese policies became the norm for much of the 1990s and the early 2000s, but 
more recently, the Beijing Olympics have provided a catalyst for a reinvigoration of the 
Tibet Movement. Widespread protests took place across ethnographically Tibetan areas in 
March-May 2008. These, according to Tibet Supporters, were against both the movement 
of the Olympic torch through the region, explicitly tying Tibet to China, and also against the 
continued lack of religious and cultural freedom under PRC rule. These protests, and the 
resultant Chinese response, were responsible for the biggest wave of pro-Tibetan solidarity 
demonstrations since the late 1980s. Protests against parades of the Olympic Torch were 
disrupted in London, Paris and San Francisco, and eventually led to a limited amount of 
condemnation for the civil and military crackdown in Tibet.  Chinese responses have been 
varied, but official sources have claimed that these protests were in fact little more than 
race riots, and again fall back to represent them as the manifestations of the Dalai Clique’s 
attempts to foment discord in China. While there has been a civil and military crackdown in 
the region, it remains to be seen what the long term effects of the Beijing Olympics on 
Tibet will be. 
Networks of pro-Tibetan Politics 
From the above passage through the history of Tibet we can begin to understand some 
general aspects of the region. This history obviously connects to the rest of the thesis, but it 
is important to recognise that Tibet’s history is not uncontested, with differing accounts 
from Chinese, Tibetan and Western (predominantly, but not exclusively, British) sources. 
These different accounts of history remind us that Tibet, far from being isolated and 
exclusive, is in fact an important region in Asian politics. Its multiple connections and fluid 
relationships have helped to define it as a region. Today, as a vast, mineral-rich region 
whose rivers supply Northern India, Southeast Asia, and China itself, the region finds itself 
at the centre of an array of political ecology problems. And of course, despite the vagaries 
of media coverage which mean that Tibet flits in and out of popular consciousness, for 
around 200,000 diasporic exiles who now live in Asia, Europe and the Americas, Tibet 
remains home, and something that many are willing to fight, and indeed die, for. 
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Fig 1.3 Protests within Tibet - April-May 2008. From Shakya, 2008 
 
This thesis makes interventions into exile Tibetan politics, and political geography more 
generally, by unravelling some of the networks of political opportunity and solidarity that 
connect the movement together. While Tibet forms the key empirical element of the 
thesis, the foray through the region’s history above has already highlighted the intertwined 
and contested nature of Tibetan politics. This informs the theoretical avenues that run 
through the thesis. Political geography in general has turned towards more relational and 
contingent approaches in recent years. Postcolonial and feminist critiques that emerged in 
the 1970s and 1980s have meant that there has been a turn towards understanding 
geopolitical problems in ways which are sympathetic to the various actors who take part in 
them. The increasing recognition that identities are defined through relationships (Miller 
1993) rather than held static has meant that political geography has increasingly turned 
towards the theoretical insights of poststructural French theory by thinkers like Foucault 
and Deleuze, but also from actor-network theory. This thesis argues that adopting a 
networked and relational approach to the playing out of these political actions produces 
theoretical and empirical insights into the workings of contemporary, ‘globalised’ political 
action. Rather than thinking about Tibet as a geopolitical problem or placing an emphasis 
on key actors like the Dalai Lama and thus emphasising the statecraft of the Tibet Issue, the 
thesis explores instead the mundane, everyday political occurrences that do the work of 
21 
 
holding the pro-Tibet Movement together. This politics of everyday occurrences plays out 
across space and influences how the Tibet Movement is productive of particular 
understandings of self and other, of the nation, and of forms of solidarity across these 
boundaries.  
With this in mind, the thesis begins by exploring the theoretical background to these ideas. 
The next chapter argues that networked accounts of the social also require a rethinking of 
how both power and scale are theorised in human geography. It thus explores the three 
areas of power, scale and networks as mutually constitutive of a wider relational political 
geography. This relational geography has important impacts upon how research is 
undertaken, and so Chapter Three deals with the research methodology of the thesis. 
While explaining how the research took place, this chapter also deals with some more 
philosophical questions about the nature of doing research in contemporary, globalised, 
politics. These two chapters form the theoretical basis of the thesis, and are concluded by a 
short intermezzo which leads into three empirical chapters by explaining how they are 
separated into distinct areas.  
The empirical heart of the thesis begins in Chapter Four, which looks at the production of 
an underlying ‘Imagined Tibet’ which influences both our understandings of Tibet, but also 
colours activist understandings of Tibet. This Imagined Tibet is influenced most readily by 
both colonial imagery of Tibetans as backward and also by the production of Tibetans as 
holders of ancient spiritual knowledge. These two elements to combine to produce an 
image of Tibet and Tibetans as passive victims of unchecked Chinese aggression, and 
ultimately serves to limit the agency of Tibetans as political actors. This underlying 
‘Imagined Tibet’ colours the other empirical evidence. The next Chapter examines the 
production of the Tibetan nation in exile. Moving away from classical work on the nation by 
Anderson (1983 [2006]) it argues that the nation is a heterogenous assemblage of actors 
that operates across a variety of spaces and times. Consequently, certain spaces are 
productive of fixed Tibetan identities, but at the same time are run through with more 
hybrid national constructions. This produces a more fluid and mutable Tibetan identity in 
exile than is generally credited. The final empirical chapter looks specifically at pro-Tibetan 
activism. It examines the ways that politics in exile is held together by a series of mundane 
and everyday organisational structures that are routinised throughout a series of networks. 
These occur both through the regulated spaces of Tibet Support Group offices and through 
the more fluid and expansive spaces of protests. Thus the connections and relations built 
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up through specifically activist communities define how effective the Tibet movement is as 
a political movement. 
These empirical chapters not only elaborate the theoretical arguments of the thesis, but 
also define the Tibet Issue as an area of political importance that shapes identities across 
the globe. The various elements that emerge through these chapters both uncover how the 
politics of pro-Tibet movements are actually developed and articulated by those involved in 
them, but also advance theoretical ideas about the nature of contemporary political action. 
This networked approach to research, as the rest of the thesis argues, is key to developing 
a more pragmatic account of politics that is theoretically informed, but crucially remains 
empirically insightful. 
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Chapter 2 – Power, Networks and the Geographies of 
Political Action  
 
 “It is not enough to be compassionate, you must act. There are two aspects to action. One 
is to overcome the distortions and afflictions of your own mind, that is, in terms of calming 
and eventually dispelling anger. This is action out of compassion. The other is more social, 
more public. When something needs to be done in the world to rectify the wrongs, if one is 
really concerned with benefitting others, one needs to be engaged, involved.”  
The 14th Dalai Lama (The 14th Dalai Lama, in Gyatso and Goleman 1992, 96, emphasis 
added) 
Introduction 
The ability to act politically is one of the key themes of this thesis. Much of it is concerned 
with the ability of people and things to influence their surroundings – acting out processes 
through which they hope to influence the political ordering of the planet. The lack of a 
territory indivisibly marked as ‘Tibet’ and the resultant struggle to create such a territory 
remains the basis of the Tibetan people’s struggle, as led by the Dalai Lama. However, 
rather than being understood as a ‘traditional’ geopolitical/international relations situation 
that revolves around actions undertaken between state-based actors5, the Tibet Issue is 
complicated by the lack of any international recognition for the Tibetan Government in 
Exile and its claim of sovereignty. Thus the Tibet Issue has become something rather more 
subtle than a classical international relations, ‘state versus state’, situation. While the 
competing claims are activated on one hand by the apparatuses of the Chinese 
Government in Beijing, Lhasa and elsewhere, the Tibetan Government in Exile is supported 
by numerous other organisations, from the growing number of Tibetan NGOs, many of 
whom are explicitly political organisations, together with a global chain of what are 
commonly known as Tibet Support Groups (TSGs). These three types of political 
organisation, Government in Exile, Tibetan NGO and TSG form the bulk of the Tibet 
Movement. It is this interconnected nature of the Tibet Issue that is important here. While 
each component could be analysed in its particular setting, for example a social movement 
theory-led account of the TSG element of the movement, this would leave out an 
                                                          
5
 It should, of course, be noted that the great struggles for decolonization can also be seen as 
traditional in many ways. Here, I simply mean to emphasise that contemporary work in International 
Relations and related fields still tends to assume geopolitics is still based largely around state based 
actors as dominant. As will become clear later on in the thesis, there exists a large amount of work in 
geography, social movement theory, and other political disciplines that shows the heterogeneity of 
political actors within these circuits of power. 
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understanding of the political movement as its various elements interact and how this 
affects the processes of political action on a daily basis. It is this understanding of power, 
interconnectedness and political action that forms the core of the thesis. 
This chapter argues that the heterogenous material geographies of political action 
generally, and pro-Tibetan politics more specifically, require a relational, poststructural 
understanding of space. To do this, it develops three main areas of engagement within 
contemporary literature on political geography. These are, firstly, power and the related 
processes of domination/resistance – more specifically following work in geography it 
thinks about the entangled and spatially contingent nature of power. As a result, the 
chapter begins by examining power and resistance through the ideas of Foucault, Deleuze 
and Latour, but also examines the work of geographers and the anthropologists on the 
topic. These contribute towards an understanding of power and resistance that stresses 
the interconnected nature of domination and resistance within the wider circuits of power.  
This formulation of power necessitates an understanding of scale within these processes, 
and the next section examines theories of scale and its affect on political activities. This 
section argues that understandings of scale have tended to privilege hierarchy and have 
not given enough credence to flattened ontological constructions of space. Here, I assess 
the theories of connection and movement put forward by actor-network theory and argue 
that while they open our understandings of space, they also foreclose some of our 
understandings of it, particularly those offered by subaltern and postcolonial studies. 
Through all of these sections, developing these theories of entangled power/resistance and 
flattened ontologies of scale necessitates an understanding of the interconnected and 
networked theory of society. Therefore, the third section on networks argues that the 
interventions of the first two sections necessitate an understanding of society, and the 
political, as networked and interconnected arenas of events and assemblages.  
As a result, this chapter sets out the theoretical framework of the thesis as a whole – that 
of power, politics and a networked understanding of the processes involved in these areas. 
It begins by looking at the idea of politics and social action, examining some of the ways 
that struggles have been theorised and asking what these accounts have offered and what 
they lack. It develops ideas about the conceptual development of political geography as a 
discipline and what this development has curtailed. The chapter considers how these 
networked accounts can help us to understand political action in ways that can potentially 
be more productive than the ‘traditional’ readings of politics. Of course, coterminous with 
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both of these sections will be an understanding of power and how it is played out through 
political action. 
Geography and the politics of power, domination and resistance 
The Tibetan struggle for independence/autonomy remains a counter-hegemonic struggle 
between pro-Tibetan groups and a hegemonic China, and as a result, it is often conflated 
with a simple dualism – China is seen to dominate Tibet and thus it comes to a big state 
controlling a small nation. This is obviously an oversimplification, and in order to 
understand the more nuanced nature of the relations between the two ‘sides’ later in the 
empirical chapters, here we need to unpick some of the theories of power, domination and 
resistance that have emerged in geography. Since the late 1990s, there has been an 
increased recognition of political resistance and contestation within geography. This has 
been most obvious in the publication of two edited collections (Pile and Keith 1997; Sharp 
et al. 2000a) which explicitly attempt to interrogate the spatiality of a variety of 
contentious political scenarios. This has been concomitant with attempts to unpick the 
nuanced nature of power and its analysis by geographers. Foremost amongst these has 
been Allen’s (2003a) attempt to show that power is more than simply something that is 
wielded by one party over another, instead involving a range of styles and types.  It is this 
kind of work that has begun to explore the nature and range of power and resistance that 
this section of the chapter will engage with. Firstly, I begin by addressing power, looking at 
the ways in which it has been theorised and in particular looking at the ways which 
geographers have recently begun to use it in political circumstances. I then move on to 
thinking about how power intersects with resistance, and how the dichotomous relations 
imagined between the two need to be unpicked, in particular focussing on the spatiality of 
these relations. 
While geography has been interested in the role of unequal relations for many years, 
current trends in political geography have been allowing more ground to open up in our 
understandings of how these actions are played out spatially. In this, we must begin to 
think about power in more subtle ways. Of course, power has been one of the more 
important theoretical issues the social sciences have attempted to understand. While there 
has been plenty of theorising that has constructed what Allen critiques as a ‘centred’ 
conception of power (Allen 2003a, 113-116) more recently, inspired by the work of Michel 
Foucault and Gilles Deleuze, there has been a turn towards decentring power and showing 
how power is strategically played out through and across society. 
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Rather than highlighting Foucault’s particular attempts to reconstruct history, here I want 
to focus on how his examinations of power and knowledge have been used. By examining 
the ways in which control is exercised, most famously in his examinations of institutions 
such as the asylum (Foucault 1967) and the prison (Foucault 1977), together with his 
examinations of sexuality (Foucault 1978), Foucault worked (at least partially) towards 
understanding the ways in which governments are able to control populations. This version 
of power as ‘governmentality’ is exercised not only by overt intervention in the life of the 
subject, but also by rolling out discourses throughout a given area that encourage self-
disciplining and conformity to ‘normal’ standards. For example, the hierarchical family 
structure of Western societies disciplines and encourages people to conform without any 
direct governmental system of interference. Thus, ‘deviant’ behaviour is exported as ‘other’ 
and undesirable, needing to be contained and limited, creating a pervasive system of 
societal control at a distance. This system of discursive control decentres power from the 
state outwards towards the specific apparatus of the state and so we see why Foucault 
chose places like the prison and the asylum as his topics of study. Power thus becomes 
immanent and contingent, emerging throughout and across society as and when it is 
deployed and practised, not in some top-down exercise of explicitly named domination.  
Foucault’s emphasis on the regimes and structures of power that operate across society 
shows the insidious abilities of states and governments to ‘outsource’ power to other 
institutions and discourses to control populations. Thus, while states can never employ 
complete control over an individual, there are other dispersed social practices which in turn 
force a degree of conformity upon an individual. Yet, while Foucault spoke often of the 
need for resistance to these structures, most famously quoting ‘Where there is power, 
there is resistance’ (Foucault 1978, 95-96) he never spoke in as much detail about the 
operations of resistance within these governed spaces.  
In particular, Foucault has been criticised by postcolonial critics in the past for his explicitly 
Euro-American worldview (Legg 2007a; Stoler 1995). Stoler’s work is valuable here as it 
thinks about colonialism in ways that are imbued with discourses about sexuality and race. 
Thus, rather than critiquing the gaps left by Foucault’s Eurocentric selection of topics, she 
develops his ideas and forces us to re-evaluate our understandings of how power, race and 
sexuality played out across colonial spaces. So, Foucault’s ideas remain influential, with 
Said’s Orientalism in particular showing a markedly Foucaultian understanding of the 
creation of a dominating discourse. I deal with Said in more detail in later chapters, but the 
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nature of this discursive, dispersed form of power remains important in our understandings 
of colonial languages. Stephen Legg’s  (Legg 2007b) work on Raj-era colonial Delhi shows 
how the purified spaces of the easily state-governed spaces of imperial New Delhi were run 
through with connections to the messy, aberrant, ungovernable spaces of Old Delhi. Thus, 
a specific form of imperial power attempted to exert its control over a spatial area, yet 
movement between differing forms and types of domination and resistance occurred 
through these very spaces of control. Importantly, Legg begins to explore in more detail 
than Foucault the messy ways in which these two processes accompany each other. 
These reworkings of Foucault show that, despite his importance to the field of power, since 
his death, there have been numerous developments of his thinking in an attempt to 
understand the actual workings of the circuits of power/resistance. One account which 
explicitly thinks about power’s deployment across space comes from Bruno Latour, of 
whom I want to speak of only briefly here, returning in more depth to his ideas later. 
Latour’s work on ‘centres of calculation’ (Latour 1987, Ch. 6) helps us understand how 
imperial centres were able to extract information for the benefit of the imperial ‘core’. 
Here, as voyages of ‘discovery’ from Western Europe encountered ‘native’ cultures, they 
were able to discover more and more information about a place and store it with other 
information about other areas. This process is iterative, with successive voyages finding out 
more and more information, and with this collection of information and data, the imperial 
power is able to gain power ‘over’ the periphery with its weaker knowledge of the world.  
While this system is problematic, privileging as it does a peculiarly Western notion of 
knowledge at the expense of other forms of knowledge (for example, indigenous 
knowledge), it, together with Latour’s attempts to come to terms with a system of power 
that rather than diffusing outwards from a point is translated from point to point within a 
network (Latour 1988), help to unpick how he thinks power is actually played out over 
space – as well as domination and the will to coerce people to do what is required, 
compliance is important. Some actants will willingly take part in the operation of a political 
system. Latour refers to the analogy of the rugby ball being passed along by people – some 
people will pass the ball directly, others will take it on before passing it on – there are a 
number of possibilities about how the ball is passed and used individually. But, by taking 
this further than a simple, immutable rugby ball, by being part in this system, these 
individuals alter what is being done – they translate power and alter the effects of the 
system. Thus, individual actants within this web then have the power to change the system 
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in minute ways – as power circulates through the system, the initial goals and aims become 
obscured and change. As Latour says (in presumably a challenge to Foucault’s clinic) ‘the 
chain is made of actors – not of patients – and since the token is in everyone’s hands in 
turn, everyone shapes it according to their different projects’ (Latour 1988, 268). In 
Latour’s view then, contra to some of Foucault’s arguments, we have a much less 
controlling and structured account of power. It thus becomes clear that power is much 
more complex than a centred account of power would allow for, and indeed, more mutable 
than the decentred controls of Foucault’s argument. This develops a sense where power is 
something more than a Foucaultian sense of engagement would account for. But, for now, I 
wish to concentrate on this specific instance of Latour’s work, and will return to him later in 
discussing his influence upon what has become known as actor network theory (ANT). 
A similar decentred and immanent account of power is offered by Gilles Deleuze. Together 
with Felix Guattari, their book A Thousand Plateaus (1987) is particularly useful, with what 
they term ‘micropolitics’ being important to our understandings of how power is actually 
played out across space. To them, political power is played out through the three segments 
of society: the binary dualisms of categorization (race/class/gender etc), the circulation of 
our affairs (or the community’s/city’s/country’s affairs) and the linear segments of 
procedure (we move through processes, and once one is finished, another begins). These 
segments operate simultaneously and overlap with each other. This segmentarity is at work 
across society, so things like the state are segmented. However, rather than thinking of 
power as centralised by the state, they argue that it is how this segmentarity is applied that 
becomes important. They overcode each of these segments as either ‘primitive’, which is 
fluid and supple, and ‘modern’, which is rigid. Each influences how the segmentarity is 
played out, so for example, in a primitive type of circular segmentarity,  
“centers [sic] already act as so many knots, eyes, or black holes; but they do 
not all resonate together, they do not fall on the same point, they do not 
converge in the same black hole” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 232, emphasis 
in original)  
In contrast, rigid circularities attempt to impose order, drawing lines between these holes 
and knots so that they become attached to a centre. However, crucially, each is still infused 
with the other – the most rigid, ‘modern’ system (Foucault’s prison, for example) is still 
subject to supple ‘primitive’ interactions, just as the most supple, ‘primitive’ society still 
possesses some form of rigid overcoding. And here, it becomes important to think about 
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how these things are played out across space, Deleuze and Guattari for example look at 
state bureaucracy, presumably one of the more rigid ‘modern’ mechanisms 
“It is not sufficient to define bureaucracy by a rigid segmentarity with 
compartmentalization of contiguous offices, an office manager in each 
segment, and the corresponding centralization at the end of the hall or on 
top of the tower. For at the same time there is a whole bureaucratic 
segmentation, a suppleness of and communication between offices, a 
bureaucratic perversion, a permanent inventiveness or creativity practiced 
even against administrative regulations.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 235) 
This becomes similar to Latour’s arguments for the agency of individuals, but allows for a 
more nuanced understanding or how people negotiate how they are placed within a 
system. This is what they term micropolitics. While the macropolitical situation involves the 
imposition of the bureaucratic regime upon a population, micropolitical processes effect 
the spread and extent of the system and, as a result, power centres are defined by what 
they cannot control rather than what they can. Thus, while things can be overcoded by a 
dominant regime, there are always escaping segments, elements that are mutant, that do 
not conform (or that are incompetently managed, see Graeber 2006). The immanence of 
power present in Foucault becomes bound with a relational contingency – as power 
relations emerge, they are bound by the specific circumstances of the spaces and places of 
their emergence and the happenings going on there.  
What should be clear here is that power is not something that is easily reducible to one 
thing, whether this is the ability to dominate or coerce. Power instead is both spatially 
contingent, but also productive. If we examine some of these decentred accounts, then 
power is an outcome of a set of relations (between both humans and non-humans), which 
are altered through the power relations within them. As Allen (2003a) reminds us, power is 
not about simple resource or capability mobilization. Indeed, Allen’s project to reintroduce 
a sense of geography to power is particularly important (see Allen 2003a, 2003b; Allen 
2004; Allen 2007). Whilst reading the accounts of Foucault and Deleuze and Guattari, it can 
be easy to fall into the poststructural trap of deconstructing space so completely that it 
becomes difficult to see one space or relations as significantly different to another – the 
world becomes a melange of interlocking segments with no discernible reason for why 
these spaces/relations are different to any other. Yet to Allen, power is a specific type of 
social relation,  
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“Subjects are constituted by the spacing and timing of their own practices 
as much as they are by those who seek to shape their conduct. As an 
immanent force which constitutes its own organisation, not one imposed 
from above or outside, power is seen as coextensive with its field of 
operation. Power is practised before it is possessed and it is this that gives 
rise to the roundaboutness of power, not some facile notion that it is a 
shadowy force lurking in the murky recesses. The spaces of the everyday 
are the sites through which subjectivity is immanently produced.” (Allen 
2003a, 9, emphasis added) 
Thus, the seemingly mundane and banal practices of the everyday are important in 
mapping out how power plays out across space. Rather than thinking through power as 
pure domination, Allen argues for a nuanced understanding of power and space. Thus, 
while recognising that power is not ‘centred’, we should temper Foucaultian and Deleuzian 
accounts where ‘everything begins to shade into power’ (Allen 2003a, 99) with a 
recognition of the specific relations through which power works, whether this is 
instrumental power (i.e. power as wielded over others) or associational power (i.e. power 
that is developed through connections and solidarities with others). Power is therefore 
defined more by the way it is deployed in space, rather than by the resources it uses. But, if 
power is inherently spatial in its character and deployment, what does this say of one of its 
subcategories -resistance? 
Power is often broken down into themes of domination and resistance, which in turn often 
come bundled together as a simple dichotomy – power is equated to domination, which in 
turns begets resistance as a kind of sub-power. In particular, resistance tends to be 
romanticised as the grand actions taken in full view of a dominating power. However, given 
that we must consider power as more nuanced and subtle, what does this accounting mean 
for our understandings of resistance? For example, Steve Pile (Pile 1997) unpicks the varied 
places and roles of resistance to oppression in society. To him, resistance takes more forms 
than those we can easily ‘see’ as outright rejections of a ruling order. In fact, he argues that 
resistance occurs across a variety of spectrums of society – it is not just about resisting 
control in those spaces that can be easily seen and mapped, and thus resistance has its own 
spatialities. He also, more controversially, calls for accounts of resistance that decouple it 
from a pre-ordered space of power. By this, he means to argue for a more mutable, freer 
form of resistance – it does not only occur in those zones of domination that the dominator 
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can control, instead occurring where people rationalise and actualise their own relations of 
power, and act against them as they see necessary. Thus, while the power to dominate is 
undoubtedly important to our accounts of politics, he calls for a more nuanced account of 
resistance that not only relates to our understandings of how we deal with ‘power’, but 
also how things like anger, desire and capacity (p. 3) all feed into our abilities to resist. This, 
together with a recognition that resistance can occur in many different spaces, not just 
those of oppression, opens up our understandings of how and what people (and things) are 
doing as a form of resistance. Indeed, to Pile, this can be taken on into psycho-analytical 
terms, where, by using Fanon’s attempt to unpick the colonial psyche (Fanon 1963, 1967), 
he argues that resistance is not only about external spaces, but it is the internal will to 
resist and attempt to change the situation that remains important here. 
There have been various attempts at this from a variety of positions. Abu-Lughod (1990) 
sees resistance as a ‘diagnostic’ of power – resistance is shaped by the imposition of power 
and domination (in this case as the institutions of the modern state into Bedouin society). 
By following how resistance is shaped by new forms of power we can see how power 
relations are enacted and performed in historically contingent ways – the playing out of 
power is inherent to producing its own resistance. Indeed, Abu-Lughod is positively 
Foucaultian in her modification of his statement ‘Where there is power, there is resistance’ 
(Foucault 1978, 95-96). In a somewhat different approach, David Graeber, in his attempts 
to theorise an ‘anarchist anthropology’ (Graeber 2004), usefully targets a number of these 
themes. To him, like Pile, revolutionary actions are present in everyday occurrences 
(Graeber 2004, 33) but he also allies this to the role of imagination in producing what he 
terms counterpower. 
“Counterpower is first and foremost rooted in the imagination; it emerges 
from the fact that all social systems are a tangle of contradictions, always to 
some degree at war with themselves. Or, more precisely, it is rooted in the 
relation between the practical imagination required to maintain a society 
based on consensus...the constant work of imaginative identification with 
others that makes understanding possible-and the spectral violence which 
appears to be its constant, perhaps inevitable corollary.” (Graeber 2004, 35) 
Graeber’s concept of counterpower is a distinctly egalitarian project. Not a simple 
opposition of power, it is a reworking of societal values based upon consensus and 
institutions of direct democracy. His anthropological studies of Madagascar lead him to 
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conclude that traditional cultural performances in the French colonial period acted as 
invisible spaces of resistance that were able to emerge and resist the newly independent 
state in the colonial era’s aftermath. These accounts are obviously infused with the 
libertarian ethos of Graeber, but they do highlight how his version of resistance emerges 
from the areas that the dominating power (in this case the state) cannot see. Those areas 
which are seemingly beyond overt displays of domination, such as imagination, work 
together with more visible resistant mechanisms to subvert and eventually remove the 
oppressive regime.  
However, if we read this account in the light of Allen’s accounts of nuanced power, Graeber 
takes us no closer to accounting for resistance as a distinct playing out of power – 
counterpower is still power, just a collaborative, associational type rather than the 
instrumental, dominatory type. To return briefly to Pile, in his account, resistance can exist 
as something separate to domination, and thus its nuances need to be better understood 
by studying it as a specific object. This, it could be argued, is a manifestation of the 
postmodern or cultural turns in geography, whereby political geography has become 
imbued with a sense of the dialectical and psychological. However, the importance of 
unpicking our understandings of resistance remains clear. Indeed, this has been built upon 
by Sharp et al.’s (2000b) introduction to their edited collection. Rejecting, rightly, the overly 
simplistic accounts of power as domination and developing social-movement theory-led 
accounts with a Foucaultian inflection, they argue that, unlike Pile’s (1997) suggestion,  it is 
impossible to separate domination and resistance. While there are varieties of resistance at 
work, these are all at work against something. To me, it follows that while power and 
resistance is not a matter of polar opposites competing against each other, we must look 
across the spectrum of powers and resistances, and see where and how the two are 
distinct and where they are coterminous – how do resistant forms emerge and compete 
with domination?  Not all ‘resistances’ are as egalitarian as Graeber would like, so how do 
they sometimes beget new, albeit modified, dominations? We need to unpick how people 
and groups are entangled into these political systems, how resistance and power may be 
relatively unseen, yet are being played out through space. Resistances are born within the 
structures and spaces of society – as Deleuze would have us believe in the ‘mutant’ ways in 
which strategies are played out across spaces – as well as on the peripheries, in the 
‘imaginative’ spaces of Graeber’s cultural accounting. As Sharp et al remind us, 
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“The relationship between such practices [of claiming, using and defending 
spaces] and the sites wherein they are articulated are mutually constitutive, 
albeit in different ways. Hence, while the strategic mobilisations of 
domination/resistance may constitute particular places as sites of action, the 
material, symbolic and imaginary characteristics of these places will also 
influence the exact effects of such practices.” (Sharp et al. 2000b, 28)  
Thus the specificity of the site imbues resistance with its own characteristics. Thus, as well 
as resistance being a diagnostic of power, after Abu-Lughod, it is also symbiotically 
attached to space. Space helps to define resistance, but resistance also defines space. This, 
of course, should not be surprising given ideas about the social and relational construction 
of space (Massey 1994), but it does make clear that resistance is inherently spatial. In 
addition, looking at the examples given above, there are a number of issues here about the 
scale of action and resistance. These cases focus on local actions against state or larger 
imperial powers, and, given the literature on social action and the politics of scale within 
geography, it is to this which this chapter now turns.  
Summary 
This section has examined some key themes in thinking about power and resistance. Firstly 
it gave an account of how thinking about power has evolved towards a decentred 
approach, where power can emerge anywhere and through many processes. These 
understandings fed into arguments about the nature of resistance. From initial thoughts 
that tried to separate domination from resistance, it has then argued that although these 
are two different aspects of power, and that resistance and domination, after Sharp et al., 
are entangled with each other. In addition, both are also entangled in space – space 
determines the form of resistance, and resistance, in turn determines the form of space. 
Scale 
Scale is something seemingly inherent to much thinking about political geography – as 
Howitt has remarked  
“Scale is a term that easily slips into our discussion because the scaled 
processes of “globalization,” “national sovereignty” and “local action” that are 
the taken-for-granted focuses of so much political geography are so obvious”  
(Howitt 2003, 150-151)  
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Given its background in geopolitics and the study of how the world is divided and bordered, 
political geography has clear links to understanding actors at different scales and their 
interaction, and so it is hardly odd that we must think about how different actors have 
different spatial reaches (see Claval 2006 for an understanding of this evolution). In this 
section of the chapter, following from the ideas of the previous section, we must reflect on 
how thinking geographically about scale is important to our understandings of the 
production and maintenance of power relations. Staeheli (1994) has argued, ‘Through 
struggle, the power relations of society are inscribed in the landscape’ (ibid, 389). Thus, 
social struggle must become dynamic - ‘Political agents and groups must be able either to 
operate at multiple scales or must be able to change the opportunity structure at other 
scales in order to pursue their claims’ (ibid. 388-9). Indeed, the (in)ability of actors and 
groups to transfer their ideas from one scale to another has occupied many geographers, 
see David Harvey (1996) on Raymond Williams’s concept of militant particularisms, for one 
well-known example. Scale then remains important in our understandings. If we take it, 
basically, as ‘a level of representation’ (Smith 2000, 724) then it follows that scale is also 
something that is socially produced and arranged, and this has been a major topic within 
human geography since the early 1990s. This recognition of scale as a social product has 
called into question the usefulness and validity of scale – if it is socially constructed, what 
purpose does it serve, and what social structures does it involve? This section of the 
argument develops these themes, looking at some of the work done by geographers, 
particularly those focussing on how scale operates within political geographies. It then 
moves on to discuss some recent critiques of scale, in particular focussing on how Sallie 
Marston, John Paul Jones II and Keith Woodward (Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005) 
have recently taken issue with scale’s hierarchical nature and argued for a different 
ontological understanding of space. This in turn leads on to the final section of this chapter 
which is concerned with the flattened spaces of a networked understanding of space and 
power. 
Firstly however, we must begin by attempting to define and capture what scale is, which is 
in itself problematic - ‘once scale is constructed, where in the world is it? Scale is not easily 
objectified as a two dimensional space, such as state borders. We cannot touch it or take a 
picture of it’ (Delaney and Leitner 1997, 97). This difficulty in defining what exactly scale is 
and represents has provoked some debate upon the validity of ‘scale’ as we treat it as an 
ontological entity. Following from the definition given by Smith, above, there are of course 
a number of facets to our understanding of scale – Howitt (1998) argues that scale is 
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usually seen as possessing three aspects, size, level and relation. The first two are over-
simplistic renderings of ‘scale’ when taken individually, and so he argues, a relational 
understanding creates scale as a ‘factor in the construction and dynamics of geographical 
totalities – rather than simply a product of geographical relations’ (Howitt 1998, 56). Scale 
is thus not simply about the ‘size’ of a political actor, nor its ‘level’ within a hierarchy, it is 
instead a part of the interweaving geographies of space and place that make up our 
individual understandings of the world. This relational approach is more commonly called 
the ‘socially constructivist approach’ to scale. Marston’s (2000) review of the field suggests 
that there are three main tenets to our understanding of the production of scale. Firstly, 
and following from some earlier points, scale is not ontologically given. It is not an object 
waiting to be discovered ‘out there’. Instead it is social interaction that creates it. The 
second is that these framings have material consequences – scale making is not only 
rhetorical, it has effects upon everyday and macro-level life. Finally, these constructions 
and framings of scale are temporary, contradictory and are politically produced according 
to the prevailing conditions at the time. Politically, then, the world can be seen to be made 
up of a number of structural components, such as supra-national organisations, the state, 
and non-state actors, each of which can interact with the others. Thus, to examine scale, 
we need to examine the interaction between these various organisations/actors and 
determine how the structure of political scale affects them and their ability to act. 
The form that this structuring takes becomes important for political geography as it is this 
which determines the agency and power relations of the various actors in a particular 
space. Here I will briefly mention a few of the more empirical studies of this that have 
taken place. For example, Cox (1998) has attempted to understand where local politics are 
situated within these politics of scale. He argues that localities are both what he calls 
‘spaces of dependence’ and ‘spaces of engagement’ at the same time. Spaces of 
dependence are marked by social relations that mark the place-specific conditions through 
which actors can realize their essential interests. However, these spaces are run through 
with wider sets of connections to regional and global arenas. These are the spaces of 
engagement, and it is through this engagement (and how effective the engagement is) that 
the spaces of dependence are allowed to come into being and continue to exist. While this 
idea has been criticised on a variety of issues (Jones 1998; Judd 1998; Smith 1998), as  
Marston (2000) points out, Cox’s ideas are important as they ground scale not in abstract 
theory, but in the processes that link the ‘local’ to other areas and scales.  
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Another route through scale-thinking is proposed by Brenner (1997, 1998, 2001) who 
initially began thinking about scale by interrogating the processes employed by the state as 
it exists within a global capitalist system. Using Henri Lefebvre’s theories of the state, he 
argues that changes in the planning system in the Federal Republic of Germany reflect not 
a progressive development of phases (like world-system analysis) but are indicative of a 
social construction of scale. The shifting of the state outward towards regional and local 
organisational structures represents an example of the unfolding of capitalism through the 
structures of society. This is what orders the relations of hierarchy between different units 
at different scales. This is similar to Swyngedouw’s concept of ‘Glocalization’ (Swyngedouw 
1997, 2000, 2004) where global capitalist processes are re-territorializing the current 
system of states and cities. This is done by shifting traditionally state-led infrastructures 
both ‘upwards’ towards global level organisations, and ‘downwards’ by devolving power to 
more local or regional configurations.  
What we have then is an increasingly complicated structuring of scale. Rather than thinking 
about things purely in terms of different scales (the body, the community etc.), theorists 
have begun to complicate our understandings of scale and see it as socially produced, and 
this social production crucially occurs across spatial scales, and therefore political action 
occurs across them too. Thus, to Staeheli (1994), it is the ability to move across scales and 
overcome the different problems encountered at each scale that marks out the most 
effective oppositional political groups, and following from this there are numerous studies 
of how actors operate across scales, whether looking at the importance of technology to 
facilitating cross-scale activity (Adams 1996), how individuals attempt to influence 
policymakers (Cidell 2006), or how social movements strategise according to the ways they 
interact with scale (Miller 1994).  
However, this more nuanced and complicated understanding of scale has not been without 
its critics. Most recently, Marston, Woodward and Jones  (2005) have critiqued these ideas 
and argued for a complete abandonment of the use of scale, instead replacing it with a 
‘flat’ networked ontology of space. This is part of their wider project based on the pre-
eminence of the site (Marston, Woodward and Jones 2007; Woodward, Jones and Marston 
2007). Their argument centres on the four criticisms of the above ways of thinking about 
scale. Firstly, operationally, there is a degree of confusion between scale as size (i.e. the 
horizontal measure of scope) and scale as level (as a nested hierarchy of objects) - thus, 
both the horizontal (i.e. the networked, relational ‘flatness’) and the vertical (the hierarchy 
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of power) become blurred and unclear as objects within the same term. Marston et al. 
argue that to privilege scale precludes the fact that  
“one encounters these ‘structures’ not at some level once removed, ‘up 
there’ in a vertical imaginary, but on the ground, in practice, the result of 
marking territories horizontally through boundaries and enclosures, 
documents and rules, enforcing agents and their authoritative 
resources” (Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005, 420) 
Therefore, it becomes more important to privilege the ‘horizontal’, relational aspects of 
this argument over the verticality given in the term scale. Secondly, scalar hierarchies are 
necessarily entangled in a macro-micro distinction (e.g. global-local) which is problematic 
as it encourages a distinction between what happens at local levels as productive of what is 
happening ‘up there’ at the global level – there is no space for blurring between these 
boundaries thanks to the ‘everydayness’ of the relations that are occurring in both these 
spaces. Thirdly, scalar hierarchy is a performative structure, if the ‘levels’ of hierarchy like 
body, district, region are inserted in a work, then the research tends, a priori, to obey the 
assumptions of scale as a given – form determines content in the research. Finally, applying 
scalar hierarchy also applies a top-down, ‘God’s Eye’ (p.422) view to research - the 
researcher becomes transcendent, which corrupts attempts, following Haraway (1991), to 
address the reflexivity and positionality of the researcher. 
Marston et al.’s critique of some of the hierarchical aspects of scale is valid and highlights 
the limits of much scalar thinking. In the place of scale, they try to create a ‘flattened’ 
spatiality which is predicated upon the ‘site’ as a key spatial arena. Drawing upon Deleuze 
and Guattari, DeLanda, and Schatzki, they argue that  
“[The] broad inclusion of orders within sites allows us to account for the 
presence and affective capacity of relatively stable objects and practices that 
continuously draw each other into relation and resurface in social life. Such a 
strategy avoids misrepresenting the world as utterly chaotic and retains the 
capacity to explain those orders that produce effects upon localized practices” 
(Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005, 425) 
By developing the site as the ontological space of interaction between objects and 
assemblages that cohere together, they begin to take apart the idea of scale. It is important 
to point out at this point that Marston et al.’s deconstruction is only limited. The article 
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itself is meant as the beginnings of thinking about scale in this way, but more crucially can 
be critiqued on a number of other levels. Of these critiques, many come from a series of 
comments upon the article from a later issue of Transactions. For instance, Leitner and 
Miller (2007) and Hoefle (2006) have taken issue with the removal of scale as one of the 
key units of geographical analysis. Collinge (2006) has argued for the adoption of a 
Latourian, actor-network theory inspired blend to this space (but more on ANT and Latour 
later).  
However, the adoption of a ‘flat’ ontology contains another set of problems, as, while they 
argue against a fetishisation of a language of ‘flows’ and ease of movement, Marston et 
al.’s conception of the linked sites and spaces emphasises the unfolding and evolving 
nature of these sites. Whilst this is no doubt important, it is also important to consider how 
the relational nature of these sites form a series of networks which can both enable and 
hinder the ‘connectivity’ of these spaces. The site, while an open arena of political 
interaction, is at the same time closed by a variety of structures and relations that can 
prevent certain actions from occurring. So, while it is true that, connections in a site can be 
over a vast geographical distance, especially in the contemporary world, there remains a 
tension within the work of Jones, Marston and Woodward whereby actors can act 
seemingly without limits, whereas they are in fact hindered by a variety of relations, some 
of which are beyond the limits of the site itself. To take an extreme example, a nomadic 
farmer in rural Tibet, while aware of constraints placed upon him/her through the 
landscape and through interactions with local communities and communist party officials, 
is constrained by other, wider influences, such as market conditions for his/her goods, 
Chinese Communist Party policy on how best to manage the land and the impact of 
domestic and foreign aid agencies in the area. Thus, while the farmer has a degree of 
agency within the system, and the site is intimately connected to wider arenas, the 
connections between the two are not necessarily clear, clean or smooth. The ‘flatness’ of 
these ontologies thus becomes crumpled and uneven, suggesting a more rigid and 
hierarchical structure, which may not extend ‘upwards’, but instead flows around and 
through the various sites of political action.  
This is a more subtle problem than I suggest here and indeed, I find Marston et al.’s site 
ontology a useful critique of most scalar thinking, but the limits to site-based ontological 
studies of politics privileging the site means creating an understanding of the connectivity 
of the assemblages contained with and around them. If (as we have seen above, through 
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Cox) spaces are run through with the influences of connections with other areas, or dare I 
say scales, many of these connections may be unseen to the research. This is of course, 
preferable to assuming a ‘God’s Eye’ view, but as a result, an analysis of a site becomes 
difficult to establish as anything other than a brief, momentary alignment of 
objects/peoples/things within a place, and the ability to produce a mapping of systems that 
extend beyond the site and become more spatially extensive becomes more difficult. This 
difficulty will become more clear through the rest of the thesis, particularly in considering 
the methodological component of the research, but it is with this site-based ontology in 
mind that I turn towards thinking through space, and in particular, a networked 
understanding of the spatial, that I now examine in the final section of this chapter. 
Summary 
This section has explored some of the key trends in thinking about scale in geography. By 
examining some of these, it has argued that while scale has been important in many ways 
to our understanding of political actions, that it has also been critiqued by Marston, Jones 
and Woodward as being too hierarchical. This critique has argued for a reassessment of the 
spatial towards an emphasis on the site, and, while problematic in some of its assumptions, 
it offers an insight into the a more vibrant and opportune space, where assemblages of 
objects can come together to affect political change. 
Networks 
The conceptual importance of networks has become increasingly important in recent 
thinking, especially in our understandings of the political. This is based to a large degree 
upon two strands of work, one that has decentred power relations and another that has 
attempted to ‘flatten’ space and show how scales are based upon interactions and not 
stratified hierarchies. Thus, this section builds upon the previous two and develops some of 
the ideas inherent in them in order to show how a networked understanding of the socio-
spatial can be useful to our understandings of political resistance. It begins by thinking 
through the work of what is generally known as ‘actor-network theory’ (ANT), one of the 
most important schools in the emergence within geography of these networked 
understandings of space. Emerging from a Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
background, ANT has become known primarily through the work of Bruno Latour, but in 
order to fully address the topic, it is also necessary to take into account the likes of John 
Law, Anne-Marie Mol and Michel Callon, amongst others. ANT is primarily known through 
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its raising of the agency of non-human actors to a level equal to human actors, however, 
there are also a number of other issues which need to be critiqued within it, concerned 
primarily within its construction of the political and its structures of domination. Thus, 
while recognising that ANT has done the social sciences a service by opening up grounds of 
human and non-human engagement, I also wish to go into more detail on the work of 
Deleuze and Guattari and think through some of their ideas on wider politics and the 
nature of domination and resistance. Here their development of the idea of the 
assemblage, particularly as subsequently developed by Manuel DeLanda (Delanda 2006), 
have both similarities with ANT, but have crucially allowed for a greater degree of political 
activity within them. This examination of how these two threads of network-led theory will 
tie together the previous sections and bring out the broad trends of the thesis as a whole. 
Although it is often noted that it does not conform to any recognizable standard of a 
coherent ‘theory’, and is difficult to represent as any one thing (see Law 1999, 1), it is clear 
that there are a number of elements that can be marked out as specific to ANT. By 
developing the linkages between social and technological aspects of (primarily) scientific 
procedures and activities, it developed in the 1980s as a form of mapping out of material 
and semiotic relations. Two of the most well known early examples of ANT are Law (1986; 
see also Law 2000) and Latour (1987). These two works neatly show how the world 
according to ANT works. Law takes apart the imperial voyages of Portugal in the Indian 
Ocean, and shows how it was crucially a combination of human activity together with 
technological advancements in shipbuilding and navigation that allowed Portugal to extend 
its maritime control and develop its imperial network and dominate trade in the area. This 
account develops the networks of relations between people and things within and around 
the ships as they moved through the sea between various trading posts. These networks 
are mutable over time, as the increasing connections brought about by technological 
advancement create new scenarios and sets of relations that are in themselves open to 
new interventions as new technologies/connections/interventions occur. Latour’s account 
is more concerned with the role of science within society in general, but in particular he 
focuses on the role of collection of scientific data collection on European voyages of 
discovery in the 15th and 16th centuries. Less concerned with the connections that occur 
within these technologies than Law, Latour develops the idea of circulation, where 
successive voyages of discovery collect more and more information about a particular 
place, these are then taken back to a ‘centre’ where the data is collated and stored. Further 
voyages find out more information and develop the existing accounts in the centre and 
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thus more and more knowledge is gained about a particular area, through which it is 
eventually possible to gain more substantial information than the indigenous people, who 
can then be controlled from the centre, in a seemingly straightforward power/knowledge 
relationship. These two works develop some of the key themes of ANT – that of agency 
being dispersed through humans and non-humans on an equal basis, that of connection 
between these various actants (more on these later) and finally that these connections are 
temporary and liable to change. 
From these two articles, we can get a general idea of what ANT asks us to believe about the 
nature of the world, and few would argue with claims that we are all connected to various 
things in various ways. However, ANT emerges from a particular construction of ‘the social’ 
that asks us to do away with what we may call a ‘traditional’ conception of society.  Latour 
developed some of these ideas in his critique of the idea of modernity (Latour 1993). The 
work of scientific modernity, since Hobbes and Boyle according to Latour, has been to distil 
from the mess of connections in the world a series of dichotomies, most particularly, 
nature/society. This act of separation creates a human-centric viewpoint, where nature, 
even though we have imagined and created it, simply exists outside our control, while 
society is something that is controllable, yet we have not imagined or created this. Crucial 
to this distinction is that nature and society remain separate and never meet, yet this is 
clearly not the case in reality. To Latour, writing in the early 1990s, processes such as the 
destruction of the ozone layer and the threat of global warming combine the two in a 
hybrid of nature and society. These proliferating hybrids which contain nature and society 
defy the modern act of separation and, as a result, we must rethink our understandings of 
science, society and nature to encompass hybrids of nature/society.  
A similar viewpoint is taken and developed by Law (2004) who, when considering how 
methods influence our work, argues that most research inscribes certain aspects of what 
we find, but also excises a great deal of what is actually going on – this he refers to as the 
‘mess’ which inhabits the world that is left by our construction of it as a series of neat 
methodological boxes. Given that we are so clearly involved in the writing of our research, 
and the playing out of our methods, then this becomes a political action – what we do and 
how we construct it becomes a clearly political act of constructing a ‘correct’ version of 
social reality. By recognising this and performing research (and by this I mean all aspects, 
from planning through to writing) that recognises that the nature of research can be fluid, 
mutable and sometimes vague and ephemeral, Law constructs a different research agenda. 
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I want to return to this point later on in my discussions of the thesis’s methodology, but 
here it is important to recognise that, like Latour, Law is involved in his own deconstruction 
of the social world, one which asks us to abandon the idea that the social can be neatly 
parcelled up and think instead in terms of fluidity, translation, and connection between 
places. 
But, given this reshaping of the social landscape, what does this mean for politics and the 
power struggles contained within it? By opening up the categories of what we can include 
as actors within society to encompass non-human as well as human actors, ANT forces a 
reassessment of agency. Callon and Law (1995) argue that agency emerges because and 
through the establishment of collectifs – ‘emergent effect[s] created by the interaction of 
the heterogenous parts that make it up’ (Callon and Law 1995, 485). The relations between 
a series of actors perform, and thus perform agency. Unpicking these collectifs decentres 
the subject, and establishes the ‘human’ as a series of connections and relations, exactly 
the same as the ‘non-human’. But crucially, because of these connections and relations, 
and through their collection in a centre of power or management, something they compare 
to the panopticon (Callon and Law 1995, 493), a strategy can emerge as the various parts of 
the collectif function together. Thus, while decentring the subject and placing it as multiple 
within the collectif, there still exist forms of hierarchical relationship (see Law 1994, 121-
123, for more on this). Crucially, all of these are materially constituted within the world, 
and are materially heterogenous, that is, they are made up of lots of different things – 
architectures, texts, conversations and so on. Thus the world becomes more and more 
complicated as we can introduce new elements to these networks as they extend with and 
across space, and so ANT has in turn forced a reassessment of the nature of spatiality. 
By questioning the pre-eminence of the social and building a more detailed, narrative 
understanding of organisations, ANT has performed a dual function – not only decentring 
the individual as mentioned above, but also decentring the world and its organisation, thus 
‘flattening’ the world into a series of connections and relations which need to be followed 
to understand them. This is done, not by understanding space as a flat, Euclidean plane 
populated by objects which can be easily represented and mapped. Instead, ANT typically 
takes on an understanding of space derived from the mathematical concept of topology. 
Mol and Law describe topological space thus: 
“...topology doesn’t localize objects in terms of a given set of coordinates. 
Instead, it articulates different rules for localizing in a variety of coordinate 
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systems. Thus it doesn’t limit itself to the three standard axes, X, Y and Z, but 
invents alternative systems of axes. In each of these, another set of 
mathematical operations is permitted which generates its own ‘points’ and 
‘lines’. These do not necessarily map on to those generated in an alternative 
axial system. Even the activity of ‘mapping’ itself differs between one space 
and another. Topology, in short, extends the possibilities of mathematics far 
beyond its original Euclidean restrictions by articulating other spaces.” (Mol 
and Law 1994, 643, emphasis in original) 
This topological understanding multiplies our understandings of space in which operations 
and interactions can take place. To Mol and Law, these are threefold. Firstly, regions, in 
which objects are clustered, and which boundaries can be constructed around. Secondly, 
networks are defined by the distance and difference between the various components. The 
functioning of the relations defines how ‘connected’ and therefore how distant they are 
from each other. Difference between objects is marked out by the variety of relations 
between objects. Thus, the first two spaces create a seemingly typical spatial map – areas 
can be marked by boundaries as we discover them, but are also run through with a variety 
of connections that work through and across these bounded spaces. However, it is the 
third type of space – fluids – that Mol and Law argue is important. These fluid spaces are 
marked by neither boundaries nor networks. Boundaries can appear or disappear, and 
things may leak between them. Sometimes, relations may transform, but not in a way that 
implies a fracture or boundary or even a difference between the two. Thus, relations and 
collectifs can be mutable systems - changes occur within and between objects that allow 
for an effect similar to translation.  
All of this means,  
“...instead of thinking in terms of surfaces – two dimension – or spheres – 
three dimension – one is asked to think in terms of nodes that have as many 
dimensions as they have connections. As a first approximation, the ANT [sic] 
claims that modern societies cannot be described without recognizing them as 
having a fibrous, thread-like, wiry, stringy, ropy, capillary character that is 
never captured by the notions of levels, layers, territories, spheres, categories, 
structure, systems.” (Latour 1997, 2) 
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To Latour then, ANT is a form of material resistance. Instead of taking universal laws 
of science and ‘the social’ as the starting point for a ‘reinjection’ of things we must 
instead learn to place these networked understandings of space/place/thing at the 
forefront of our production of the world. 
What does this mean for our production of the politics of contestation? While Latour 
has set out his arguments for a more networked political ecology (Latour 2004), he 
has a somewhat ambivalent relationship to ‘radical’ politics. This can be further 
extended when taking into account much of the rest of the ANT literature, which, 
unsurprisingly given its background in STS, does not deal with resistant politics. 
Exceptions are clearly seen within the recent work of sociologist Andrew Barry (Barry 
2001) and more recently Paul Routledge within geography (Routledge 2008; 
Routledge, Cumbers and Nativel 2007). However Routledge’s accounts of ANT are 
clearly heavily influenced by the work of Latour at the expense of some of the other 
theorists of ANT.  
Despite these works on a networked politics, there is a tension within ANT in its 
production of the social realm and how it deals with large social processes, most 
obviously with its ability to speak about and for unequal political relations. This is 
most clearly seen in the work of Law and Latour cited earlier in this chapter whilst 
thinking about power in the construction of colonial regimes and centres of power. 
By developing ideas about the production of the colonial space, the two ANT 
theorists produce a system which in which the colonised remain curiously absent. 
This is an unfortunate omission, and has been taken further by Elam (1999) and 
Haraway (1992) who, dealing specifically with Latour’s work, recognize that he does 
not adequately develop the non-human sections of ANT, usually relying upon the 
interactions of men and machines and ignoring the possibility of non-machinic non-
humans existing. More crucially Latour’s ANT ignores the sets of connections 
between the various non-human actors in the network, and this creates a network 
that is still human-centred despite Latour’s claims to the contrary. Latour’s 
production of ‘the modern’ and its associated critique of it remain limited as a result. 
His modernity is one that is ‘purified’ by the decisions he makes as to what is 
included and what is excluded. Latour’s account of space then is only a partial 
reassessment of society, excluding some key non-human actors, and importantly, it 
is the researcher here who is in control of this limited writing of reality.  
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While these critiques are predominantly concerned with the work of Latour, they do 
have a degree of prescience to ANT as a whole, as many of the other key figures 
within it can be faulted for only dealing with a human/machine system of 
interaction. These concerns have led to a degree of reassessment, with claims to 
now be ‘after’ ANT occurring (Law and Hassard 1999). However, none of these claims 
have really begun to start thinking about the politics of doing a networked 
understanding of the political. Thinking back to Latour’s account of power, we can 
see a flattened account of power being passed through actants in a network (the 
rugby ball analogy) but little is said about a wider understanding of contestation and 
opposition. To stretch the rugby analogy, what happens when there is a scrum, or 
ruck?6  
In order to understand what a politics of networks could entail, I here revert to 
thinking about the work of Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, whose work has been 
influential to some ANT ideas. ANT is explicitly about actors as things that have the 
potential power to influence their surroundings. As such, Deleuze and Guattari’s 
concepts of the rhizome and assemblage represent significant influences upon ANT’s 
networked understanding of the social realm. The vitality of the social (and by 
extension, political) worlds of Deleuze are created by the filling up of what would 
seemingly be dead space by emphasizing not oneness but multiplicity. Rather than 
thinking in terms of wholes, taking the idea of the rhizome from the natural sciences, 
they argue we should be thinking in terms of assemblages. Space is made up of 
rhizomatic filaments that can be accreted into tubers in places, but crucially these 
accretions form only a part of the assemblage. Similar to the networked imaginary of 
Latour, 
“A rhizome ceaselessly establishes connections between semiotic chains, 
organizations of power, and circumstances relative to the arts, sciences and 
social struggles...a rhizome or multiplicity never allows itself to be overcoded, 
never has available a supplementary dimension over and above its number of 
lines, that is, over and above the multiplicity of numbers attached to those 
lines. All multiplicities are flat, in the sense that they fill or occupy all of their 
dimensions: we will therefore speak of a plane of consistency of multiplicities, 
                                                          
6
 We must also acknowledge that rugby carries with it a certain number of masculine overtones, and 
so this particular rendering of politics as sport conjures up certain ‘alpha-male’ images of 
competition. 
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even though the dimensions of this “plane” increase with the number of 
connections that are made on it.” (Deleuze and Guattari 1987, 8-9) 
In the rhizome, everything is an interconnected assemblage of parts, even if connections 
are unseen, for example, humans can be connected to animals through bacterium and viral 
infections. The multiplicity of parts becomes an assemblage through connection with 
different elements. This is crucial in Deleuze’s immanent conception of the world, where 
fluid and temporary relations abound in the multiplicity of assemblages.  
Politically, this vitality is important as it allows for an unfolding of possibilities. Indeed, the 
rhizome, with its ethos of non-hierarchical organisation has become important to some 
anarchist groups as an organising principle (Marshall 2007, 696). The ability to connect with 
things gives a greater degree of potential for a more radical politics to develop. This makes 
Deleuze and Guattari’s philosophy a profoundly optimistic thread of political action, where, 
rather than thinking through things in terms of obstacles and blockages, we can think of 
options and connections. This has meant that politics becomes more contingent – the 
playing out of political possibilities depends upon the unfolding connections, blockages, 
extensions and receptions of these filaments throughout specific spaces and places.  
However, Deleuze and Guattari’s plane of immanence is not uncontested. Massey (2005), 
building on critiques by Miller (1993), Kaplan (1996) and Katz (1996), argues that the binary 
molar-molecular system created in A Thousand Plateaus, rather than encouraging 
multiplicity, in fact denies agency to other places and areas. The very existence of these 
spaces as binary continues to propagate other binaries. Rather than creating multiple 
identities, instead we revert to dualisms of developed and undeveloped – minority 
subjectivities are defined by their oppositional state to dominant regimes. Thus, the 
rhizomatic and micropolitical ideas of Deleuze and Guattari fail to recognise the position of 
relative power they inhabit. The bipolar, smoothed/striated spaces of their work in fact 
work more to obliterate the many different forms of understanding that run through space.  
As Massey continues, a further set of problems emerge when we consider the openness of 
space (Massey 2005, 174-175). This problem emerges most clearly in the work of Michael 
Hardt and Antonio Negri in their widely read Empire (2000) and Multitude (2004). Here, 
while proposing a new, rhizomatic form of resistance in the form of the Multitude, they slip 
into speak of the multitude as a pure arena of smooth space, missing the necessary 
heterogeneity of political action within its ranks. This eliminates any form of spatial 
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specificity within the Multitude (or in Empire either). Indeed, one of the most disappointing 
aspects of Multitude is its lack of any engagement with any real understandings of how 
political movements like the WTO protests in Seattle actually worked. Instead, they are 
held as examples of an unproblematic solidarity where there is little or no negotiation 
between different actors/movements. Space, then, becomes completely smooth and open 
to flows and we find ourselves drawn to a similar argument to that which closed the last 
section – neither a space of completely flat, smooth flows of information, nor one of closed 
and structured order between political actors exists, despite the theoretical advantages 
that both propose. 
Rather than dismiss the rhizome and similar thinking though, as mentioned above, the 
potential for reworking and reordering political action remains somewhere within it, 
especially when countered against its more ordered, scalar counterparts. So, rather than 
becoming transfixed by the sometimes relentless polarity of Deleuze and Guattari, what we 
need to do is begin to think more clearly about how we can negotiate this problematic 
boundary between open/closed space, and smooth and striated. 
Summary 
This section has discussed how so-called ‘networked’ understandings of space have created 
specific understandings of the socio-political. Taking as its starting point the work of actor-
network theory (ANT), it has shown the various useful ways that it has attempted its own 
reassessment of the social. However, it has argued that ANT has not adequately developed 
an understanding of inequality and resistant politics to complement its reworking of 
scientific practices. Instead, it has argued that adopting a more Deleuzo-Guattarian 
understanding of the unfolding possibilities of space allows for a more radically contingent 
account of the political. 
Conclusions 
Power, scale and networks have all become clear theoretical parts of the political 
geography tradition. This chapter has given an overview of selected threads of these 
understandings, focussing in particular on post-structural accounts of the spatial that foster 
a more nuanced sense of the agency of political actors. By taking account of the way that 
power, and more particularly the power processes of domination and resistance, I have 
argued for a decentred understanding of power, where domination and resistance are 
entangled amongst each other. This decentred account of power has necessitated an 
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understanding of scale within politics, where it was argued that entangling power relations 
within space necessitates a move towards an ontologically driven understanding of space 
that emphasizes the site as a key location of political action. In order to develop an idea of 
how this flattened socio-political world can actually be played out in some sort of practical 
way, the chapter turned towards thinking about networks as a key theoretical tool to 
understand what is actually going on in the world.  
This chapter established much of the overarching theoretical ground that this thesis will 
travel through. It argued for a poststructural appreciation of space, driven by networked 
understanding of the social. However, it must be recognised that these networked political 
formulations create some problematic issues for our understandings of space. Most clearly 
accounted for when thinking about work on scale and networks themselves, what becomes 
clear is the tension between how we can begin to understand the ways that space and 
place are intimately connected to ‘other’ areas. This tension is something that the thesis 
attempts to work a pathway through. The next chapter on methodology sets up the ways in 
which the research attempted to understand and account for the differences between 
‘local’ and ‘global’ in ethnography, and the themes also emerge through many of the 
empirical aspects of the research. 
To return at the end of this largely theoretical chapter to some more empirical matters, 
Tibet is often conflated with a number of themes. From Shangri-La, to part of the ‘new age’ 
movement, Tibet, like any nation/imagined community, means many things to many 
people. Even by concentrating on the political aspects of Tibet, it becomes clear that there 
is a great deal of interconnection between various elements and filaments of the semiotic 
object that is ‘Tibet’ and its supporters. Unlike the flattened and unproblematic solidarities 
of Hardt and Negri’s Multitude, the pro-Tibet Movement is run-through with relations 
between different groups and actors. From the problematic solidarities between Tibetan 
and non-Tibetan activists, competing strategic ideas about the best path for future political 
engagement with the Chinese, the changing and fluid nature of Tibetan identity, and the 
mundanities of everyday office politics, this thesis travels through aspects of all of them. 
The empirical chapters of this thesis each deal with a set of networks connected to one 
particular theme. Within each, it should be possible to see the various ways in which these 
interconnect with the other chapters and more aspects of Tibet besides. Given what this 
chapter has said, it cannot claim to offer a complete understanding of the Tibet Movement; 
however, it offers a nuanced account of the workings of politics in and through these 
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various situations and sites. Indeed, it is my contention throughout this thesis that politics, 
and particularly the politics of Tibet, needs to be understood in these more relational and 
networked ways in order to produce critical commentaries that are able to begin to move 
sympathetically through the landscapes that we as researchers travel through. Rather than 
cutting through these political movements and assuming that we can eventually gain a 
perfect knowledge of them, instead, we must recognise that there are other 
epistemological systems and at work which may be beyond the comprehension of the 
research. This raises issues of how we can effectively study a world of unfolding 
possibilities, and so next I turn to the methodology of the thesis. 
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Chapter 3 – Networked and Fluid Ethnography 
 
Introduction 
This chapter develops the theoretical ideas of the last chapter by exploring their impacts 
upon the methods necessary to understand a ‘networked’ political action. Actor-network 
theorists have traditionally engaged with doing ‘fieldwork’ of some sort, from Mol’s clinical 
studies (Mol 2002) to Law’s (1994) and Latour’s (1986) studies of social processes at work 
in laboratories. However, while works like Law’s ‘After Method’ (2004) purport to be about 
methodology, they are more concerned with the theory of ‘being’ and understanding the 
underlying processes of being an ANT researcher, and consequently do not consider in 
much depth how one actually goes about doing a networked piece of research that 
attempts to understand what is going on ‘in the world’.  
I argue that, methodologically, networked accounts of politics need to become more 
engaged with ideas circulating through anthropology and ethnographic fieldwork. In 
particular, there is a need here to engage with the role of spatially extensive networks (i.e. 
those that extend beyond the confines of a particular, spatially limited, site) and address 
how political activities can stretch across and through the spaces we are involved in as 
researchers. Anthropology and other areas involved in ethnographic methods have long 
been concerned with understandings of spaces that fit into spatially larger ‘systems’ (Nash 
1981). Given the increasing speed and frequency of communications across the world, it is 
unsurprising that those writing about ethnographic methods have begun to consider the 
ability of ethnography to help understand these flows and movements. In particular, I focus 
on the ideas that have emerged around so-called multi-site ethnography, including the 
related ‘global ethnography’ that have attempted to understand how an ethnographic 
research method can be situated within and effectively interrogate a social arena that is 
spatially extensive. 
Concerned with transnational political networks, this thesis is centrally placed to comment 
upon these ideas. The Tibet Movement, although numerically small, is reliant upon its 
global network of supporters, both Tibetans in exile and non-Tibetans. By attempting to 
‘see’ these networks in my capacity as a researcher, it was necessary to evolve a research 
plan that allowed an understanding of the Tibet Movement and its various connections to 
emerge through the networks. This involves a process of research planning that allows one 
to be in the sites of the Tibet Movement, examining and attempting to understand the 
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production, maintenance, and sometimes, the collapse of these networks within and 
around the spaces. Rather than simply using ethnographic methods to supplement ANT’s 
methodological lack, it is therefore a necessity to readdress the ways in which both ANT 
and ethnographic methods are conducted. The fluid nature of the spaces of ANT and the 
spatial extensity of ethnography require a method that is adaptable to both. By examining 
the anthropological and ethnographic work done on understanding the world today, I begin 
to build an idea of how we can begin to understand how we can study political action 
within and across space. 
The chapter begins by exploring how ANT theorists have developed their methodological 
field, particularly examining how their attempts to do empirical research have (or haven’t) 
produced a research method to accompany their theoretical influence. Following this, I 
then think about what writings on ethnographic methods could offer to a networked piece 
of research. These are then used to describe the empirical research process undertaken 
here. These sections, as well as laying out how the research was planned and empirically 
took place, will also contain a necessary examination of my own position within the 
networks and assemblages of the Tibet Movement. 
Actor-network theory’s impacts on method 
While there are a great deal of people who have worked on ANT, the number who have 
written extensively about the methods of ‘doing’ ANT remains limited. In Organizing 
Modernity John Law begins to think about how, in his construction of modernity, one can 
actually go about doing an ethnography of materially heterogenous relations.  
“I could talk of ethnographic research methods as if they were clear-cut, fixed 
and impersonal. I could pretend that there was no interaction between what I 
observed and myself as an observer. But, as I’ve indicated, I believe that this 
would be wrong because ethnography is also a story of research – and in some 
measure a tale about the ethnographer as well. And, though perhaps in a 
smaller way, it is in addition about the way in which the ethnographer acts 
upon her subject matter” (Law 1994, 4) 
This insight into Law’s understanding of ethnographic methods provides a number of 
avenues into what he, and wider ANT theorists, think about the role of methods in 
empirical research. Firstly, there is no real definition of what he means by ethnography, 
does this mean ethnographic participant observation (most definitely) or can this include 
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ethnographic interviewing of participants or any of the other specific techniques that can 
be grouped under the umbrella of ‘ethnography’ (possibly, but we cannot be sure). 
Secondly, Law suggests that ethnography consists not only of observing a place, but is also 
implicitly about ways of being within a particular place. Most ethnographic methods, as we 
shall see later in this chapter are intimately concerned with how the field and researcher fit 
together, in particular the ways in which the researcher must negotiate and discipline their 
relations to the research participants. Thirdly, and almost unspoken by Law, there is also an 
acceptance of ethnography as the preeminent research method for ANT – no other 
techniques are mentioned (at an extreme level, however, it is difficult to imagine a purely 
quantitative networked piece of research). What I aim to do in this section is to move over 
some of the ideas that Law has considered. Most importantly, how does a networked 
method actually emerge in the work I have cited in the previous chapter? Crucially, I want 
to think not only about why ethnography would seem to be the most useful set of methods 
available to us as researchers, but also think about the ways that an ANT-led research 
practice lead to very particular understandings of the ethnography.  
ANT, throughout its history, has been devoted to observing and untangling the threads and 
connections that run through ontological reality. From Latour spending time in with the 
engineers of ARAMIS (Latour 1996), Law spending time in a laboratory (Law 1994), Mol in 
hospitals (Mol 2002) and clinics and Barry at political events (Barry 2001), ANT clearly 
necessitates an empirical understanding of the world. However, even in these places, ANT 
does not really speak of what methods are used, instead making claims about the nature of 
reality, often with little reference to how the researcher fits into this system. For example, 
Latour’s ARAMIS discusses how he conducted his ethnography, and presumes to speak for 
the machine itself as an actor, yet he pays little attention to how he as an 
author/researcher fits into this system. These claims to seeming objectivity by ANT sit 
awkwardly with feminist critiques from Haraway (Haraway 1991, 1992). While ANT writers 
claim only partial perspectives and understandings of these networks, they often presume 
to speak for the various non-human actors within these networks as if they can be 
knowable and understood from a human perspective. The networks become decentred 
and mapped, but the researcher often manoeuvres through the networks seemingly 
smoothly. This process of the researcher becoming an immutable object of interpretation 
and, by extension, an arbiter of what the research is and who is allowed to speak in it 
remains a problematic aspect of ANT’s methodological philosophy. 
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John Law’s work represents something of an exception here, as the quote that began this 
section highlights. Of all the theorists of ANT, he has most often engaged with these 
questions of method. In his most extensive engagement with these ideas, After Method 
(Law 2004) he places method itself as more than just a set of techniques; 
“...method is not just what is learned in textbooks and the lecture hall, or 
practised in ethnography, survey research, geological field trips, or at 
laboratory benches. Even in these formal settings it also ramifies out into and 
resonates with materially and discursively heterogenous relations which are, 
for the most part, invisible to the methodologist. And method, in any case, is 
also found outside such settings. So method is always much more than its 
formal accounts suggest.” (Law 2004, 144) 
Instead, he argues that method is integral to the way social worlds are produced. So, the 
very ways in which research is performed serve to reinforce or weaken different 
hegemonic social strategies. So, the dominant, ‘Western’ discourses of scientific modernity 
serve to silence the possible ‘other worlds’ that are present in places like indigenous 
knowledges. To Law, the inability of traditional method to understand the messy areas 
which cannot be purified under the principles of enlightenment-era science means that we 
cannot treat is as an objective statement of discovering the truth of reality ‘out there’ in 
the field. Instead, method is performative of particular renderings of the social, and it is 
through repeated performances that hegemonic understandings of ‘social science’ are 
solidified. This is not to say that these are immutable though, and variations in the 
performance of these methods mean that they change over time, and have at least the 
potential to be reworked. To Law, this reworking must take the form of a more decentred 
account of method that examines the different ways of constructing ‘the social’ – the other 
worlds of indigenous understandings of space and time should be incorporated and not 
excised from the ‘pure’ spaces of enlightened modernity.  
While these points are valid, it seems to me that Law, in attempting to shift our 
understanding of methods, does something of a disservice to ethnography as a technique 
by ignoring the many ways in which people have sought to answer some of the very 
questions he poses in After Method. These questions can include how does writing our 
‘field’ influence our conclusions and findings? And, how do we cope with the ‘mess’ that is 
the nature of our everyday research worlds? With this in mind, I turn to the next section 
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which examines the ways in which ethnography, and to a lesser extent anthropology, has 
engaged with political studies of spatially extensive systems. 
Networked Ethnography – Spaces and Sites of Action 
The Tibet movement consists of various organisations, individuals and objects scattered 
across the world. Engaging ethnographically with the various constituent parts of this 
movement necessitates a form of study that can react and move with these different 
components. Following on from Marston et al.’s (Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005) 
ideas about the site in the last chapter, we can think here about ethnography as a fluid and 
vibrant source of engagement around a particular place. Here, I follow Steve Herbert 
(2000) in thinking about ethnography as a research method which relies upon the process 
of participant observation, with themes emerging from this participation, combined with 
periods of reflection. Through ethnography we attempt to uncover differential relations, 
the bindings that hold these relations together and the way they are also fragile and can 
fall apart. Indeed understandings that place ethnographic explorations of the local as being 
at the heart of extensive spatial systems are not new. Vincent (1990) and Clifford (1997) 
have shown that anthropologists traditionally placed the people they study within such 
systems, but the disciplining of ‘academic’ Anthropology in the post-WW2 period led to a 
closing off of these themes, instead replacing them with in-depth studies of localities. This 
is not to say that ethnography, and its close relation anthropology, has not engaged with 
the idea of ‘the global’ more recently. Anthropology has long been concerned with 
ethnographic methods and their relevance to ‘the site’ and how wider global systems can 
be interpreted through ethnographic methods (Appadurai 2000). There is obviously more 
to anthropological field work than ‘classical’ studies involving years spent in a particular 
community (Dresch and James 2000, 22), and there is a tension inherent within 
anthropology in general and ethnography in particular as to what the ‘field’ is and what its 
limits are (Amit 2000; Gupta and Ferguson 1997). These have unpicked how ‘being in the 
field’ is not simply a matter of being outside one’s usual space, but involves a disciplining of 
the researcher as they exist both within and around the field, and also how they reflect 
upon ‘the field’ when outside it (see also Powell 2002, for an explicitly geographical 
account).  
In line with this, although there is a long history of political study in anthropology (see 
Vincent 2002), ethnographic studies of the political have become increasingly visible (Blom 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001, 2005; Joseph, Mahler and Auyero 2007; Vincent 2002). These 
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include studies of politics within specific localities, but have also attempted to address 
spatially extensive nature of politics. There are many attempts to capture a wider ‘global’ 
system within an ethnographic study, but I focus here on one of the most famous of series 
of attempts, that of multi-site ethnography, made famous by Marcus (1998), which has 
attempted to address some of the problems of doing a postmodern/postcolonial 
ethnography in the present funding climate where it has become difficult to undertake 
long-term anthropological studies.  
Multi-site ethnography is an attempt to approach our subject as it appears in various 
places, studying it in the multiple sites that it emerges in. In this way, the subject is more 
readily visible to the researcher, and its tale of how it fits into the larger system around it 
can be told.  
“Multi-sited research is designed around chains, paths, threads, conjunctions, 
or juxtapositions of locations in which the ethnographer establishes some 
form of literal, physical presence, with an explicit, posited logic of association 
or connection among sites that in fact defines the argument of the 
ethnography” (Marcus 1998, 90) 
It follows that the ethnographer’s job is then to ‘follow’ these chains and threads, whether 
these be of people, things, metaphors or allegories through the various sites that they 
emerge in. In many ways, this remains a very traditional way of performing ethnography – 
the essential practice the researcher is performing is of translation of idioms/languages 
from one site into another. There are problems here – on one level, as Marcus points out, 
most of these ethnographic translations are done for the benefit of Anglo-American voices 
(Marcus 1998, 85). This hinders any form of multi-lingual multi-sitedness that allows the 
voices and worlds of others to emerge through the research. On a more methodological 
level, the limited time spent engaging with a topic in its multiple environments can be 
critiqued as anathema to the ‘traditional’ type of anthropological study that involves 
prolonged engagement with a subject. While multi-sited ethnography can speak to a 
spatially plural research topic, it cannot cope with the simultaneity of events in the 
contemporary ‘globalised’ world particularly well. Being in lots of different sites gets one a 
degree of understanding of how individual areas work, but when ‘global’ events are 
occurring, we are still only observing one particular place, despite how interconnected it is 
to a wider spatial area. Finally, similar to the problems of ANT’s accountability to speaking 
for its subject, the very imagining of these topics as readily accessible and describable in 
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multi-sited ethnography is problematic, as Cook et al., one of geography’s advocates of 
following ‘things’ through global supply chains, has argued 
“A good following story has a clear focus. Like a chicken. That never goes out 
of sight. But anything and everything that’s in and around it (throughout its 
conception, birth, life, death and travels) could become part of that story. But 
where exactly are the beginnings and ends of such a story?” (Cook et al. 2006, 
657)  
These points are especially valid as they raise considerable issues - if we engage with 
objects and people in multiple places/spaces, how do we adequately treat each scenario? 
As what we follow becomes in/visible, how do we account for this and describe it 
adequately? This is more than advocating an ethnographic method that simply jumps from 
site to site, instead it remains a problem of how we can relate our understandings of 
seemingly small scales to larger fields; how can the mess of everyday existence be 
adequately understood given our fleeting glimpses of it? As Hannerz notes 
“...sites are connected with one another in such ways that the relationships 
between them are as important for this formulation as the relationships within 
them; the fields are not some mere collection of local units. One must 
establish the translocal linkages, and the interconnections between those and 
whatever local bundles of relationships which are also part of the study.” 
(Hannerz 2003, 206) 
There are examples of multi-site ethnographies that attempt to stitch together global 
processes from a series of encounters (Freidberg 2001; Scheper-Hughes 2004), but there 
still remains a tension between empirically grounded, ‘local’ examples of a wider ‘global’ 
system that remains more abstract and unknown.  
One of the more explicit attempts to develop these ideas comes from Burawoy et al.’s 
(2000) Global Ethnography - a subtle type of multi-sitedness that allows us to visualise the 
effects of the global system in a variety of places by comparing lots of different 
ethnographies and attempting to draw out their linkages to an overarching system of 
capital circulation. This approach produces a series of localities, pulling them together as 
subjects of a wider global system, and thus leaves us in a similar global/local dichotomy. 
Burawoy (2001) has more recently recognised a need for a more spatially nuanced 
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ethnographic account of globalisation, but there still remains a fundamental tension 
between local and global here. 
In another attempt to situate ethnography globally, Joy Hendry calls for a ‘globography’ 
(2003) which argues for an interpretation of how society and culture are influenced by 
icons and objects from elsewhere. Thus her study of Japanese theme parks looks at the 
translations that happen between cultures. This allows a greater degree of understanding 
of the connections between places – how cultures are constructed and represented by 
others and how these flows of ideas and knowledges actually play out. Ultimately these 
attempts to integrate the local of ethnography within a larger system still rely on a 
dichotomous construction of local relations structured within global system.  
How, then, can we extract something worthwhile from this seeming intractable opposition? 
Calls for the increased use of ethnographic methods as a geographical research tool 
(Herbert 2000; Megoran 2006) are echoed by Gillian Hart’s (2004) attempt to think about 
the role of a ‘critical ethnography’ that is able to move beyond the global/local dichotomy. 
To Hart, ethnography should be able to draw upon work by the likes of Massey (1994) to 
think about role of place as a nodal point in a larger, socially produced, space. Following 
from here, engaging spatially with ethnography is particularly useful, especially concerning 
accounts of the relational and networked nature of political action. 
Geographers have made important contributions to thinking about the networked nature 
of political action that disrupts this global/local binary. Accounts by Lester (2001), Ogborn 
(2002), Lambert (2005), and Featherstone (2005, 2007) have attempted to show how 
materially heterogenous relations were of crucial importance in producing hegemonic or 
counter-hegemonic alliances in history. Yet, geographical studies that have thought about 
the empirical study of these types of relational networks in contemporary politics remain 
sparse. Most recently Paul Routledge (occasionally in collaboration) has begun applying 
ANT to contemporary political networks (Routledge 2008; Routledge, Cumbers and Nativel 
2007). While this is on the whole, useful and productive, his understanding of ANT is 
somewhat limited to a Latourian reading of the social landscape and he thus misses out on 
some of the different accounts of the socio-spatial that can claim to be ANT, particularly 
Law’s work mentioned above. This lack is something that I have attempted to address 
(Davies 2009), where I relate some of these ideas explicitly to specific Tibetan protest 
events (for another example of this type of work, see Featherstone 2008). 
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Thus, while work has begun to emerge which takes on some of these ideas about multi-
sitedness, and while work in geography has begun to look at politics in networked ways, 
there remains a lack of work which addresses the methodological shortcomings of both. 
ANT, despite its claims to the contrary still tends to consider the researcher as an objective 
observer who can unpick the truth of networked, heterogenous systems. Multi-site 
ethnography takes on spatially extensive systems and attempts to see how they work 
through ontological reality. However, too often these ideas have ended up reproducing a 
dichotomy between global/local that is problematic. By attempting to apply ANT and 
ethnographic methods together, this research argues for a style of ethnography that is not 
only reflexive and able to recognise the situated nature of ethnographic participant 
observation, but which also works between the dichotomies of global/local and produces a 
more ontological understanding of ‘the site’ as an arena of political action that involves 
processes from a variety of spatial levels. 
Methodologies of ‘Networks’ 
While the above sections discussed the more theoretical aspects of the methodology of 
this research, before I begin to examine the particular methods and strategies used to do 
the research, it is necessary to examine the wider context of Tibet, socio-political research 
and the concept of networks. This section will begin to apply some the ideas above to this 
research project. It does this by examining work done previously on similar topics, but also 
by beginning to think about how this research process was begun and the underlying 
strategies that form an inherent part of the thesis.  
The network analogy has come increasingly to the fore in the examination of social 
movements in recent years. In Social Movement Theory, this has emerged particularly in 
terms of thinking about the ‘relational’ study of social movements. In this way, the social 
constitution of networks becomes important. Rather than thinking of how networks work 
simply as structures in which social movements are contained, the role of the individual 
activists or groups and their ability to forge relations and act as nodes in the network 
explain in useful ways how the political networks actually function. So, we move away from 
the idea of a social movement as a ‘collective’ towards a more fluid conception of these 
groups (McDonald 2002). As Diani (2003) argues, by looking at the social, informal 
elements of the network, we move ‘from metaphor to substance’ – rather than thinking 
abstractly about the network, we can identify the pathways and flows of information and 
knowledge through the network. This happens in many different ways, both through 
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networks of individuals, networks of organizations and, more loosely, networks of 
collectivities and events such as protests. These different typologies of groupings help to 
hold the network together.  
However, separating these ‘groups’ of networks and breaking down the topic theoretically 
into discrete sections is particularly lacking in an understanding of the interconnected 
nature of the social put forward by theorists like Deleuze, Latour and Law. The Tibet 
Support Group network is a broad coalition of movements, all with roughly the same goal, 
but each with a slightly different process through which they attempt to ‘Support Tibet’. 
For instance, one Tibet group in the UK tries to base its support on providing information 
and educating people in the UK about Tibetan issues, whilst another is a nationwide cell of 
an international coalition based much more on principles of demonstrations of support 
through non-violent, direct action protests. All of these different support groups 
necessarily occupy different geographical spaces, with some being very small local groups 
or individuals, while others act as umbrella groups for a country- or region-wide 
organisation. In addition, the Tibet Movement is necessarily transnational in its character – 
the groups are attempting to represent and create a particular version of Tibet that does 
not exist today and much of the struggle is based on widening knowledge about the 
situation of Tibet and Tibetans, both inside Tibet and in areas where Tibetan exile 
communities have settled. Together with these areas are the multitude of places where 
non-Tibetan activists are based in their campaigns to strengthen pro-Tibetan arguments.  
This brief snapshot of what I shall term the pro-Tibet Movement reveals how the network 
as a whole is a rich and variegated system of minor networks comprised of individuals, 
organisations, and protests, all of which act with their own particular agendas. As with any 
organisations, these agendas are not rigid and can be changed through the routine of 
negotiation between members of the groups. As a result, the research project as a whole 
has to reflect the flexibility of the pro-Tibet Movement. At the outset it is obvious that such 
a complex system is impossible to categorise completely, no matter how extensively we 
research it – the results of the research are always likely to be partial depending on the 
elements we as researchers have been exposed to. However, any attempt to try to 
interrogate the processes that shape these flexible and fluid networks must also be flexible 
and fluid. As a result, from an early stage, it was clear that a qualitative methodology 
should be employed. Robson (2002) refers to a qualitative methodology as being a flexible 
research design, and while this damps down the flexibility of quantitative methods, it does 
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emphasize the ability of qualitative methods to be much more reflexive and able to cope 
with (often sudden) changes in the research environment. This is not to say that 
quantitative methods cannot be adaptive, but that qualitative are much better able to cope 
with change – a large questionnaire-based survey is more difficult to modify when 
underway than a series of ethnographic enquiries.  
While qualitative methodologies encompass many different methods and traditions, this 
research will engage primarily with ethnography, but will also make some forays 
(admittedly partial and fragmentary ones) into other areas, such as grounded theory and 
case studies.  Ethnography is, at its most loosely defined, the study of any forms of social 
behaviour through a variety of methods. This research undertakes a decidedly 
anthropological ethnography, in that it examines groups through means of participant 
observation and analysis primarily. In this case, ethnographic methods provide the most 
comprehensive way of engaging with the pro-Tibet Movement as a heterogenous network 
of groups and investigating the processes involved in the constitution of this network. 
Trotter II (1999) argues that ethnographic network research is particularly useful in 
unpicking how individuals adapt according to the way that their organisations are grouped 
“Differences in the ways in which organisations are structured, as well as 
in the positions people occupy within them, affect the flow of 
information, constraining not only the amount but the specific content 
of information that people receive. Studies of social networks allow 
social scientists to explore cultural differences in the ways that humans 
organize themselves into groups, communicate about critical life 
circumstances, and work out the problems they encounter in everyday 
life.” (Trotter II 1999, 2) 
Although speaking specifically in terms of social networks, it is clear that these ideas are 
important in the more socio-political networking of the type that the pro-Tibet Movement 
can be classified as. The actual specifics of the ethnographic research methods used will be 
engaged with in the later section dedicated to them, but it is clear that they provide a 
useful engagement with the idea of socio-political network research. 
However, to return to reflexivity and the issues of sensitivity in political research, the 
importance of adopting this methodological approach becomes clear. Hammersley and 
Atkinson (1995) discuss the importance of reflexive thinking, and the importance of 
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political engagement while doing ethnographic research. To them, reflexive ethnographic 
research goes beyond positivistic or naturalistic methodologies by not relying on 
empiricism to justify our accounts and allowing us to engage with our roles as a researcher 
during our research. Again, more of this is discussed in the later section of this chapter 
dedicated to discussion on reflexivity and positionality, but here it is important to take 
these ideas into account in terms of research design.  
Ideas of reflexive learning stress our limited abilities as researchers and the ideas that our 
knowledges are produced and negotiated as we move through our research process. As 
this research attempts to uncover the networked nature of these movements, it was 
decided at an early stage that it was necessary to focus on exactly ‘how’ these networks 
fitted together. As Rubinoff (2005) argues, the computer-linked, transnational networks 
that form much of our everyday lives have important consequences for our role as 
researchers. Rather than thinking of researchers as unproblematic entities who can slip in 
and out of networks to observe them as we please (what Haraway (1991) would call our 
‘God-Trick’), we must recognise that by interacting with people and places in this network, 
we necessarily become implicated as part of these networks ourselves. This is of course a 
commonplace consideration in feminist and postcolonial influenced work in the social 
sciences, but what Rubinoff usefully does is place herself, and her work, as an integral part 
of her research networks. Her involvement and, in turn, her writing about the network, 
adds new pathways and nodes for the flow of information which sustains or breaks the 
network itself. Thus, her writing about a Latin American life-history writing project opens 
up a new node for ‘outsiders’ to engage with the network. In this case, it was important to 
recognise that any knowledge that I had of the pro-Tibet Movement at the start of the 
research process was necessarily limited and thus it became important to become a part of 
the networks and to attempt to travel along the pathways of them as much as is possible. It 
is through these partial travels through the sites of the Tibet Movement that we can build 
an awareness of some of the constituent actors that help the network to function (or fail to 
function, as the case may be). 
As a result, the research technique for the research overlapped somewhat between a 
grounded theory/network analysis viewpoint, similar to what Lofland (1996) promotes in 
his work on social movements. By this, I mean that by attempting to engage with the 
networks of political groups/individuals that campaign for Tibet, the research was 
attempting to uncover and identify ongoing themes and issues that emerged through the 
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process of being inside the network. As a result, while my knowledge was at all times 
partial and related to what I observed, during the early stages of the research, my 
knowledge of the Tibet Movement was particularly limited. Thus, although a ‘pure’ 
grounded theory approach was impossible, I attempted to approach the networks as an 
outsider and through mapping the nodes and pathways of the network I would develop 
theoretical ideas as they emerged from the research. Therefore, there was a continual 
process of mapping the different networks and examining the different flows and fractures 
of information that move from node to node, place to place, inside them. As a result, the 
research occurred in a processional fashion, as initial meetings and encounters with 
informants created new themes to explore and uncover.  
It can rightly be argued that in many ways this generates a partial account of the network, 
as the researcher can only explore the avenues that become available to them. However, 
this is not, in my opinion, a weakness in the research. Rather, it is an effective way of 
mapping the pathways that exist within the networks at any one time. By attempting to 
move within the network, we are better able to see how it functions and changes over 
time. Embedding the research within the network for a substantial period of time, it 
becomes possible to uncover the ways in which political networks are transitory objects, 
which adapt over time to best suit the prevalent circumstances. Thus, while a pathway into 
the research may initially prove of limited use, it can later become part of a different 
network within the Tibet Support Group network as a whole. Thus a long term engagement 
with the various networks and pathways such as this has the potential to uncover the 
variegated and temporal nature of these networked linkages   
Positionality/Ethical Engagements 
Following from the networked consideration of this research above, it should be clear that 
this reflexive approach requires a consideration of the roles of the researcher in the 
research. As hinted at above in the discussion of Rubinoff (2005), the role of the researcher 
as part of a network is clearly complex. As a result this section examines the role of the 
researcher and their positionality. This will firstly cover the methodology of ANT, focussing 
in particular on the limitations of traditional ANT-led approaches both methodologically 
and reflexively. It will then turn to considerations of the ‘role’ of the researcher and the 
debates surrounding how our relationships with our research subjects are formed and 
played out through our research. Finally, it will briefly consider how this affected my 
research and how I initially engaged with these issues and came to a starting position in 
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how I placed myself with my research. However, due to the reflexive nature of the 
research, this then will be developed and explored further through the empirical accounts 
of the research process that form the substantive part of the rest of this chapter. Thus, a 
relatively processional account of my changing positionality and reflexive decision making 
should emerge through the rest of the chapter.  
Given ANT’s limited attempts to reconcile the position of the researcher within the 
research detailed above, I turn instead to feminist and postcolonial ideas about how we 
engage with our roles as researchers. Much has been made of the role of the researcher 
and the research participant and their status in the ‘research relationship’ (Katz 1994; 
McDowell 1992; Pile 1991; Rose 1997). These debates have situated geography and 
research not as static, rather they are filled with fluid power relationships – as we move 
around and into ‘the field’ we are confronted with different relationships, during which we 
will have varying degrees of power. Thus, as responsible researchers we have to engage in 
these relations in ways that do not harm our research subjects, who in many cases should 
be considered partners in the research themselves. As a result, there is a blurring of the 
space that exists between us and our research. We are no longer able to unproblematically 
say, as Geertz (1979) argued, that when we are in the field we are studying ‘natives’, 
instead, we are engaging with them in spaces that are often close to our own everyday 
lives, and which cannot be easily fenced off as ‘the field’. We are therefore obliged to 
consider our positionality as part of the research process – we must consider our personal 
histories and address how our own backgrounds and preferences necessarily shape our 
research experiences and relationships.  
In terms of researching political activist groups, the debates on these issues have focussed 
on how the researcher can be an activist and still produce valid research. These have 
recently focussed on participatory methods (Chatterton 2006; Kindon, Pain and Kesby 
2007). These issues are useful, but occupy a tangled section of this research – while it is 
accepted that the research will become a part of the networks, the research is not 
following an ‘action research’ path per se, rather, while attending demonstrations and 
performing tasks within the networks was a feasible research avenue, at no stage would I, 
as the principle investigator, consider myself to be a ‘Tibetan Activist’. Instead, let me turn 
towards how my own positionality influenced the research process. 
The most obvious issues around positionality emerged through my perceived status as a 
researcher who was middle-class, white and citizen of the UK. This brought benefits, as it 
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allowed me access to many groups both in the UK, India and with a key informant in San 
Francisco. Being seen as ‘Western’ and a professional researcher, rather than an interested 
bystander or journalist meant a series of negotiations took place. My perceived position of 
privilege as someone who was both interested in Tibet, and as someone who would be able 
to disseminate my research findings, and therefore, presumably be of benefit to the pro-
Tibetan cause, meant that certain doors and gatekeepers were particularly helpful and 
certain participants were easy to access. However, this perception was something I was 
keen to temper. As someone who had never been involved in Tibetan Activism, but had 
spent some time travelling in India and had been to Dharamsala during that time, I was 
aware of, and generally sympathetic towards the Tibetan cause. However, to say that I was 
anything else was a misrepresentation of my position, and as a result, from the outset I 
always attempt(ed) to make clear what my positionality was in order not to deceive any 
research informants/participants. So, for ethical reasons, I made a decision to inform 
participants who were directly involved in the research that I was not a Tibet supporter, 
and while sympathetic to Tibetan refugees’ causes, I was attempting a critical piece of work 
that would not privilege one side of the Tibet Issue over the other. Despite informing 
participants of this verbally and through an information sheet I had prepared, many 
participants still treated me as something of an honoured guest who was to be thanked for 
doing work on Tibet. So, on one occasion at a Tibetan diasporic community event, I was 
told I would have to take part in a ceremony honouring the Dalai Lama together with other 
dignitaries. Once it was explained that I was simply a postgraduate student, I was swiftly 
demoted to my more usual bystander status, but throughout my research, it was often 
assumed that I was somehow a powerful and influential actor who could ‘help’ the Tibet 
Movement through my research. At the same time, I was also forced to perform a series of 
negotiations with TSGs and their members in order to prove that I was a reliable researcher 
who would not betray confidences through dissemination of my findings. 
I was also hampered throughout the research by my lack of Tibetan language skills. While I 
undertook limited learning of the language in Dharamsala and through self learning, I was 
never able to engage in more than exchanging pleasantries with my research subjects. As a 
result, the research reinforces the overwhelmingly Anglo-American bias of multi-sited 
ethnography mentioned above. Thus, my role as ethnographer was already limited to those 
areas which I could understand and begin to ‘translate’ into an academic language. Early on 
in the research process, I also decided that this research project would be based on the 
pro-Tibet movement in and around the Tibetan Diaspora. So, despite the research being 
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notionally about Tibet, no research would take place there. This was to avoid the 
complications of doing a research project in such a sensitive region as China, especially one 
that would involve asking people sensitive questions which could have harmful 
consequences for those who took part in the research.  
These questions of positionality and reflexivity all emerged through the research process as 
unevenly and problematically as can be imagined. Thus, rather than go into them in more 
detail here, I integrate them into the following sections where I go into more detail about 
the processes by which the research took place. What follows for the rest of this section is 
a chronological account of the various processes by which I gradually became more and 
more involved with the networks of the Tibet Movement, beginning at very small, place-
based networks within the UK, and evolving out through the networks as they became 
visible and allowed me to engage with them. Thus, thinking multi-sitedly, the research 
followed not a single ‘thing’ or group as it/they move through the spaces of pro-Tibetan 
activism. Instead, it becomes following what is visible at any particular time, whether this is 
a particular, definable object, or the circulation of particular discourses and ideas. 
Initial Stages  
Stage One 
The initial basis for this research, as stated in the beginnings of this chapter, emerges from 
the attempt to study a large transnational movement in a networked form. In order to 
explore and uncover the complexities of such a large movement, it was necessary to 
attempt to engage with groups and members for as long a period as possible. However, 
there is of course a limit to the amount of engagement that is possible in such a large 
movement within a limited time period. However, as stated in the previous section, the 
research attempts to engage with the network in a way that was cognizant of the fact that 
as a researcher, I too am part of the network and would be travelling along its pathways 
and nodes, but also establishing new nodes and pathways for information to travel along.  
To undertake this ‘networked’ research it was recognised at an early stage that it was 
necessary to establish some key contacts in the Tibet Support Group (TSG) network in the 
UK. The UK was chosen initially as the main starting point for the research due to the 
constraints of where I was based, but also as a repertoire of contacts in ‘Western’ 
campaigning groups can prove useful in gaining access to Tibetan campaigning groups in 
other areas, such as the US, but can be especially useful in gaining contacts amongst 
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Tibetan exile groups (see Houston and Wright, 2004, for more on this particular aspect). So, 
beginning in June 2006, initial forays into the UK’s TSG network began. In the UK, there are 
three major campaign groups for Tibetan issues, all of which are based in London. 
However, two of these centralised groups explicitly have ‘local groups’ – small groups 
based around the country who perform local activities like fundraisers and lectures, but 
who can then come together for large scale meetings. These ‘local groups’ could therefore 
be seen as the basis of much of the ‘grassroots’ organisational structure of the Tibet 
Support Group network in the UK. Initially then, it was decided that as a way to begin to 
interact with TSGs in the UK, the research would attempt to interact with these small local 
groups. This was decided both for the above reasons, but also because the smaller scale 
‘local’ work would seemingly be easier for the research to interact with – the ‘gatekeepers’ 
present at these local levels would probably be more interested in why the research was 
taking place and would be more approachable than the large scale, centralised 
campaigning organisations of which they were nominally part. 
As a result, initial forays into the network revolved around contacting local groups in and 
around the North West of Britain in order to uncover what the networks functioned like. 
These initial attempts were guided by local group lists produced and maintained by the 
central organisations, together with wider searches through literature and internet 
websites in order to attempt to find groups. Through these searches, I was able to make 
contact with two ‘groups’ who worked in Manchester. This initial contact was through a 
series of informal meetings with the official contacts listed on the various groups’ e-
mail/telephone lists. However, once contacted, it emerged that both of these groups had 
effectively ceased to exist as specific TSGs due to faltering support, and as there was little 
evidence for any other groups who were active in the immediate area, the research’s initial 
attempts to gain entry to the network were widened geographically into a second stage 
which covered the whole of the UK.  
Second Stage 
In this second stage, the sampling strategy changed, from one based around small informal 
meetings with identifiable, local groups, towards one based on ‘activity’. Stage one of the 
research had basically involved hunting for groups within a given geographical region which 
was chosen for its proximity and ease of access. However, this investigative methodology 
was relatively ineffective as discussed above. As a result, after a reassessment of strategy, 
it was decided that the research would now attempt to target activities instead. In these 
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terms, I attempted to attend any publicised events, from local fundraising events to 
protests. These were targeted through a ‘sampling’ process that was determined primarily 
through the ability of the network to advertise them – as I was still an outsider to the 
network at this point, my knowledge was essentially limited to groups who had up-to-date 
contact listings or had internet websites where information could be found on upcoming 
events.  
In order to impose some limits to this rather flexible and fluid sampling regime, I restricted 
myself to activities that were specifically related to the political situation of Tibet. Many 
TSGs have fundraising events or visits which involve a heavily cultural aspect - as 
mentioned in previous sections, culture and politics remain intertwined in Tibet to a heavy 
degree, and as a result, it is impossible much of the time to separate the two. However, 
some TSG’s have events based around Tibetan Buddhist rituals and advice, such as a 
lecture from a visiting Lama, or a dance show by a visiting troupe of Tibetans. While these 
shows obviously have an underlying political intent, being representations and expressions 
of a distinct culture that is restricted in Tibet by the Chinese authorities, in this preliminary 
stage, it was decided that a focus on the most overtly political statements and displays 
would provide the best entry points into the specifically political arena which the research 
was addressing. This is not to say that cultural events are not important as expressions of 
Tibetan difference to Han Chinese culture, or that the research would ignore these 
representations, but simply to recognise that it was necessary to bring some focus to the 
initial targeting of the entry points to the networks of UK TSGs. 
In this second stage, I attended numerous events, from a protest outside the Chinese 
embassy in Central London, to a sponsored walk in Scotland. In cases where there was a 
key contact for the protest/group, I made contact with them to ask if it was okay for me to 
attend as part of an initial research process. During the course of attending, I chatted to 
other participants about their views on Tibet and why they were involved, and always 
made it clear to those I spoke to that I was doing a research project on Tibet and these 
events. At various times I was able to explain my ethical background and positionality as an 
academic and not an activist during these events, but this was not possible in some cases 
due to the briefness of the conversation. Recording of events was done through written 
notes taken during the course of the events, and in some cases photographs of the protests 
were taken. In the case of photographs, no photographs were taken of individuals who 
wished to remain anonymous to protect their identity. During this period I made contact 
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with members of the three large, specifically-UK based organisations in London. During the 
course of these events, it became clear that the ‘hub’ of the network is based around the 
larger organisations in London, with local groups, while being relatively active in their local 
area, remaining relatively autonomous from the central organisations unless there were 
specific large events in their region when they mobilised to support the events as a 
collective. During this period then, the focus of the research began to shift once again. 
Local groups, while important at times of protest and in terms of maintaining support, 
became more clearly demarcated as peripheral bodies for most of the active campaigning, 
which focussed on London and its attendant support organisations. Having spent around 3-
4 months travelling and attending these events, it became clear that a focus on becoming 
involved in the ‘deep’ ethnography (Hendry, 2003) of these ‘core’ organisations was more 
valuable than travelling through the peripheries of the network. It is here then, that the 
research moved out of its initial, exploratory moves in the networks towards a more 
focussed examination of the UK campaigning groups, which will be explored more in the 
next section. 
Networked Ethnography and Interviews 
As should be clear by now, the networked based approach pursued here involved a degree 
of reflexive consideration when deciding sampling strategies and the like. While the idea of 
following ‘the network’ or ‘the theme’ was a flexible research strategy, it necessarily 
involves a great deal of consideration into which groups would be investigated and 
pathways would be followed. In many cases, this was done in order to explore the 
particular themes that were being studied, for example the maintenance of a uniform 
Tibetan identity in diaspora. However, for the ongoing in-depth ethnographic research, the 
choice of pathways was more limited by circumstances.  
Building from the earlier stages of the research, I now had identified and established 
contact with the three main specifically UK-based Tibetan Support organisations. The 
decision was made to initially limit myself to UK-based groups. This was done mainly 
because of my location, as, despite the transnational nature of the research, I would 
primarily still be based in the UK, with any contact with foreign groups remaining fleeting 
and transitory. Therefore, in order to establish the necessary long-term and in-depth 
associations with the groups I would be studying, it would be better for the research to 
take place in the country where I would be based for the longest period of time. Of the 
organisations that were based in the UK, I had reliable contact with one TSG, and limited 
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but ongoing contact with another two. As a result of this, I first approached the TSG whom I 
had the most contact using the social connections I had built at their events in order to gain 
access to them.  
During this time, as still a relative outsider to the Tibet Movement in the UK, I was engaged 
in a number of processes. Firstly, I needed to prove my legitimacy to the groups. By 
legitimacy, it is meant both that I was a bona fide researcher who was engaged in actual 
research and was genuinely interested in their organisation, but also, ethically, as a part of 
this that I would ‘protect’ members of the organisation by anonymising both individuals 
and organisations. In addition, in order to facilitate my entry into these support group 
networks, it was decided that I would offer my services as a volunteer for the groups while 
doing my ethnographic research. During my initial meetings, numerous references were 
made to the lack of a dedicated workforce in most TSGs, with many of them relying upon 
voluntary staff. These volunteers performed a valuable support role for many of the 
organisations, but were often only available for short periods of time and could not be 
relied upon as a guaranteed labour source. Thus, by offering my services as a 
researcher/volunteer for a 3-4 month period, I was able to gain entry into the groups as I 
was assisting them and also participating in the everyday working practices of the 
organisation and thus able to study the more ‘micro’, ‘local’ networks of humans and non-
humans inside the office space and the connections that linked the particular spaces of the 
office to the ‘outside’ world.  
As a result, the ethnographic work started with spending one day a week in the office of a 
TSG, performing basic administrative tasks, such as packing envelopes or data-entry. These 
tasks both gave me an insight into how the office worked, but also allowed me to think 
through my research and take notes at the same time. However, as I was performing tasks 
for most of the time, most of the note-taking was done during travel from London back to 
Liverpool, and thus was done away from the specific field site itself.  
Of course, this brought up a set of ethical issues such as negotiating my role as both a 
researcher and a volunteer for the organisation I was performing the research on. In 
relation to this, I was constantly involved in negotiating and clarifying my positionality in 
order to work effectively with the groups. As stated above, I endeavoured wherever 
possible to make it clear that while I was a volunteer, I was primarily a researcher who, 
while sympathetic, was not involved in the movement through activism on a day to day 
basis. Initially, I explained this through my contacts with the gatekeepers who allowed me 
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into the organisation. However, once the research had actually commenced, it became 
clear that most people assumed I was purely a volunteer. As a result, over the course of the 
next few weeks, I went through a process of explaining to the staff of the TSG the research 
work I was involved in. This took some time, and as people were involved in their everyday 
work patterns and did not want an account of academic research, it became more practical 
to explain things in terms of ‘Hi, I’m volunteering here at the moment, and I’m doing 
research on Tibet here too’. Having briefly explained what I was doing, I then moved on.  
While this process satisfied some of the ethical elements of my positionality by making sure 
everyone was clear that I was doing research, most people still assumed that I was ‘in’ the 
movement in general – through general conversation it became clear that most people 
assumed that because I was interested in what, in most people’s view, is a fairly marginal 
resistance movement, I must therefore be deeply involved or interested these issues. These 
concerns were difficult to resolve throughout the research – while I explain to most people 
my specific positionality, it is impossible practically to engage with everyone who I have 
spoken to in this. As a result, I was continually involved in a process of engagement with all 
participants in the research, but where some are more privy to my research aims and goals 
than others. Thus, the disciplining of myself and my position in the research remained 
limited by this throughout the entire research period and this remains a problematic aspect 
of ethnographic research.  
However, despite these reflexive difficulties, ethnographic participant observation 
continued to be the main thread of the research for the next year, from September 2006 to 
September 2007. Following from an initial voluntary period with one TSG, I began attending 
Tibetan Community in the UK events, protests and marches in support of Tibet, and ended 
with another voluntary period with another of the London based TSGs. March 2007 was 
spent in Dharamsala, India, the seat of the Tibetan Government in Exile (GiE) and home to a 
large exile community and a number of TSGs. March was specifically selected as a time to 
conduct the research for a number of reasons. March 10th is the anniversary of the Tibetan 
(or Lhasa) Uprising in 1959 which led to the move into exile of the Dalai Lama and a large 
number of his supporters. This is always commemorated with a number of events amongst 
the Tibetan community. In addition, March was recommended by contacts I had made, as 
the Dalai Lama’s Spring Teachings take place at this time, and these attract a large number 
of Tibet supporters to Dharamsala. Thus, an idea of the social makeup of the pro-Tibet 
Movement can be built up around this time. However, as I was to discover, there were a 
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number of problems with this period. Exile Tibetan society tends to stop when the Dalai 
Lama is teaching, so it became difficult to get responses from people or to arrange 
meetings. Especially difficult was the fact that the GiE was returning from recess, so many 
political actors within it were busy with this and unable to be contacted. 
It was also clear that, as my time in Dharamsala would be limited, prolonged periods of 
time working with groups would not be possible. Thus, while I was able to attend protests 
and have informal conversations with people quite regularly, performing a relatively 
straightforward participant-observer role, I was reliant to an extent on contacts given to 
me by my participants in London, together with establishing my own sets of contacts 
beforehand and while in Dharamsala. The relatively short timeframe also meant a rolling-
out of a supplementary research method, that of semi-structured interviewing (discussed 
below), which allowed me to ‘hit’ a greater number of targets in this time. This strategy of 
establishing contacts in a particular place was also followed in April 2007, when in San 
Francisco I was able to contact a key actor within the pro-Tibetan Movement in the Bay 
Area while I was in the area for a conference.  
Participant observation-led ethnography was therefore a key method for both entering the 
network and allowing me to travel within and around the Tibet Movement. Whilst this 
immersion into a particular set of relations was not without its problems, it was successful 
in establishing a series of connections and understandings of the state of the ‘field’ that 
would have not been uncovered otherwise. However, it was necessary to supplement this 
with a number of key informant interviews, so here it is necessary to discuss this additional 
technique. 
 Interviews 
In addition to the overtly ‘anthropological’ research of ‘how’ the offices , TSGs and people 
in the Tibet Movement ‘worked’, the practices and rituals that helped to ‘form’ the 
organisation and how the office was connected to other networks of Tibetan activists, 
there was also a process of identifying participants for interview who could not be 
contacted through participant observation. These were people who either were not 
present in the sites I was observing, or who were connected in different ways to the 
movement. Also, given my time in Dharamsala and San Francisco, periods of participant 
observation were not as readily feasible due to the short periods of time spent within the 
specific communities. Therefore, in order to interrogate these additional spaces and places 
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of the Tibet Movement in more depth, key interviewees and informants were identified 
during the course of the fieldwork. Due to the specific nature of these selections, there was 
no sampling frame per se, rather, as issues arose, those who seemed to be the most 
important actors in the campaign/issue were noted and approached.  
These groups and individuals were selected in a variety of ways, but through the embedded 
nature of the participant observation strand of research, in many cases the network 
‘allowed’ the research to identify them and whether they were accessible. Those that were  
Table 3.1 Thesis Fieldwork Locations 
approachable were then asked for interview. So, in some cases, people would be 
recommended to me by third parties – ‘Oh, you’re doing research on x; you should go and 
speak to y at the so and so office’. In this way, as I became aware of groups who were 
involved in the ‘threads’ of the network that I was interested in (either through 
recommendation from other groups or in the course of doing reading/research), these 
additional groups then became ‘targets’ for possible interview. These were then 
approached in a way similar to the initial stages described above, but were explicitly asked 
for an interview/meeting at the outset. Thus through a loose system of my own time spent 
building contacts, researching groups away from the field, or through social contacts within 
Fieldwork Sites/Locations 
Ethnographic Sites Interviews 
Manchester – TSG/General London – Independent Activist 1 
North East Scotland TSG London – Independent Activist 2 
London TSG 1 Office Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – Lhasang 
Tsering, Independent Activist 
London TSG 2 Office  Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – Tibetan NGO 
Officer 
London – Fundraisers Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – Thubten 
Samphel, Central Tibetan Administration  
London – Protests Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – TSG Officer 
London – Social Events Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – Tibetan Centre 
for Human Rights and Democracy 
London – Tibetan Community Events Delhi – Indian/Tibetan NGO Officer 
London – Royal Albert Hall – Dalai lama 
event 
San Francisco, USA – TSG Officer 
Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – General  
Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj – Protests  
Liverpool – General   
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the network, I was able to identify a number of key targets for interview, eventually 
conducting 9 semi-structured interviews. These were with: 2 activists in London who were 
unaffiliated with any particular TSGs; 1 key informant interview in San Francisco; and, 6 
interviews with activists and GiE officials in Dharamsala. Practically, this resulted in 
fieldwork being undertaken in the locations in Table 3.1. More specific detail on the 
process and questioning pattern within these interviews can be found in the 
Methodological Appendix at the end of the thesis.  
Conclusions 
This chapter has set out the methodological background to the thesis. Rather than setting 
out only to explain and justify a sampling strategy, it has instead examined the nature of 
‘doing’ a networked piece of research and has developed some of the methodological ideas 
of those who espouse networks as the pre-eminent form of organisation. It has argued that 
while ANT has promoted an idea of what we should be doing in research, it has, in fact, told 
us very little about how we should go about doing this. The notable exception here is John 
Law, but even then, his work remains limited and does not explain the practical side of 
what we should be doing in understanding these networks and our position in them.  
Instead, I have argued for a more ethnographically informed account of networked political 
action. Building from ideas present within social anthropology, I promote some of the ideas 
of a ‘global’ ethnographers like Burawoy et al. (2000) and Hendry (2003), together with the 
work of geographers, in order to develop an ethnography that is more aware of the global 
processes and flows around particular sites and spaces. In particular, I have argued that we 
need to think through the ways in which the site is not a container for a specific 
event/organisation. Instead, it is a more fluid space, open to influence from ‘outside’ but 
also constricted in a variety of ways. This builds from the theoretical arguments of the last 
chapter but also means that we must adopt a more nuanced research strategy. 
This theoretical background to the methodology informs the research strategy that 
involved being ‘multi-sited’ throughout the research, but also attempted to understand the 
connections and processes between these different places and spaces. Theoretically, this 
approach offers a more nuanced account of the field, but crucially it involves a reflexive 
methodology that emphasises the networks and my own place within them. Thus, by 
attempting to become entangled within the networks one begins to get a particular idea of 
how some (not all) of the Tibet Movement works. This understanding is contingent and 
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partial, but as a study of networks of immanent power relations, then this is somewhat 
inevitable. While problematic in justifying our work as the arbiter of a particular 
understanding of a topic, for me, this contingency is important in uncovering how 
domination and resistance actually work through the spaces of the everyday. These 
emergent and snatched glimpses of power at play through the spaces and places of politics 
are important in our understandings of how actors actually try to effect political change. By 
constructing a methodology that transfers research agency back towards the networks of 
power that circulate through society, the research process becomes less imbued with the 
academic researcher’s voice as the arbiter of truth, instead producing an account of the 
social that becomes more truthful to those voices that emerged when the research was 
taking place. Thus, rather than treating the contingency and partiality of networked 
research methods as methodological weaknesses, I see them as a particular strength in 
developing our understandings of the fragmented and illusory ways in which politics (and 
ontological reality more generally) are actually played out. 
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Intermezzo – Striating and Overcoding Tibetan Politics 
 
March 2008 marked a new set of challenges to the Chinese regime in Tibet. Sparked by a 
combination of tensions surrounding the upcoming Beijing Olympics and the 49th Anniversary of the 
Tibetan Uprising on March 10th, a series of protests occurred in Lhasa, the wider Tibet Autonomous 
Region and in ethnically Tibetan areas of neighbouring provinces. These knitted into an intricate 
and multifaceted global network of action. Pro-Tibetan activists had already been gearing up 
actions in preparation for campaigns against the Beijing 2008 Olympics. Both Tibetan and Chinese 
sources quickly developed their own propaganda arguments: Chinese sources quickly inscribed 
events in Lhasa as a ‘riot’ organised by the ‘splittist Dalai clique’, with images of destruction of 
property being widely circulated (Xinhua 2008); Tibetan sources developed the opposite rhetoric of 
‘peaceful’ protests against the regime, with violence only emerging after Chinese civil, military and 
paramilitary intervention (TCHRD 2008). 
It was in these circumstances that I found myself in London marching in solidarity with those 
Tibetans who had been interned by the Chinese authorities. Officially having finished my fieldwork 
around 6 months earlier, the field interjected into my reality and it became a necessity to examine 
those events that I could gain access to and re-enter the field once again. These protests in London 
were, on the surface, routinized into ‘typical’ Tibetan protests, but the recent media coverage of 
events in China and elsewhere had swelled the numbers, so that instead of the usual c.100 people, 
around 3-400 people had gathered for a march from the embassy of the People’s Republic of China in 
London to Trafalgar Square. Tibetan flags were waved and the Tibetan national anthem was sung 
outside the embassy. 
This series of events marked the swinging into action of the Tibet Movement. A few weeks later, the 
procession of the Olympic Torch was marked by a series of protests in London, Paris and San 
Francisco. What emerged at all of these events were standardised Tibetan markers of identity such 
as flags and familiar chants. Yet, at the same time, new splinters of action emerging as individuals 
decided to take part in actions and the Tibet Issue came to prominence for the first time since the late 
1980s. 
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All of these actions seemed to explode out of nothing, and the networks that had shown themselves to 
my research in the earlier phases of fieldwork were becoming less useful. Some still seemed to be 
working, while others had become imperceptible. What I was sure of was that many of these ideas 
and actions were emerging somewhat jumbled together – Tibetan nationalism was being deployed by 
middle-aged ladies who spoke of how they just felt sorry for the poor Tibetans. One of my 
participants appeared on UK national radio proclaiming the Dalai Lama to be the next in line to 
Gandhi and Nelson Mandela. Tibetans in Nepal repeatedly clashed with riot police outside the 
Chinese Embassy in Kathmandu. Governments across the world began to decide how they were 
going to respond to this uprising and behave towards China and the Beijing Olympics.  
 My job in all of this was to continue trying to disentangle these various threads of the research. 
What follows in the rest of this thesis is a rendering of the Tibet Movement, which despite the 
networked theoretical background, still portrays different components of the Tibet Movement as 
relatively discreet entities. This is in many ways done for ease of use – to make a fully rhizomatic 
piece of work would make it virtually unreadable to anyone but an academic audience. Instead, I 
have built a three-layered approach to the empirical content of the thesis. I begin with non-Tibetan7 
engagements with and productions of Tibet and Tibetans. These imagined geographies of 
Tibetanness colour all productions of Tibet, and need exploring before we can understand 
adequately what the Tibet Issue means to people in its day-to-day existence. Following from this, I 
build on these themes to show how Tibetan nationalism emerged from the networks of the research. 
Nationalism remains one of the most potent driving forces for a new generation of Tibetans in exile. 
Finally, I examine the networks of political contestation – how the Tibet Movement competes 
against Chinese discourses about Tibet and how it holds itself together.  
These three chapters emerged through the research, developing as they became more and more 
obvious as key drivers of the research. What should become clear upon reading is that they 
interweave with each other, and they are arranged in such a way as to complement and build up a 
more detailed picture of the movement as the thesis moves on. However, it is also clear that I have 
                                                          
7
 Here I follow Moran (2004) in using ‘non-Tibetan’ and ‘Tibetan’ as cover terms for the 
heterogenous groups of individuals who could be included in these groups. ‘Non-Tibetan’ I use as 
those who, when self-defining, who would not count themselves as Tibetan. ‘Tibetan’ is likewise 
those who define themselves as such. This is for simplicity, but readers should be aware of the 
various groups and individuals of different ethnicities, classes and religions who consider themselves 
‘Tibetan’. 
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had to perform some overcoding and striation to these various themes in order to make them fit. 
Thus, the thesis in places tears apart these themes into separate entities to a much greater extent 
than reality. In others, it excludes themes which do not fit into these chapters. As a result, themes like 
ethnicity, diaspora and exile, while obviously important to the Tibet Issue, can be notable for their 
absence in places. This is one of the necessary problems of doing a networked ethnography. What is 
visible, and what we can adequately map-out as networked connections will always remain limited. 
However, what we gain by doing this – an ontologically rich understanding of the workings of 
political action – is a more than beneficial consequence of these forays into the reality of the Tibet 
Movement. As Jennifer Hyndman explains: “Situating knowledge is the key practice grounding the 
imagery of vision, particularly cartographies of geopolitical alliance and enmity. ... Embodied 
vision, that is to say ontologically committed, partial perspectives, may have the potential to subvert 
dominant geopolitical narratives” (Hyndman 2004, 309).  
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Chapter 4 – Imagined Geographies of Tibet 
“The question...for me was whether it was possible to make the case for 
Tibetan independence, which one assumes, all people of good will (when 
presented with the facts) would support, without invoking the romantic view of 
Tibet as Shangri-La” 
(Lopez Jr 1998, 11) 
“So what’s it like working with Tibetans then? They must be very passive.”8 
Introduction 
Politically, the competing discourses of the Tibet Issue remain a product of two lines of 
argument – China’s claim that Tibet is and always has been part of China, against Tibet’s 
claim that pre-1949 it was culturally and administratively independent of Chinese rule. This 
cleaving of the issue into two has been productive of the current impasse in the Tibet Issue, 
and both sides and their supporters have attempted to justify their own versions as ‘true’ 
through different readings of history (Avedon 1994; Craig 1999; Epstein 1983; Furen and 
Wenqing 1984), which have also become prominent in the reproduction of a stylised 
‘Tibet’, run through with orientalist connotations that paint both Tibet and China as 
‘Other’. As a result it is virtually impossible to understand the Tibet Issue without an 
understanding of the production of an idealised, semi-mystical Tibet. Indeed, this 
construction of an imagined Tibet and China would seem to emerge primarily from a Euro-
American viewpoint. Yet, China’s record of human rights abuses inside its borders together 
with Tibetan exiles’ predominantly Tibetan Buddhist traditions continue to provide seeming 
evidence of China as aggressive and dominating with Tibet as spiritual and withdrawn. 
To illustrate this point, one of the most recent media representations of Tibet is from a TV 
advertisement. A cartoon mountain peak with a monastery perched precariously at its 
zenith before Tony the Tiger, emblem of Kellogg’s Frosties breakfast cereal, appears. 
According to the English, Asian-accented, voiceover, he has been sent to the ‘Tiger Monks 
of Tibet’ by Kellogg’s to control his ‘primal desire’ for the cereal. A training montage follows 
where he is trained in the ‘ancient arts’ of patience, restraint and self control. Of course, 
Tony cannot control himself, and gives in to his desires shouting ‘They’re grrrreat!’ before 
                                                          
8
 ResearchDocs/Diaries/General – in this case, a fellow postgrad on a university training course 
asked me this question over lunch. 
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enthusiastically eating a bowl of Frosties while his monastic mentors make disapproving 
noises behind him. This is only one of the latest portrayals of Tibet in popular media and 
advertising. In essence, it distils Tibet into a series of defining characteristics that run 
through the imagined geographies of Tibet. Fantastic landscapes, monks (or Lamas when 
necessary), and ancient wisdom that we in ‘The West’ cannot understand all combine to 
create a sense of other worldly exotica and paint Tibet and Tibetans as ‘other’ to our Euro-
American selves. Yet, while there has been much written on this subject (Dodin and Räther 
2001b; Lopez Jr 1998), what remains relatively unexplored is how Tibetans and their 
supporters  negotiate their use of the underlying languages of imperialism and colonialism 
in these arguments. It is this lack that this chapter addresses.  
While these themes of representation and reproduction have clear links to strands of 
postcolonial thinking, the Tibet Issue has never been deployed as something overtly 
colonial. Sautman (2006) argues that there is a lack of evidence for any processes that can 
reasonably be called ‘colonial’ or ‘imperial’ within Tibet, instead pointing out the confused 
nature of the pro-Tibetan argument and the lack of any clear data about, and definitions of, 
the processes going on inside Tibet. In addition, the Tibet Issue is not often deployed as an 
explicitly anti-colonial struggle. Barnett (2001) has argued, from the pro-Tibetan side, there 
were deliberate attempts by the Tibetan Government in Exile (GiE) to ally itself not with 
other ‘post/anti-colonial’ nations, but towards seeking alliances with the populations of the 
traditionally colonial/imperial states of the West. This was done by elaborating a ‘freedom 
through rights’-led approach, advocating Tibetan autonomy to practice a specifically 
Tibetan culture as an essential human right. This argument still draws on elements that 
stress the colonial and imperial aspects of the Chinese occupation – population change 
through ethnic Han Chinese in-migration, resource extraction, and cultural oppression are 
all used as justifications for resisting the Chinese occupation, and are often expressed as 
forms of colonial occupation and sometimes linked with the term genocide. The Dalai 
Lama, for instance, often refers to a type of ‘cultural genocide’ being practiced in Tibet 
(see, for example, CNN 17 March 2008). Thus, rather than exterminating the Tibetan 
population, the Chinese are seen to be doing irreparable harm to the traditional culture of 
Tibet.  
This notion of a ‘traditional’ Tibetan culture, preserved in exile while being destroyed in 
Tibet, creates a need to develop our understandings of how Tibet is imagined and 
actualised in people’s everyday activities. In Tibetan terms, this debate has largely been 
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used to examine the production of the Shangri-La image of Tibet and the Tibetan people 
and its possible impact (Dreyfus 2005; Lopez Jr 1998). This can be examined through the 
theoretical tool of Said’s Orientalism, where the exotic images of an Oriental ‘other’ are 
symbolically used by the colonial metropole to dominate the colonial periphery itself. As a 
result, there are two processes at work here, on one side the antagonistic imperialistic 
debate against China, but at the same time, a debasing of Tibetans and Chinese by a 
dominant Western Orientalist view that privileges passive Tibetans against authoritarian 
Chinese.  
What this chapter seeks to explore are some of the trajectories of imperialism and 
colonialism within the Tibet issue and how these are produced, but more importantly, how 
individuals negotiate and place themselves within these discourses. Initially, the chapter 
will discuss how Tibet is placed in imperial/colonial literature. This will both act as a broad 
review of the literature, but will also look at how the competing discourses and histories of 
Tibet are played out by the Chinese and Tibetan ‘sides’ of the argument. The second part of 
the chapter will examine the history of Tibet’s relations with the West and think about 
some of the issues arising from debates around Donald Lopez Jr.’s Prisoners of Shangri-La, 
but will also examine some empirical findings of how this Orientalism is produced and 
practiced. The final section of the chapter will look at how these issues are played out in 
reality through looking at the ways in which Tibet has been imagined by the various actors 
within this research. 
Imperial/Colonial Relations and the Tibet Issue  
The relationship between Tibet and China is undoubtedly intricate and weighed down by a 
series of historical ‘facts’ used by both sides to justify their position. This does not stop it 
being projected by both the Tibet Movement and the pro-Chinese sources in simplistic 
terms that disavow the other point of view entirely. Pro-Chinese arguments rely upon the 
continued insistence that Tibet has always been a region of China and before 1950 was 
ruled by a brutal theocratic regime that was responsible for keeping the majority of the 
society in a form of feudal servitude (Epstein 1983; Furen and Wenqing 1984). Pro-Tibetan 
accounts obviously dispute this, but as well as promoting the idea of a Tibetan nation as a 
discrete entity (which is discussed in more depth in the next chapter), material circulates 
that tends to emphasise the harsh treatment of Tibetans in Tibet (TCHRD 2007), the 
extraction of Tibet’s natural resources (Anon 2007), or claims the occupation to be akin to 
genocide (CNN 17 March 2008). However, as can be seen from this mixture of claims, the 
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apparent imperial or colonial aspects of this become more difficult to discern (Sautman 
2006). This section will attempt to unpick and situate Tibet more closely in these arguments 
and debates.  
Broadly, this argument marks a shift in the literature that recognises a turn away from only 
recognising overt displays of imperial/colonial behaviour towards coded and disguised 
practises that blur what we could consider as colonial behaviour in contemporary and 
historical worlds. Work on internal colonialisms (see Hechter 1975 for the archetypal study 
of this kind), and more recently on the stretching of imperial ideas beyond modern 
boundaries (Jones and Phillips 2005) and contemporary neo-colonialism (Gregory 2004; 
Mann 2003) have meant it is now imperative that we think beyond imperialism and 
colonialism as something that has occurred only in various forms throughout human 
history. 
Imperialism, if taken most directly from its Latin derivation imperialis or imperium, 
generally refers to an empire or the power of command over an area. Of course, this 
derivation has much to do with the classical construction of an ‘empire’ - a territory which 
one can possess and control, but it still retains much of its pertinence in the present. The 
exact definition of what it means to be imperial as opposed to colonial or simply 
governmental is still something that can be debated according to specific circumstances. To 
take one well known example, Edward Said argues that in its most general sense, 
imperialism is “the practice, theory, and attitudes of a dominating metropolitan centre 
ruling a distant territory” (Said 1993: 8).  
Despite the seeming simplicity of this definition, it already throws up a number of issues. 
Firstly, it is a multi-pronged process, incorporating practices, a presumably overarching 
corpus of theory, and a broad sweep of societal attitudes as its tools. Secondly, these 
practices are all incorporated in order to produce two larger effects - dominating and 
ruling. Here, governance and superiority of one place over another are realised and 
solidified, so that the system of control, once in place, is reinforced as it is performed over 
time. Finally, Said crucially equates imperialism with distance, which is not simply equated 
with an actual spatial unit of distance. Imperialism can be against those who are not in 
close geographical proximity to us, but can also be practised against a societal ‘other’ who 
can be easily differentiated against the imperial ‘self’. There are problems with this marking 
of distance between coloniser and colonised. Fanon’s work (Fanon 1963, 1967) obviously 
interrogates the relations between coloniser and colonised, but the spatiality of these 
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relations is also open to question (Jones and Phillips 2005; Massey 2005). In addition to 
these problems, embedded in Said’s notion of imperialism is the idea of it acting on a 
distinct territory, and here he harks back to the idea that imperialism is linked between 
geographical units of area, while avoiding the idea that imperialism is explicitly connected 
to the possession of that territory. To him it is the role of domination between the two 
regions that is the crux of imperial rule – as long as one can force another to do one’s 
bidding, there is no explicit need to take over the other’s physical landscape. 
Thus, imperialism does not necessarily require the possession of a territorial ‘empire’. 
Territory, and its possession and exploitation have, instead, become increasingly conflated 
with the related process of colonialism – to continue with Said’s definitions, colonialism is 
about the ‘implanting of settlements’ (1993: 8) upon an area that one controls. To him it is 
often, but not necessarily, a consequence of imperialism. The implanting of settlements 
leads in turn to colonialism’s linking with a number of other processes, such as population 
transfer and resource extraction. Colonialism therefore becomes much more practical, 
involving as it does processes that can generally be recorded in some way, whether in the 
movement of people, or the economic value of any resources produced from a colonial 
region. In addition, colonialism is often seen as being a distinctly discriminatory practice. A 
huge amount of literature has examined how colonialism established a system of unequal 
power relations between the ruler/coloniser and the subject/colonised (Fanon 1963; Fanon 
1967; Memmi 1974).  
It is with the imperial concepts of domination, rule and distance, together with the colonial 
processes of settlement and discrimination that pro-Tibet advocates try to situate their 
particular argument. This argument is built upon a series of mutually constitutive clauses 
and statements. The initial basis of the Tibetan discourse is, of course, the production of 
Tibet as an independent nation itself. This is discussed in the next chapter, but here it is 
important to recognise the foundational basis of this. From the building of a nation myth it 
becomes possible to separate Tibet from China – they are two distinct political entities and 
this political separation reinforces the physical, geographical distinction between the two 
areas. From here, it becomes a short step to invoke Said’s version of imperial relations 
upon Tibet’s relationship with China. The physical, political and cultural distance between 
the two is constructed and maintained through particular versions of history that 
emphasise different ways in which Tibet proved its independence. When this is combined 
with the takeover of political control by the Chinese in the 1950s, it becomes a short step 
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to manufacture Tibet as the victim of imperialistic forms of aggression and domination 
(see, for example, Avedon 1994 ; Craig 1999 and; Losada 2004 which all deploy this position 
in a variety of ways). 
However, this process is questionable. Most recently Sautman (2006) has criticised 
scholarship on Tibet for not considering most of the statistics that have emerged from the 
Tibetan region, claiming that there is no substantive evidence to back up claims of 
genocide, colonialism and imperialism. While this could easily be argued to be another 
addition to one ‘side’ of the Tibet Issue’s Manichean discourse, it also highlights some of 
the issues raised by Mountcastle’s (2006) article on defining what is ‘real’ about the Tibet 
issue. While she concentrates mainly on the nature of human rights as a political issue, she 
does raise important concerns about how Tibet is represented in partial ways by scholars. 
As she correctly points out, “the Tibet Issue has been in many respects an extra-Tibetan 
issue” (Mountcastle 2006: 88). This reflects that fact that Tibet, despite romantic claims of 
it being ‘closed’ to the outside world in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, has always 
been defined and shaped by its relations with the wider world (Hopkirk 1982), and in some 
cases, defined those places too (Tuttle 2005). This is something that I wish to turn to in 
more depth later in the chapter, but crucially what Mountcastle does is raise the issue of 
who is speaking for whom, and how are academics implicated within this. The presumed 
validity of scholarly work compared to other forms of writing has become increasingly 
important for each side to establish that their argument is correct while the other’s is false. 
There remains here the broader question of how imperialism is proved to be at work. 
Claims and counter claims based upon empirical evidence such as Sautman’s and various 
pro-Tibetan arguments tend not to prove anything, instead reinforcing the prevalent 
discourses. Of course, this fact is recognised by many Tibetologists, and it is through 
readings and attempts to unpick the Tibet issue in an impartial way and from a variety of 
standpoints that often yield the most useful work (Barnett 2006; Goldstein 1997; Sautman 
and Dreyer 2006; Shakya 1999). 
It is in these more balanced accounts of the relations between Tibet, China and the rest of 
the world that it becomes increasingly difficult to recognise something that can clearly be 
seen as a deliberate colonial or imperial process occurring. Indeed, many of the policies of 
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Beijing have been ostensibly put in place to benefit the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR)9. In 
terms of population alone, the region was not subject to many of the population policies 
that affected the rest of China, while the influx of ethnic Han and Hui populations into 
Tibet, claimed as a deliberate form of population transfer by pro-Tibetans, is mainly a 
secondary effect of advantageous economic policies put in place in Tibet in an effort to 
foster development. Thus, while Chinese policy is definitely aimed towards integrating 
Tibet into China in terms of both infrastructure and wider economic development, 
according to Goldstein (1997) there is no evidence for a concrete Chinese policy to 
promote in-migration. 
From the Tibetan viewpoint, recently there has been a recognition that many of the ‘facts’ 
that have been used by TSGs and other campaign organisations have been misleading. 
French (2003) examined the statistics behind a ‘fact’ that is widely quoted amongst pro-
Tibet sources that over 1.2 million Tibetans had been killed as a direct result of the Chinese 
occupation, and found that the sources were to an enormous extent unreliable. However, 
this does not stop claims of Chinese aggression inside Tibet emerging amongst the exile 
community (TCHRD 2006). 
In addition, what it becomes important to recognise at this point is that while the Tibet 
issue is widely debated in terms of absolutisms, the role of the unspoken third party must 
at some point come to the fore. This is that of the West and its role in defining the Tibet 
issue. Few would argue that it was ‘the West’s’10 colonial intrusion into Tibet during the 
late 19th and early 20th Centuries that brought about the current situation (Goldstein 1989; 
Shakya 1999; Xu and Yuan 2006). However, it is increasingly recognised that the West both 
gave impetus to the political situation with its various interventions into the region 
(including covert CIA-backed guerrilla fighting in the 1960s, see Dunham 2004; 
McGranahan 2006) but also saw the terms of the debate becoming expressed in the 
language of Western political modernity. Dibyesh Anand (2006, 2007) has argued that the 
relations between Tibet and China have only been forced into becoming the Tibet Issue 
through this engagement: 
                                                          
9
 Indeed, the ‘benefits’ of imperialism/colonialism to those who suffer under it have always been 
deployed as a positive – for the latest in a long line of defences of imperialism as ‘development’, see 
Niall Ferguson’s Empire (2003). 
10
 I speak here in generic terms of ‘The West’. Rather than suggesting a homogenous group of 
people who can be labelled under the term, I employ the term in the commonsensical way in which 
it is deployed by many within the Tibet movement. I follow here Moran (2004)  in hoping that by 
occasionally emphasising the term ‘Western (and indeed ‘Tibetan’ and ‘Chinese’) we should not 
forget the historically situated, context specific and heterogenous nature of the groups I refer to. 
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“Both the Chinese and the Tibetans ignore the fact that they are 
“prisoners of modernity,” a modernity whose terms have been 
dictated by the West as a political actor as well as an ideational 
construct. Whether one likes it or not, the West is already within the 
Tibet Question, as the dominant vocabulary available to political 
communities derives mostly from Western ideas and language. This 
dominance of the West is demonstrated very clearly in the discussion of 
the Tibet Question, where instead of resisting the hegemony of 
Western ideas, arguments from all sides buy into them with a 
vengeance. ... Modernity, with its universalization  of specific Western 
politico-legalistic ideas and concepts such as territoriality and 
sovereignty, has offered a highly problematic framing of the Tibet issue 
and legitimized [historical] colonial reifications of the region.” (Anand 
2006: 285-287, emphasis added)  
Thus to Anand, far from being a third party in these relations, the West’s influence is 
deeply pervasive in the Tibet issue. By both constructing boundaries on artificial colonial 
borders and promoting Western ideas of the state, together with creating a cultural 
mythology of Tibet and its relations with China, ‘the West’ and its relations to Tibet and 
China have underscored the nature of the Tibet Issue. Anand argues we need to move 
beyond the narrow confines of these empiricist and historicist accounts that try to 
determine the ‘truth’ about Tibet’s past and adopt a more holistic account that works 
towards resolution of the issue rather than continued use of the same, seemingly 
intractable, arguments. 
This argument raises a number of issues about the Tibet question. The West becomes an 
additional actor in the seeming binary relationship, and can be mobilised by both sides. For 
instance, the Tibetan emphasis on Human Rights is culled directly from a desire to engage 
with a global modernity. China claims that Tibet was liberated from imperialists and 
maintains that Tibet’s support from the West are part of attempts to split China (Xu and 
Yuan 2006). This relationship with the West also takes the form of something similar to 
Edward Said’s arguments against Orientalism (Said 1978 [2003], 1993) and the West’s 
representation and production of a romanticised Tibet is crucial here (Dodin and Räther 
2001b).  
86 
 
What this section has attempted to do is to reassess the political ground on which the 
discourse of the Tibet Issue sits. Traditional historical accounts from both Tibetan and 
Chinese discourses are found wanting when claiming Tibet as their own. Thus it becomes 
difficult to claim with any degree of real authority that Tibet is the subject of 
colonial/imperial rule by the Chinese regime. Instead, the issue becomes clouded and 
further and further from resolution as claim and counter-claim are made and distributed 
through each discursive network. In an attempt to shift the argument from its traditional 
dualism, I have attempted to take on some of the more recent writing on Tibet that 
recognises the role of the West and its shaping of the political language of Tibet. I have 
argued that it is necessary to take this into account and, with this in mind, the chapter will 
now turn to think through some of the empirical research and look at how individuals 
involved in the Tibet issue negotiate their position in regard to these issues. 
Imagining Tibet – A history of (Western) representation and engagement 
Tibet scholars have done much in recent years to examine the varied ways in which 
imaginings of Tibet have been deployed (Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008; Dodin and Räther 
2001b). Tibet’s geographical isolation through much of history, although overplayed as I 
have discussed previously, still led to a dominant vision of Tibet as distant and unknown, 
while at the same time filled with exotic cultural practices and, at times, of great wealth. 
These imaginings of Tibet have emerged historically almost exclusively through non-Tibetan 
readings of the ‘Land of the Snows’, but have now become so embedded that they circulate 
through Tibetan and non-Tibetan language about Tibet. As a direct result of this, any 
attempt to understand the Tibet Issue and its associated political activities must develop an 
understanding of this long history of engagement. This section will give an historical 
account of the various ways which Tibet has been both engaged with and produced. 
The earliest mentions of Tibet from non-Asian sources come from the Middle Ages, with 
various travellers, from missionaries to the Mongol Khans describing Tibet as they have 
travelled through it. Marco Polo writes of it based on rumours he hears in China (Dodin and 
Räther 2001a). Before that, religious rumours circulated that Tibet was the home of the 
Christian kingdom of Prester John (Kaschewsky 2001, 7). This contact between ‘West’ and 
‘Tibet’, predominantly through missionary activity, produced particular understandings of 
Tibet as a place of religious activity. Kaschewsky describes the travels of the Portuguese 
Jesuit António de Andrade, whose accounts of ‘priests’ in Tibet stresses the piety, celibacy, 
and vows of poverty, all presumably things that he could relate to, and goes on to tell of 
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various rituals involving the expulsion of evil spirits and use of holy water in certain 
practices (Kaschewsky 2001, 5). Rumours of Tibet as a possible sanctuary of an ancient 
Christian sect continued into the eighteenth century, with some accounts thinking that the 
first Dalai Lama was in fact Prester John himself (see Lopez Jr. 1998, 27). 
With the emergence of Western (predominantly, but not exclusively, British) colonial 
regimes in South Asia, these ideas of Tibet were simplified into blanket ideas of idolatry and 
shamanistic ritual. These narrow understandings of Tibetan Buddhist culture, and the 
nineteenth century evangelistic Christian tendency of the British Indian society, lent to 
more aggressive missionary activity on the Tibetan borderlands. This activity led to the 
eventual ‘closing’ of Tibet to outsiders. In reality, this closing tended to apply only to Tibet’s 
borders with the South Asian colonial powers, with representatives of the Chinese Qing 
dynasty being present in Lhasa throughout this time. However, the border was always 
mutable, and infiltration of Tibet by individual travellers and agents did occur (Hopkirk 
1982; McMillin 2001). The most notable of these were the Indian agents trained by the 
British colonial government to map out Tibet, but there were additional travellers who 
attempted to make the journey to Lhasa, now styled as a ‘Forbidden City’. Thus, the 
colonial desire for knowledge of the forbidden, exotic ‘other’ became one of the major 
driving forces in the representation of Tibet. 
A further influence came in the form of religious study. The growth in the study of ‘other’ 
religions in the late nineteenth century culminated in Tibet Buddhism being appropriated 
by the Theosophical Society which began to represent Tibet as a repository of ancient 
knowledge (Pederson 2001). Together with long-standing rumours of the riches of Tibet, 
with stories of ants digging up nuggets of gold from the earth, so rich and untapped was 
the landscape (Hopkirk 1982), Tibet began to be seen as an area ripe for exploitation by 
colonial powers. 
The development of the ‘Great Game’ as Imperial Russia’s influence in Central Asia came 
into contact with British India’s northward expansion through Afghanistan meant that Tibet 
became further drawn into Western political imagination. Thus Tibet was coded both as an 
empty buffer between the two empires, but also thanks to its already well established 
reputation, as a mystical land of financial and spiritual riches. This meant that having a both 
strategic and mercantile influence over Tibet became coveted by both sides of the Great 
Game. The lack of contact between the British Indian administration and the Lhasa 
Government of the 13th Dalai Lama, together with the reported presence of Russian agents 
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in Lhasa led to numerous border conflicts and eventually culminated in the Younghusband 
Expedition of 1903-04. This ‘expedition’ into Tibet by a British colonial army was led by Sir 
Francis Younghusband, ‘The last great colonial adventurer’ (French 1994), who, influenced 
by the growth in mystical ideas circulating through public life in the early 20th Century, was 
intrigued by what he saw as the more esoteric elements of Tibetan culture, and would go 
on to write a number of controversial books on his own ideas about religion, even 
becoming involved in the commissioning of the musical version of Blake’s poem 
‘Jerusalem’. 
This invasion, quite aside from the political ramifications that continue to affect Tibet (as 
discussed in the Introduction to this thesis), did not ‘open’ Tibet to foreign travellers, but 
popularised Tibet as an exotic location with Lhasa as a ‘forbidden city’, encouraging further 
travellers to attempt to gain access. Most notable amongst these was Alexandra David-
Neel, the French traveller who determined to become the first western woman to enter 
Lhasa. Her travels to Lhasa, disguised as a Tibetan woman and accompanied by her 
adopted Tibetan son, documented ‘hidden’ rituals of Tibetan Buddhism and were 
popularised through her book, My Journey to Lhasa (David-Neel 1927 [1969]). However, it 
must also be noted here that for many who arrived in Lhasa, the forbidden city of myth and 
legend was something of an anticlimax. Tibetans and their towns were largely portrayed as 
filthy and degenerate. Austine Waddell, Younghusband’s medical officer in 1903-04 said of 
the Tibetan town of Phari:  
‘Appallingly foul and dirty, possibly the dirtiest and foulest town on earth, a 
vast barrow in a muck-heap, with an all pervading foul stench everywhere’, the 
Tibetan inhabitants were ‘to be in thorough keeping with the squalor and filth 
amongst which they live’ (quoted in Barnett 2006, 28).  
While Tibet was seen as a repository for ancient knowledge, its people were portrayed as 
little more than superstitious savages who (amongst other things) believed protective 
amulets could protect them from Western bullets. 
This increasingly popular mystic notion of Tibet as a land of ancient spiritual knowledge was 
further enhanced through various other publications, most notably Walter Wentz’s 1927 
translation of an obscure document he called the Tibetan Book of the Dead, which is 
problematic for a whole host of reasons (see Lopez Jr 1998, esp. Chapter Two - 'The Book' ). 
This, combined with James Hilton’s novel ‘Lost Horizon’ (Hilton 1933 [1947]), created the 
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notion of Tibet as ‘Shangri-La’. Shangri-la is a hidden valley in the Himalayas where a 
monastery, filled with Western monks who have almost magical powers of long-life, looks 
over a valley of docile Tibetans who farm the fertile valley floor. So popular that it was 
turned into a film (Capra 1937), Shangri-La became synonymous with Western 
understandings of Tibet. These misleading, and occasionally fictitious, accounts of Tibetan 
culture reached a new peak with the publication of ‘The Third Eye’ in 1956 by a Tibetan 
lama called T. Lobsang Rampa (the T stood for Tuesday). In reality, Rampa was a man called 
Cyril Hoskin, the son of a plumber from Devon who claimed to have been possessed by the 
spirit of a Tibetan Lama, and over the course of several years to have transformed to such 
an extent that his very molecules were ‘Tibetan’ (Lopez Jr. 1998). Even when this part of his 
identity was discovered, Rampa’s works were hugely popular, as they provided a (wildly 
inaccurate) narrative account of everyday life in Tibet and in particular a series of 
outlandish ritual ceremonies. Despite being roundly criticised as the work of a fraudster, so 
popular were these accounts that they spawned two further books. 
Thus, by the time of the early years of Communist Party rule over Tibet, the ‘imaginary’ 
Tibet of Western discourse was largely cemented. Tibetans and Tibet were exotic others, 
who may or may not have had access to esoteric rituals and practices, but were themselves 
uncivilised, either being docile subjects of benevolent rule, or filthy inhabitants of dirty 
towns. With the move into exile came a shifting of this discourse slightly. Chinese claims 
that they had liberated Tibetans from a feudalist serfdom were contrasted with accounts 
by Tibetan exiles that stressed pre-1949 Tibet as something of a golden era, when there 
was no famine and the people were happy (see also Barnett 2006; Gyatso 1998). This, 
combined with the evolution of the ‘New Age’ movement (Korom 2001), has led to the 
continued production of Tibet as a repository of ancient knowledge, but rather than 
imagining Tibetans as uncivilised, they instead become peaceful and knowing because of 
their timeless Buddhist nature (see Sperling 2001 for a useful critique showing the symbolic 
use of violence by previous Dalai Lama regimes ). 
Chinese discourses and imaginations of ‘Tibet’ are important to mention as they too are 
productive of certain idealised discourses of Tibetanness. Similar to the ‘Western’ 
viewpoints mentioned above that place Tibetans as ‘dirty’ and ‘uncivilised’, Barnett 
equates the Chinese view of Tibet as one of “undifferentiated awfulness” in its continued 
denigration of the feudalist-style system of societal organising in prerevolutionary Tibetan 
life (Barnett 2006, 35). Heberer (2001) has shown how this construction of Tibet as a ‘hell 
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on earth’ has helped to develop the paternalistic attitude of many Han Chinese doctrines. 
Here, Tibetans are again played out as passive receivers of the benefits of Han Chinese 
modernity. This attitude has obvious parallels with classical justifications of imperial 
processes as a form of development, or as introducing civilisation to a barbarous area. But, 
while stressing the primitiveness of Tibetans, Heberer also argues that Han Chinese 
imaginations of Tibet are infused with the exotic, and occasionally, the erotic by 
representing minorities in particular ways that emphasise their sexuality compared to 
ethnically Han Chinese (see also Stoler 1995 for more on sexuality and imperialism). This is 
similar to representations of other ethnic minorities in China, and is seen as representative 
of a greater Han Chinese practice of developing a paternalistic self/other relationship 
within the contemporary boundaries of the People’s Republic of China. While this thesis is 
not directly about Chinese representations of Tibet, they still resonate with orientalist 
attitudes and are open to considerable critique and, therefore, are also important to our 
understandings of the Tibet Issue. 
For the rest of this section, I move on to look at a closer theoretical understanding of 
Western imaginations of Tibet. Taking on the theoretical tool of ‘Orientalism’ as a starting 
point, it develops these ideas by turning towards Lopez Jr.’s Prisoners of Shangri-La, as well 
as other Tibetan scholars to assess how these discourses are actually worked through the 
networks of the Tibet Movement. By examining the ways in which these discourses are 
appropriated and run through the various parts of the Tibet Movement, we can begin to 
understand how resistant political actions are mobilised in discourses that would seemingly 
only denigrate Tibetans and Tibet. 
Edward Said’s Orientalism (1978 [2003]) is well known enough to outline its general 
argument here. Most broadly it gave recognition to the fact that the Orient is defined to a 
large degree by the Occident’s engagement with it. It is thus produced and manufactured 
as a site of all that is exotic, base and corrupt compared to the enlightened civilisation 
offered by the Occidental core. But most crucially Orientalism takes away the Orient’s 
ability to define itself. Through an overwhelming weight of cultural reproduction, the 
Orient ultimately loses its ability to produce an image of itself and is thus defined by an 
‘imagined geography’ created by the Occident. It is from this imagined geography of the 
Orient as a place of exotic and uncivilised practices that emerge the racism of colonial 
practices, together with a disempowering of those in the Orient – the subaltern classes can 
no longer gain any voice unless they perform in ways that the imaginary geography 
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imposed by the Occident recognises. Of course, Orientalism is not without its critics, who 
have argued that it is either simply wrong to place such an emphasis on those who started 
the study of ‘The Orient’ (Irwin 2006) or that its Foucaultian account of creating difference 
by placing people within grids of power is too rigid in its dividing of Occident/Orient. 
Ahmed (1992) is particularly trenchant in his critiques of Orientalism, and its essentializing 
of Occident and Orient. Particularly, he argues that by emphasising the ways in which 
identity is defined through difference, Said is simply employing a classical form of discourse 
analysis, which ultimately means all of history is one of Orientalism, and creates a scenario 
where imperialism is disengaged from any political-economy type imperatives and simply 
emerges, almost naturally, without the influence of capitalism. Further, Ahmed argues that 
Said overplays representation as the overwhelming modus operandi of Orientalism – why 
should we assume that representation always makes the other inferior, and do we all 
necessarily buy into that representation? Thus, Said’s history of Oriental-Occidental 
relations essentialises and overplays accounts of difference and is remarkably 
disempowering for both of these groups.  
Despite these critiques, Orientalism remains important in unpacking the idea of how we 
represent the other, and it is difficult to deny that ‘the Occident’, as a crude umbrella term, 
has had an overwhelming influence upon ‘the Orient’. What this means is that, in order to 
attempt to understand many current situations, it is necessary in many cases to review the 
long history of colonial engagement in a particular place (see Gregory 2004). We must 
obviously move beyond essentializing the various discursive arguments at work in the Tibet 
Issue into a domineering West, an aggressive China and a passive Tibet. The temptation 
with Orientalism is to reify it as ‘prison’ of language from which actors cannot escape. Yet, 
we must examine how these ideas are deployed in reality to understand how these 
discourses are actually played out through our participants’ everyday lives. A more 
contingent and sensitive reading of the places and spaces of this imaginary Tibet can, I 
would argue, help us to develop a more balanced understanding of the Tibet Issue and 
move beyond simple stereotyping. 
Given this need for a context sensitive understanding of how Orientalism is played out, it 
becomes necessary to consider Tibet’s subjection to these processes in this light. Thus, the 
mysticism-infused historical projections of Younghusband and David-Neel become products 
of their particular circumstances in Victorian and Edwardian European society. 
Contemporary ‘Western’ activists would claim to be counter hegemonic in attitude to 
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Chinese dominion over Tibet, and would generally consider themselves to be acting in a 
non-imperialistic way (as we will see in the empirical evidence later in the chapter). Whilst 
there are differences in both space and time in the production of Tibet, a stream of ideas 
and connections that mean a distinctly ‘Tibetan’ system of representation can be 
recognised. Foremost amongst academic understandings of these ideas is Donald Lopez’s 
account of the long process of mystifying Tibet in Prisoners of Shangri La (Lopez Jr 1998). 
Lopez, as one of the foremost Western scholars of Tibetan Buddhism, creates an account 
that is deeply indebted to both Said and Foucault. His account is a broadly chronological 
sweep through the history of the West’s engagement with Tibet, and more particularly 
Tibetan Buddhism. Taking several key ‘strands’ of Tibet that have been perceived to be 
‘Orientalised’ he examines the long history of Tibet’s encounter with the West, from 
19th/early 20th Century colonial incursions and the construction and changing meaning of 
the word ‘lama’ that is in many ways synonymous with Tibet, through to the present Dalai 
Lama’s engagement with the West, his argument centres on Tibet’s cultural production as a 
Shangri-La of ancient mysticism.  
This imagining of Tibet is central to a disempowering of the Tibetans themselves. The 
production of Tibetans as a peaceful and isolationist ethnic group both belies history 
(Dunham 2004; McGranahan 2006; Sperling 2001) but also crucially removes from them a 
degree of agency. This has close links to a type of ‘New Age’ thinking (Korom 2001) and 
combines with a belief that Tibetans are somehow more spiritual beings, not concerned 
with the mundanity of everyday existence, rather practicing esoteric rituals that are 
unknowable to outsiders. By being beyond the everyday realm, they are beyond 
consideration as political actors and subjects. This comparative lack of power also relates to 
the relationship between the traditional colonial powers that led to Tibet having little 
international recognition in the aftermath of its invasion and the Dalai Lama’s move into 
exile (Shakya 1999). 
However, while Lopez at points argues that the ‘prison’ that is Tibetan Buddhism’s 
relationship with the West has become nearly all encompassing (a point disputed by 
Dreyfus 2005), he does recognise that Tibetans do have the ability to possess some power, 
albeit within the confines of traditional, Orientalist understandings of Tibetan Buddhism – 
the power of Tibetan Buddhism’s call to people (predominantly in Europe and America, but 
elsewhere too) means that Tibetans can actively recruit people to their cause, contesting 
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and disrupting relations by appropriating the representative discourses that surround 
them: 
“In this way Tibetans have quite literally incorporated foreigners into 
their patronage sphere through their own version of colonialism, what 
might be termed spiritual colonialism. Rather than taking control of a 
nation, Tibetan Buddhists are building an empire of individuals who, 
inhabited by birth by the spirit of a Tibetan saint, become, in effect, 
Tibetans, regardless of their ethnicity.” (Lopez Jr 1998 206-207, 
emphasis added) 
Thus, Tibetans are able to recruit their own population, which, to Lopez, can be easily 
written in imperial terms. However, by acting in such a way they are, at the same, time still 
promoting an emphasis on Tibetan Buddhism and spirituality more generally, rather than 
on Tibetans as beings rooted in a system of political action. Tibetan Buddhism becomes the 
Tibet Movement’s biggest strength and also its greatest weakness. This is the ‘prison’ in 
which Lopez places Tibetan Buddhism, and by inference, the pro-Tibetan side of the Tibet 
Issue.  
While there is much that Lopez is correct about here, by widening the issue slightly and 
taking into account a Tibetan society that encompasses more than Buddhism, there are 
additional ways in which Tibetans have attempted to attract people to their side of the 
argument. Studies of Tibetans which examine the daily political actions that they are forced 
to go through are increasingly numerous, from outright violence (Dunham 2004) through to 
how life in exile is negotiated (Houston and Wright 2003; McConnell 2008; Yeh 2007). 
Particularly useful is Barnett’s (2001) examination of the explicit decision in the 1980s to 
shift the pro-Tibet argument away from colonial/imperial issues (despite the use of colonial 
language of penetration/violation in the debate) towards a human rights-based approach 
to politically contesting the Tibet Issue. This seemingly rational political decision-making 
process shows how Tibetans deliberately attempted to connect their argument not with 
other subaltern struggles against colonial oppression, but instead turned towards an 
argument based upon the UN’s conceptions of universalist human rights. This shift has 
proved both useful and problematic for Tibetans, with a greater degree of access gained to 
sympathetic audiences in ‘the West’, and thus a greater series of networks with which to 
voice the Tibet issue. However, when this is combined with, as Mountcastle (2006) has 
argued, a perceived decline in the realpolitik value of the issue, with human rights not 
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being seen as ‘real’ compared to other geopolitical issues. This example shows how the 
pro-Tibet Movement’s political strategising is an active process. Rather than being trapped 
within an anticolonial discursive language, the Movement is able to shift discursive ground, 
gaining and losing power as its strategies alter to suit particular targets.  
So far, this chapter has been concerned with the theoretical make-up of our 
understandings and labelling of Tibet. The rest of the chapter moves beyond examining 
Western literary and cultural representations of Tibet in isolation. Instead, it looks towards 
the individual and everyday practices that Tibet supporters use to negotiate their way 
through these messy and contradictory practices of dis/empowering Tibet and Tibetans. As 
a result, we turn now to some empirical examples of how these ideas are played out. 
Individual Negotiations of Shangri La   
While the issue of Orientalism still resonates with academic treatment of the Tibet issue, 
there seems to be a relative lack of engagement with the issue in the everyday practice of 
being a Tibet supporter. Particularly, the issue of Tibet as Shangri-la is glossed over by many 
as belonging to the past. Lhasang Tsering, interviewed in Dharamsala, justifies this as 
follows  
“[Shangri-la] was a help and a problem in the early years [of exile]...[Western 
people] equated [Tibet] with this mythical Shangri-La, c[a]me here, f[ou]nd we 
are just another bunch of smelly, problematic human beings and get 
disillusioned (laughs)... So, to that extent, the very fact that there were people 
interested, [and] there to help, was of great assistance, and, now we have 
reached a stage where those who do come, no longer have that illusion about 
the Shangri-La.”11  
Here, Tsering develops this from both his personal history of being a young refugee in India 
but clearly articulates the idea that most ‘Western’ people did not have an adequate idea 
of what to expect of Tibetans as human beings – the mystic construction of Tibet being so 
pronounced. But crucially, this is only equated to the ‘early years’. This imbues past Tibet 
supporters with a certain naiveté but also presents contemporary Tibet supporters as more 
capable of understanding Tibet than this first generation of supporters – they are not held 
by the ‘illusion’ of Shangri-la as Lopez would have us believe. This idea that the ‘Tibet’ of 
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popular imagination does not matter now was also expressed by one of the workers at a 
UK TSG, who, when I spoke of the problematic rendering of Tibet waved it away by saying 
that such things “weren’t really the focus of attention any more”.12 
However, throughout the fieldwork and interviews that comprised this research, it was 
more than clear that this emphasis on Tibet and Tibetans as ‘special’ was still discursively 
enacted. This obviously varies depending on whether the interviewee is Tibetan or not, but 
the Western viewpoint, is elaborated by T, an independent activist based in the UK. When 
asked about how Tibet was represented in the West, T responded  
“I make an analogy between Gandhi and the Dalai Lama…what’s 
happened with the non-violent movement since Gandhi’s death as sort 
of taken over I suppose, morally, intellectually and […] as a figurehead 
by the Dalai Lama is that non-violence has become equated with non-
action. […] If you [watch the film] Gandhi, you will observe that he did 
not do nothing, he was an activist, but he was an activist that insisted 
on stopping short of violence. However, he was only, ‘ha ha’, dealing 
with the might of the British Empire. The British Empire was brutal, but 
they were as nothing compared, compared to Communism. So, what 
has happened, is that the Tibetan people have genuinely become […] 
unable to help themselves […] under the Chinese government, I mean I 
personally met a 19 year old Chinese nun who when the Dalai Lama 
was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize went and sat on the pavement and 
silently held up a little banner that said ‘Long live the Dalai Lama’ and 
that was her only offence – she was imprisoned for 20 years. So what 
their policy has done, it has been so severe, so extreme […] that they, 
they can’t sit on the pavement silently to ask for their freedom, their 
independence, their autonomy, their right to study what they want, 
speak to who they want, discuss what they want…[long pause] elect 
their own leaders, speak their own language in their own country, they 
have been totally […] they, they can’t speak to each other, literally 
even today, […] and they can’t even speak in a group of friends in a bar 
because you never know when there might be a Chinese person 
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amongst you that is prepared to take money for denouncing you […] 
it’s a situation that in the West we can’t even begin to comprehend.” 13 
This extended quote highlights the nuanced ways in which activists position themselves in 
relation to the tripartite arrangement of Tibet, China and non-Tibetan arguments. Initially, 
she situates the Tibet struggle within the long colonial history of the world, but rather than 
speaking specifically of Tibet, relates it to popular understandings of Gandhi, the other 
great anti-colonial, non-violence advocate. This is articulated here through understandings 
of Sir Richard Attenborough’s film Gandhi, rather than any of Gandhi’s writings or thoughts 
on topics such as Satyagraha. This comparison to Gandhi is justified by the placing of the 
concept of activism and struggle, so Gandhi and the Dalai Lama both become activists. The 
success of Gandhi’s campaign against the British Empire, for T, lies in the very fact that it 
was against Britain. Thus, Communism (and by extension the Chinese Communist Party and 
its various elements) is painted as a more vicious and cruel form of imperial domination 
than certain other forms14. Tibetans are denied, not only democratic freedoms, but human 
freedoms such as speech under this regime. This overbearing system of domination and 
control upon the individual is something beyond ‘our’ comprehension in the West.  
Throughout this, there are a series of dislocations and arguments. Thus, the Chinese 
deprive Tibetans of any form of agency in T’s understanding. But, at the same time, this 
system of oppression is stratified, so that most of the blame is pushed upwards to the 
relatively abstract ‘Communism’, only mentioning Chinese people directly when they are 
the subjects of this system of surveillance and its impacts upon them. This is done to 
perform a complicated, yet conventional, dance whereby ‘normal’ Chinese people are not 
implicated as instigators of the oppression of Tibetans, thereby nullifying any anti-Chinese 
overtones, not entirely successfully – elsewhere in the interview, T refers to “all the 
Chinese people that I’ve ever dealt with have been utterly charming, [...] the thing is about 
the Chinese, is that, like the Americans they believe their own propaganda”15. So, while 
attempting to prove her understanding of Chinese people as normal human beings, T 
repeatedly casts them as ‘other’ to not only Tibetans, but also to Western (particularly 
European) standards. This is used to justify a statement complaining that Tibetans in Tibet 
are unable to help themselves, and taking this further, this is seen as something ‘we’ are 
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unable to comprehend in our more civilised Western modernity. This neatly encapsulates 
what Barnett (2001) calls the ‘double-orientalism’ process, whereby Tibetans are passive 
and peaceful and Chinese are evil and cruel, and the concrete processes of oppression are 
far from our ability to understand in Western society. Crucially, this act creates a system 
whereby Tibetans in Tibet become powerless and thus are left needing people ‘outside’, 
whether Tibetan or otherwise, to intervene on their behalf. These claims are all tempered 
by a degree of factual understanding – indeed, the human rights situation in Tibet (and in 
China more generally) is different to that in London. However, while based in reality, and 
therefore not entirely a ‘Western’ product, it is T’s deployment of these ideas that is 
productive of particular renderings of the Tibet Issue. 
T represents a particularly extreme viewpoint in these arguments, and her particular 
attempts to cement her position can only ever represent her ideas, but many of these ideas 
have emerged at various points throughout the research. In Dharamsala, an American 
resident at my hotel told me of how students newly arrived from Tibet in Macloed Ganj 
who were being housed and schooled at the Tibetan Children’s Village complex were more 
violent and aggressive towards their fellow pupils than previous refugee cohorts. This, it 
was implied, was because of the Chinese occupation stripping Tibetans of their ‘peaceful’ 
Buddhist culture16. It is impossible to dispute that Chinese rule over Tibet has undoubtedly 
been more oppressive than liberal, and Tibetans have had many of their cultural traditions 
eroded through many of the processes that the Chinese Communist Party has put in place, 
and I am not intending to claim otherwise. But statements like the ones above (and, 
similarly, the second epigraph quotation at the beginning of this chapter) hearken back to 
an idealised Tibet of the past, where Tibetans lived in a golden age of harmony and 
passivity before 1949, and by extension denigrate Chinese interventions into Tibet as ones 
of unparalleled aggression and little else. These blanket generalisations trivialise the Tibet 
Issue and ignore the complicated geopolitical landscape on which it sits. 
In many cases, activists are extremely aware of the need to distance themselves from such 
simplistic rhetorical debates. PG, a non-Tibetan UK-based campaigner, has, on numerous 
occasions, told me of the need for Tibetans to lead the struggle for Tibet, once in direct 
opposition to comments similar to T’s above. To PG, non-Tibetan Tibet supporters are 
exactly that; supporters, who can engage in solidarity work, but are there to follow the 
Tibetans’ lead on issues like campaign targets and strategies. However, despite this rational 
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exposition of a distinction between Tibetans and non-Tibetans within the Tibet Movement, 
this becomes more difficult to play out in reality. PG himself articulates this difficulty in his 
account of an activist project on the Beijing Olympics that he undertook in Beijing in the 
summer of 2007. 
 
Fig 4.1 ‘Racist Park’ road sign. Source: http://beijingwideopen.org/2007/08/04/day-4-fake-tibet-
in-racist-park Accessed: 17/11/08 
While in Beijing, PG and a colleague visited the National Ethnic Minorities Park in Beijing17. 
The park itself had been the site of some controversy when, due to poor translation from 
Mandarin to English, it was signposted as ‘Racist Park’ (see Fig 4.1). However, this park is 
intended to show various ethnic minorities of the People’s Republic of China in re-
enactments of their specific cultures. To begin with, I quote a number of PG’s reflections 
upon aspects of the park which he drew attention to. 
“[T]hey’ve built on the top of a small hill a fake monastery. And it really is the 
size of a small monastery, you know, we’re not talking about Legoland here, 
it’s a real building done up to look like a monastery. But as with everything in 
the park, it looked like it had been built in a rush, it looked cheap, it was 
obviously not right. I mean, Tibetan buildings, traditionally you know, they’re 
angled, the walls are angled, whereas this was straight, well almost straight, 
you know, if there was any angle it would have been minimal, you know, it just 
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wasn’t right. Walking up to the monastery, they had a courtyard in front of the 
monastery, and ... they had these sort of boulders and even the boulders 
looked fake, and they’d painted murals on them which were supposed to be 
Buddhist murals, but, they were again done so cheaply and quickly there was 
no detail in them, they looked like they could have been, you know painted on 
by anybody in about ten minutes, or even like spray painted ... with a 
cardboard cut-out, it just had that look and feel about it. It had no real detail, 
therefore no respect to ... what it was supposed to be.”18 
PG goes on to describe coming across some Tibetan prayer wheels, which are often used as 
symbols of Tibet’s religious culture: 
“...they’d built these prayer wheels, and you know, they were meant to be 
spun around, but there was no information about them, there was no, detail 
about what they actually were, what the correct way of spinning them, you 
know, the correct way to walk around the area that they’d built, by walking 
around clockwise, spinning the prayer wheels in a clockwise direction. So you 
had tourists, you had children, a lot of children, walking through, spinning 
them this way and that and not using the handles, literally like toys. And I 
couldn’t really see what ... anyone would be getting out of any of it. To me 
there wasn’t any real learning or understanding of the culture.”19 
These two examples are important as they show how PG constructs a particular style and 
way to practice being ‘Tibetan’. Following Bishop (2000), clear markers like architecture 
and religious practice are, according to PG, misunderstood by the designers of the Ethnic 
Minority Park, and so the park becomes ‘fake’. This misunderstanding of the ‘correct’ 
Tibetan culture allows PG to then articulate two processes of control; firstly he denigrates 
the Han Chinese ability to understand Tibet, with their crude constructions proving that 
they are unacceptable guardians of Tibet and its individual culture. There is no ‘respect’ 
towards Tibetan culture in the park. Secondly, and by performing the first process, he is 
proving that he possesses a greater understanding of Tibetan culture - he knows what is 
right, and more importantly what is wrong with this park, and thus makes himself a more 
‘true’ guardian of Tibetan heritage and culture than the creators of the park. This is also 
articulated by PG’s final comments about the purpose of the park. To him, the park is not 
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about fostering any greater understanding between Tibetans and Han Chinese people – the 
lack of any guidelines about the prayer wheels justify this. Instead, to PG, as he makes clear 
throughout this section of the interview, the park is a propaganda vehicle. And it is this lack 
of authenticity, combined with what he perceives as propaganda, which taints PG’s 
experiences of the park – he initially described it as 
“...kind of like a theme park, I guess. And in a way, I kind of felt that it was a bit 
more like a zoo, because they actually had Tibetans there, as well as the 
buildings and structures that they built, they also had Tibetans there, who 
performed...”20 
Thus the park becomes something inhumane, with Tibetans performing for Chinese 
purposes: 
“And it all sort of, it all hit home then I think, exactly how China was using 
Tibet, you know, I mean we don’t know if these Tibetans had volunteered to 
do it, or they were told to do it, or what, but you could see they weren’t happy 
[...] they weren’t overjoyed at what they were doing, they were just doing it 
[...] it obviously just felt all wrong.”21 
Here PG hints at the fact that his impressions of the park are just that – his own personal 
impressions, but the effect of the poor recreation of what he deems as ‘Tibetan’ have 
reinforced his ideas about Han Chinese misunderstandings of Tibet so that the whole place 
becomes an extreme example of all that is wrong with China’s attempts to package Tibet as 
part of the People’s Republic. PG was in Beijing for around a week, yet he still described the 
ethnic minority park as the most ‘significant’ moments of time he spent while in Beijing 
when interviewed around a month later. During the interview, he was still clearly 
emotionally affected by the place, so strong were his objections to the park’s production of 
Tibet. 
Thus, while individuals can be rational actors who do not rely on such rhetorical arguments, 
as many pro-Tibet activists are, these discursive devices are still rolled out. This deployment 
of rhetorical arguments is a result of the assemblages of which these individual actors are 
part. PG’s and T’s accounts are crucially influenced by their own relationality to their 
surroundings. As people who have both been to Tibet, they can claim a degree of 
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authenticity to their points. T uses this to claim that she knows Tibetans are powerless, 
while PG deploys it rather more subtly to back up his knowledge of Tibetan architecture 
and culture. The representations of the Ethnic Minorities Park that PG deploys come out of 
an assemblage of both his previous experiences in Tibet, his time working at a TSG for over 
a decade, and his immediate surroundings in Beijing, where he was under heavy police 
surveillance while documenting his time in Beijing as an activist. Thus, the particular 
situation, flavoured by his own particular background producing TSG materials supporting 
Tibet, led to a reading of a situation that he read as demeaning to Tibet and Tibetans, and 
he can straightforwardly transfer the blame for this onto the Chinese authorities who built 
the park.  
At the same time, activists like PG and T have also balanced these judgements within their 
own moral frameworks. Thus, even while Tibet is a distant object in its predominant 
geographical imaginary, T and PG, in their relatively expert positions as pro-Tibet activists, 
and their interests in human rights more generally22, have constructed a moral framework 
around Tibet that, somewhat justifiably, allows them to argue that the Chinese occupation 
of Tibet and their human rights record during this time is wrong and needs rectifying. 
What all this tells us is that Tibet, as produced by contemporary activists, is still run through 
with a set of contradictory imaginaries. While some will see Shangri-La as something from 
the past, even those political actors who are careful in their representations of Tibet and 
Tibetans, like PG, find themselves drawn into the language of this ‘special’ Tibet, 
denigrating China and emphasising the victimhood of the Tibetan people. Of course, all of 
these are a part of the wider role of establishing one’s argument. In order to maintain and 
sustain the idea that the pro-Tibet side of the issue is correct, TSG materials, for example, 
still continue to paint the Tibet Issue with the same broad brush strokes of opinion. One, 
produced after the March-April 2008 protests in Ethnically Tibetan areas of the PRC, states: 
‘After nearly 50 years of living under an oppressive and brutal regime, Tibetans have had 
enough...The response by the Chinese Authorities [to the protests] was swift and 
brutal...Tibetans need us now more than ever.’ 23 The reasons for deploying this argument 
are clear enough, but the emphases on Chinese brutality and Tibetans needing ‘our’ help 
continue to play into the troublesome productions of Tibet discussed above. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the production and maintenance of Tibet primarily, but not 
exclusively, through the Western imagination. It first set out discussion of Tibet as 
specifically related to languages of imperialism and colonialism. What becomes clear here 
is that, while it is difficult to claim outright that Tibet is the victim of a colonial occupation, 
the languages of colonialism and, in particular, the representation of self/other, runs 
through the Tibet Issue and the Tibet Movement more specifically. In order to build this 
further, the second section gave a brief account of Western (and an even briefer account of 
Chinese) representations of Tibet. These accounts are important as they clearly show the 
development of specific strands of thinking about Tibet, but they also disprove some 
traditional theories about Tibet, for example, that is has been isolationist in its world view 
for much of its history.  
The final section took the theoretical arguments of the first two sections and examined 
how they emerged through the empirical research. What became clear here was that while 
there is clearly an effort by Tibet Supporters to move away from ‘Shangri-La’ and simplistic 
renderings of Tibet as an exotic other, in reality, the discourses employed by the pro-
Tibetan side of the Tibet Issue cloud this issue. While individual activists make claims about 
the nature of solidarity and allowing Tibetans to be the leaders of the movement, their own 
understandings are still refracted through the problematic imaginary of Tibet as a ‘special’ 
place with ‘special’ inhabitants. The inability of the Chinese authorities to recognise this 
means that the Manichean discourse of peaceful Tibetans (and their supporters) versus the 
‘brutal’ Chinese continues to be played out. Given that the Tibet Issue has yet to be 
resolved after 50 years of employing this discourse, questions remain about what is the 
best use of these imagined discourses of Tibet and China. It is evidently difficult to work 
outside of these discourses, and so, modifying them again becomes difficult, and while 
Tibetans and their supporters make a conscious effort to think of issues like Shangri-la as 
belonging to ‘the past’ (see Lhasang Tsering’s quote above), these issues continue to 
permeate popular and activist understandings of Tibet.  
This chapter has highlighted an important empirical area of the thesis, but it also acts as an 
introduction to themes that run through the other empirical chapters. The ‘Imagined Tibet’ 
discussed here is clearly important to the Tibet Movement. The next chapter examines in 
more detail Tibetan Nationalism and its production in exile, and many of the themes 
developed here will be seen running through it as well.  
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Chapter 5 – Locating the Tibetan Nation 
“I am not Jack, nor am I an Ashok. 
My country China has occupied, 
Myself into exile expelled, 
My papers say I’m stateless, 
At heart I’m still a Tibetan. 
My name is Tashi, and I am from Tibet”24 
 
Introduction 
The nation and nation-state, despite their seeming dilution by the processes of 
globalization, continue to exert a hold over us. Ethnic nationalist conflicts like the Tibet 
Issue continue to be powerful rejoinders to claims that fetishise the world as spaces of 
flows (Castells 1996). Following from the last chapter, where we examined the creation of 
an imagined Tibet and Tibetans, this chapter takes this a step further by exploring the 
networked and heterogenous ways in which Tibet is experienced as a nation in exile. The 
chapter works through the ways that the Tibetan nation is produced and negotiated in the 
diaspora by blending what Partha Chatterjee has called the ‘nation in heterogenous time’ 
(Chatterjee 2004, Ch. 1) together with more networked understandings of the nation. 
These accounts stress the ways in which the nation is both produced through a series of 
interlocking components, but crucially is experienced differently within and across the 
spaces of ‘the nation’. 
This is a shift away from the idea of nationalism as an academic subject as it emerged from 
authors like Anderson (1983 [2006]), Gellner (1983), Hobsbawm and Ranger (1983), and 
Smith (1986). These predominantly focus on how the nation and nation state emerged as a 
distinct historical entity. Thus they focussed on theorising the nature of the development of 
nationalism, whether from the development of pre-existing ethnic ties by Gellner or the 
creation of mass print-media that Anderson attributes with a causal nationalist power. As 
Jones and Fowler (2007) rightly point out, particularly within studies of the nation within 
geography, the focus has been on the representation of a national community, whether 
this is through things like a particular landscape, monument or display. Instead, there have 
recently been increasing calls for work that looks at how the nation is reproduced through 
“manifold processes and institutions that help to form, mould and reshape nations and 
nationalism within particular spatial and temporal settings” (Jones and Fowler 2007, 333). 
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 From the poem ‘My Name is Tashi’ from the collection Tomorrow & Other Poems by Lhasang 
Tsering, Rupa Publications, New Delhi (Tsering 2003). 
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This allows a view of the production of the nation that moves outside the purely ‘national’ 
scale, examining how spatially extensive processes and actions can be mutually 
constitutive of ‘the nation’. 
Similar understandings of the growing heterogeneity of the ‘nation’ have also emerged 
from studies of scattered social groups, particularly (but not exclusively) diasporic national 
communities. Here, the articulation of group identities in spaces that are not contiguous, 
bounded, uniform geographical spaces necessitates an understanding of the nation that 
understands the specific linkages such as economic, political and cultural practices that 
unite the community. As Brah (1996) has suggested, it is through a confluence of narratives 
that the identity of a diasporic community becomes centred as a uniform construction of 
community, but at the same time this is negotiated through each individual’s memories 
and socio-spatial specificity. Thus, the diaspora becomes a heterogenous site of the nation 
and so “the identity of the diasporic community is far from fixed or pre-given. It is 
constituted within the crucible of the materiality of everyday life; in the everyday stories 
we tell ourselves individually and collectively” (Brah 1996, 183) 
Despite these calls, there remains a tendency to think about the nation as a particularly 
scalar institution. Sitting within a nested hierarchy rising from ‘the body’ to the ‘global’, the 
nation (and the nation-state) can still be a powerful actor within the social realm 
(Mansfield 2005). As a result, much work still sits within a peculiarly bounded vision of ‘the 
nation’. While the nation has been opened up, we still tend to think of how terms are 
essentialised and hardened into groups (Haldrup, Koefoed and Simonsen 2006), and there 
still remains a lack in work that positions the nation as something other than a 
geographically bounded entity.  
This chapter assesses the Tibetan diaspora and nation through a series of more networked, 
spatial arguments. The seeming ease with which people and information can now move 
between these national blocks increasingly blurs and fractures the boundaries between 
areas that were once relatively distinct. Through these processes of movement and 
exchange, I address the production and maintenance of the Tibetan nation, but one that 
engages with the issues raised by Jones and Fowler, and Brah above, namely, how people 
relate to and reproduce the Tibetan exile nation. On one level, how do they interact with 
institutions like the machinery of state and on another, how do they sustain the nation in 
other ways that are much less visible and apparent. In this case, Tibet exists in a diasporic 
form of exile that is involved in a political struggle to gain a form of independence and/or 
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autonomy from Chinese rule. Yet, Tibetan identity, while tied to a notion of ‘homeland’ and 
a specific culture (Kolas 1996), is both about and beyond a specific, spatially-limited 
territory. Turning to ANT-led ideas about space (Hakli 2008; Mol and Law 1994) can lead to 
interesting ideas about the ways in which the nation is produced. The claiming of a territory 
from afar creates a meaningful home for exiled Tibetans to attach their identity to. 
However, the diaspora creates a more networked, and crucially fluid, arena for identities to 
become malleable and altered, with a resultant breakdown of clearly defined ‘Tibetan’ 
identities (Houston and Wright 2003; Yeh 2007; Yeh and Lama 2005).  
Empirically, this chapter examines the production and maintenance of ‘Tibet’ from a 
number of perspectives. Firstly, it will look at the role of the Tibetan Government in Exile as 
a producer and maintainer of a specific vision of Tibet, and how it calls to Tibetans to enact 
Tibet in particular ways. Secondly, the chapter will examine the role of more mundane 
practices by looking at the role of the Tibetan National Football Team. The National team 
serves a number of purposes by acting as a symbol of Tibet and its continued existence, by 
becoming a political tool to create solidarity with others and also to foster and maintain 
opposition to the Chinese occupation. Before turning to the empirical data however, it will 
be necessary to try and assess some of the previous work on producing and maintaining 
the nation and the role of oppositional politics in nationalism. 
Nationalism from territory to heterogeneity 
The study of the historical emergence of nations as distinct entities, while problematic, is 
important to situate the rest of this chapter. Benedict Anderson seems to almost regret 
coining the phrase ‘Imagined Community’. Indeed, while it is true that any nation does 
consist of a community of people who can never meet or possibly know everyone, the 
phrase to him has become so devoid of meaning that he cannot bear to type it fully25. His 
seminal work (Anderson 1983 [2006]) has become something of a yoke around the study of 
nationalism’s neck. It is very nearly impossible to think of the study of nationalism without 
turning to the book (and to a lesser extent Gellner’s (1983) and Smith’s (1986) 
interventions in the literature). This is not to say that his book is not a useful tool to 
understand the processes that produced nationalism. What it is to say, is that the term 
‘Imagined Community’ has become almost universal and, following from this, that the finer 
points of his argument have become lost. This is not something that I necessarily wish to 
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 See note 1 in his Afterword ‘Travel and Traffic’ in the 2006 Verso Edition of Imagined Communities 
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correct here, but it is necessary to point out that Anderson’s work has become so all-
powerful in the literature that it becomes necessary to sweep over the vast majority of his 
argument in order to get some mention of the work into any debate on nationalism.  
Anderson, Gellner and Smith were concerned explicitly with the production of the ‘nation’. 
More specifically, they were concerned with the emergence of the systems of nationalism 
through the emergence of various types of material and semiotic objects that allow 
nationalism to spread throughout a given community. Yet, as Agnew (2004) is right to point 
out, this style of studying the emergence of nationalism is limited in choosing only one 
‘thing’ (in Anderson’s case print-capitalism, or ‘modernisation’ for Gellner) when in fact 
there are a whole raft of processes that craft and form nationalism. Further, in his explicit 
critique of Anderson’s work, he goes on to say that 
“The appeal of nationalism rests initially and finally in the fact that in 
many parts of the world the political organization of territory into 
national states has created real, not simply imagined, material 
communities of interest and identity in which large numbers of 
residents see their fate tied to that of the national state or, if they do 
not have one of their own, obtaining one for themselves” (Agnew 
2004, 225, emphasis in original) 
This focus on territory is something that Agnew relies upon explicitly in his formulation of 
how nationalism is worked through and out. Indeed, this seems to be tied up in many ways 
with the appeal of nationalism to create an ‘other’ with whom the nation can be easily 
opposed and can have the ‘line drawn in the sand’ between the two groups that act as a 
boundary (or national border).  
The concentration of work on boundaries (and their seemingly explicit geographical nature) 
is most notable through the work of Paasi (1998, 2002), which has looked variously at how 
identity, at scales from the national to the regional, is bounded through institutionalised 
practices despite the increasing mobility of people and things in the world today. Thus 
through their institutional construction these territorial units can still exert power and 
maintain their discrete identity as unified objects. While this argument is correct in many 
ways, with border controls and other means stifling the ‘space of flows’ that theorists like 
Castells (1996) would have us believe in, the production and maintenance of identity is not 
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something that can be simply ‘held’ in a territorial unit as this implies an ability to simply 
stop relations across space.  
There are of course many other ways to look at the production of the nation, such as 
Johnson’s (1995) work on monuments, Edensor’s (1997) on memory and commodification 
and Gruffudd’s (1994) on landscape, as examples of how specific sites and arenas are 
implicated in the production of nationalism and highlight the importance of particular 
places/spaces to the maintenance of wider nationalist projects. However, these arguments 
still work with a relatively ‘closed’ conception of the site of nationalist production. Each 
area is relatively distinct and productive of a spatially limited nationalism, and the nation 
becomes a collection of what Gellner would term ‘cultural threads and patches’ (1983, 56) 
of which any selection, not necessarily the ones that are articulated, can be used to build 
the ‘whole’. 
This has been further developed more recently by a turn towards the ‘everyday’ as 
significant. In particular, Edensor (2002) has argued that the likes of Anderson, Gellner and 
Smith have all, to a lesser or greater extent, viewed culture reductively, arguing that the 
subconscious of culture cannot be subsumed by more overt productions and 
representations of the symbolic. Indeed, Edensor is right in arguing that much scholarship 
focuses on the ‘top-down’ imposition of nationalism by triumphant elite-led cultures. 
Instead, he argues for a study of national identity that incorporates a non-historicist, non-
elite culture that incorporates the ‘unspectacular’ (p. 12) into its framework. There is a 
slippage here between ‘nationalism’ and ‘national identity’ as Edensor shifts from the 
seminal theories of nationalism to a promotion of a theory of national identity, which are 
not the same thing, but he is correct in asserting that the study of the production, 
reproduction and representation of the nation is more complex and crucially is grounded in 
sites throughout a nation rather than only in specific places that seemingly make up the 
patchwork of Gellner’s analysis. Thus he argues for a national identity constructed through 
a complex dialogic matrix of dynamic interactions that include ‘images, ideas, spaces, 
things, discourses and practices’ (p.17).  
However, this turn towards the ‘Banal’ or the ‘Everyday’ has still tended to deploy the 
notion of the nation as a relatively bounded, territorial institution. The production of the 
nation or national identity is productive of difference. Edensor, for example, assumes that 
globalisation and supranational organisations like the EU threaten the bounded notion of 
the state, which seems to be viewed relatively unreflexively as an attempt to simply move 
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sovereignty and identity ‘up’ a scalar level. More recently, Haldrup, Koefoed and Simonsen  
(2006), have tried to blend some of the cultural understandings brought about by a reading 
of Said’s Orientalism (1978) and Billig’s Banal Nationalism (1995) as a way of creating and 
building upon the growth of seemingly racist discourses in the everyday language of 
Denmark. To them, the political production of a particular discourse and its permeation 
throughout a society show how the minoritarian, immigrant ‘Other’ becomes homogenised 
and racially typecast. Of course, this can be read as true in many cases, but their account 
still views the ‘elite’ culture of a political party as the starting point for this particular 
discourse, and crucially, assumes that racist language is a bipolar opposite of normal 
behaviour, thus producing a clear separation between indigenous self and immigrant other. 
What this fails to take into account is the multiplicity of relations and discourses at work, 
and as a result creates a vision of two discrete and competing totalities that do not meet in 
the middle. Increasingly, the boundary between ‘Danish’ and ‘Non-Danish’ becomes 
hardened and we move towards versions of nationalism that become predicated upon 
difference to others.  
These ideas of nationalism as constructing relatively fixed identities are, according to 
Bhabha (1994 [2004]), part of the problem. To him, the historicist narrative strategy of 
nationalism is particularly problematic: 
“The linear equivalence of event and idea that historicism proposes, 
most commonly signifies a people, a nation, or a national culture as 
an empirical sociological category or a holistic cultural entity. 
However, the narrative and psychological force that nationness 
brings to bear on cultural production and political projection is the 
effect of the ambivalence of the ‘nation’ as a narrative strategy. As 
an apparatus of symbolic power, it produces a continual slippage of 
categories, like sexuality, class affiliation, territorial paranoia, or 
‘cultural difference’ in the act of writing the nation” (Bhabha 1994 
[2004], 201). 
To Bhabha, this series of slippages is held together through repeated performances at and 
between sites (the patches and threads of Gellner). The nation both maintains itself but in 
a vicious cycle also draws in more and more people to belong to that particular ‘nation’. 
However, the continued movement and articulation of these various sites and groups 
means that the homogenizing attempts of the national are always limited, and it is in the 
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borderlines between these various groups and sites that Bhabha bases much of his 
argument. To him, it is the tensions that exist on these borderlines and limits that allow the 
translation of differences between Gellner’s patches to form new kinds of solidarities. Thus, 
the liminality at the edges of these different groups within a particular nation and the 
interplay between difference and sameness becomes important in the production of a 
particular nation. All nations are necessarily hybrid and networked constructs of different 
individuals, and what Bhabha attempts is a movement of the nation outwards, from its 
traditional conception as something that is generally (but not exclusively) seen as 
synonymous with a state or sometimes a national ‘elite’ and instead looks at the various 
and multiple performances and actions through and across ‘the nation’ itself. 
Partha Chatterjee has also been one of the more vocal critics of these conceptions of 
nationalism. To him, from a postcolonial and subaltern perspective, Anderson’s conception 
of the nation affords little scope for alternative nationalisms to evolve (Chatterjee 1991). As 
products of a modernity that privileges ideas of progress, compared to the relative 
hegemony of the nation as a method of social formation, those who adopt different 
systems of organisation are immediately classed as backward and pre-modern. The most 
clear critique comes from Partha Chatterjee’s chapter ‘The nation in heterogenous time’ 
from The Politics of the Governed (2004). Here, he refutes Anderson’s claim of nations as 
imagined communities, claiming that this imagines time as homogenous – neatly packaged 
and ordered under the influence of modernity (and/or capital). Instead, he takes 
Anderson’s later ideas around the seriality of nationalism in The Spectre of Comparisons 
(Anderson 1998). Serialities are those objects, institutions and discourses which can act as 
the binding agents for collective subjectivities such as nation or ethnicity. Anderson, 
attempting to redress some of the critiques of his Imagined Communities above, uses a 
binary of these serialities to try to address the differences between ethnic politics and the 
politics of nationalism. Unbound serialities are rooted in everyday universality – they can 
be communicated through things like newspapers and allow for individuals to imagine 
themselves as part of a community. They are seemingly limitless and not hindered by a 
need to classify objects, yet are negotiated through space and time. Thus, Anderson argues, 
‘politics’ in Asia was learned, taught and changed as it was practiced through it particular 
local circumstances. This is in contrast to terms like industrialism or militarism, where the 
name-labels were applied after the processes had already begun. It is through unbound 
serialities that nations emerge as subjectivities.  
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By contrast, bounded serialities are the classifications and categorisations imposed by 
modern forms of governmentality. Under these terms, individuals become anonymised and 
fractions of populations are not allowed to exist. Ethnic minorities become totalities who 
can be counted – 3,000 Jews, 2,000 Tibetans. People are one thing or another, never 
hybrids of different classifications. Thus, to Anderson, nationalism has at least the potential 
to be liberating, whereas ethnic politics are bounded and closed to any differences. Bound 
up with a conception of modernity that allows for a spread of secular politics, and in 
particular certain notions of democracy, these ideas can be critiqued through Massey’s 
(2005) understandings of the contemporaneity of political action. If we think about these 
serialities in their ‘pure’ form, distinct from each other, then they would seem to make 
sense. However, it is when they are played out in reality, through the spaces of ontological 
reality, then they become more difficult. The negotiation between pure nationalism and 
pure ethnic politics (in this case) is messy and problematic. Nations that tie themselves to 
an etnie are inextricably bound into a type of ethnic politics at the same time. Thus, what 
Anderson is attempting to do is the classic modern act of purifying hybrids (Latour 1993), 
playing out a particular vision of nationalism against a particular vision of ethnicity and 
cleansing the ground in between. In Chatterjee’s critique of these ideas, the expansion of 
nationalism can be seen as one aspect of a growing liberal universalism in the world. This 
leads to a utopian modernism, where progression and the elimination of the backward, 
pre-modern is the ultimate goal. However, as with all utopian streams of thought, 
Chatterjee argues that this is ultimately unreal – people can imagine being in these secular 
and modern nations, but in reality, this is impossible. Thus, rather than imagining time as 
homogenous,  
“Time here [in reality] is heterogenous, unevenly dense. Here, even industrial 
workers do not all internalize the work-discipline of capitalism, and more 
curiously, even when they do, they do not do so in the same way. Politics here 
does not mean the same thing to all people. To ignore this is...to discard the 
real for the utopian” (Chatterjee 2004, 7) 
For Chatterjee, then, we need to begin to think about the nation not in terms of serialities. 
Bounded and unbounded remain inseparable as opposite poles on the spectrum of social 
reality. Instead, one must steer a path that moves between the extremes of an unrealistic 
cosmopolitanism on the one hand, and ethnic partition on the other.  
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This thinking by Chatterjee, when combined with the work of Doreen Massey in For Space 
(Massey 2005), produces a heterodox reading of both space and time. Massey’s argument 
is explicitly about producing a more mutable and heterogenous conception of space which 
is equally (if not more) important than time within these framings. If we think back to 
Chapter Two of the thesis, these lines of argument have links to the planes of immanence 
present in the work of both Deleuze and Foucault. Chatterjee’s notion of heterogeneity is 
clearly drawn from Foucault’s, while the seriality of everyday politics is reminiscent of 
Deleuze and Guattari’s thinking through the classification of immanence emerging as both 
molar and the molecular. The co-implication of these national serialities as presented by 
Chatterjee, and the more general thought on political subjectivities by Massey, articulates a 
reading of Deleuze and Guattari that emphasises ways that political processes are played 
out across a continuum. Rather than being purely molar (or, as Anderson would have it, 
ethnic), or purely molecular (national), the negotiation and playing out of the politics of 
nationalism are always a blend of the two. 
To think through how these spatially heterogenous accounts of the national can be played 
out in reality, I turn to actor-network theory. In particular, the explicit attempt by Hakli 
(2008) to employ a topological (after Mol and Law 1994) understanding of nationalism to 
Finland. This topology privileges the notions of regions, networks and fluids as different 
elements of a nationalist project. Thus, the region is the bounded territory of the nation-
state, where the inside can be clearly demarcated from the outside. The networks are the 
technological organisations and apparatuses, like state-based programmes of 
governmentality, which bind this region together. These are defined by the intensity, 
strength and speed of relations between elements. Thus, connection is not measured by 
distance, but through the stability of the relations occurring. This breaks down the 
Euclidean notion of space, instead asking us to look at the ability of different elements of a 
nation-state to speak to each other regardless of geographical distance. Finally, the fluid 
regions are those that are mutable and negotiable. Hakli defines these as the embodied 
practices of nationalism, the ‘practical sensibility’ (2008, 7) of nationalism that people carry 
with them through their everyday existences.  
This topological reading of space produces a rendering of the nation that is not rooted in 
the concept of territory. Instead, elements of nationalism that are transterritorial and 
deterritorial can become just as easily mobilised and examined by treating the differing 
spatial ways in which they emerge and are deployed. This fluidity and ‘sensibility’ of 
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nationalism develops from an earlier turn in nationalist thinking that begins to privilege the 
‘everyday’ of constituting nationalism. What I want to examine here is to incorporate some 
of the ideas of Chatterjee’s and Hakli’s renderings of the nation as a process, and uncover 
some of the multiplicity of ways that the nation can be enacted and re-enacted, produced 
and reproduced. While in many ways, Tibetan nationalism works to reinforce its difference 
to a Han Chinese ‘other’, there are also ways in which solidarities and ideas from different 
nationalisms are taken. The boundaries of the Tibetan nation are not fixed, either 
territorially or discursively. Instead, they can become permeable, variable and much more 
difficult to pin down. Before I turn to empirical discussion of this, it will be necessary to 
examine the history of Tibetan nationalism. 
Tibetan Nationalism – Religion, Elites and Print Media 
To understand the heterogenous nature of contemporary Tibetan nationalism, it is 
important to situate it within its own particular history. Much of the writing on the 
production of the Tibetan nation has focussed on some fairly traditional ideas about nation, 
nationalism and national identity. As we saw in the last chapter, most representations of 
‘Tibet’, unsurprisingly, are problematic and contested, blending Tibet and non-Tibetan 
ideas together. These representations revolve around a small number of key areas. For 
instance, Kolas (1996) argues that religion is the pre-eminent structure that shapes Tibetan 
Nationalism. Karmay (1994) identifies literary and ritual aspects of Tibetan culture that 
produce a Tibetan identity in addition to the main vehicle of Buddhism. In his account of 
the production of Tibet from the ‘outside’, Bishop (2000) examines the media and its role in 
the production and representation of Tibet, finding three broad areas that these 
representations inhabit, namely Religion, People and Landscape. Thus, to Bishop, outside 
reproductions of Tibet have tended to stereotype Tibet as a mystical land of religion and 
high mountains, inhabited by Lamas and nomads. This argument has obvious connections 
to the discussions of how Tibet is ‘Orientalised’ (Said, 1978, Lopez Jr., 1998) that were 
discussed in the previous chapter. Here I aim to examine the construction of the Tibetan 
nation in ways that, while encroaching upon these ‘traditional’ ways of imagining and 
producing Tibet, also shift the Tibetan nation ‘outside’ these traditional boundaries of 
relatively fixed territorial entities. To begin, we must first examine a brief historical 
overview of Tibetan nationalism until the present. This can be split roughly into two parts. 
Firstly, Tibetan nationalism ‘inside’ Tibet is considered to show how the Tibetan nation and 
state attempted to produce itself from the period c.1900 to 1950. Secondly, we move on to 
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look at the emergence of more specific types of Tibetan nationalism in exile, examining the 
ways that the ‘nation’ has been held together in the period from 1959 onwards. 
Nationalism in Tibet – c.1900-1950 
The pre-1900 period remains contentious in determining whether Tibetans in Tibet 
accepted Chinese sovereignty or not. Disputed histories and counterclaims by both sides 
aim to gain legitimacy over the modern geopolitical entity of Tibet. However, here I want to 
concentrate on the period from the turn of the 20th century. This is to avoid becoming 
tangled into a historiographical tangent, but also because, despite the long history of Tibet, 
China and ‘Western’ engagement, it is only with the direct encroachment of the British 
colonial regime in India upon Tibet that the present form and shape of the Tibetan nation 
as a distinct political entity begins to take place. 
The traditional ‘Western’ preconception of Tibet as a ‘closed land’ before Younghusband’s 
Expedition of 1903/04 is now widely seen as something of a misconception. True, Tibet had 
attempted to limit its contact with the English and Russian empires that were encroaching 
upon its borders, but this process, as Barnett (2006) points out, only pushed the encounter 
between Tibet and the West towards these borderland regions. In fact, histories like 
Hopkirk’s (1983) account show how, while notionally Tibet ‘closed’ to the outside, this did 
not prevent small scale incursions by individuals or small groups in order to gather 
information. But, in addition, this ‘closedness’ assumes a western perspective and ignores 
the fact that Tibet was for all this time in contact with the Chinese government. Indeed, 
much of the confusion over Tibet’s status emerges through the presence of Chinese Amban 
(diplomatic mission) in Lhasa until they were ejected during the fall of the Qing dynasty in 
1911. To the Chinese, this presence shows that Tibet was officially under Chinese control 
until this point, something denied by the Tibetan state. In addition, much of what we 
consider as uniquely ‘Tibetan’ is closely related to China. The Potala, the Dalai Lama’s 
winter residence, and symbolic of Tibet to many, together with the Jokhang Temple, the 
most important temple in Tibet, both owe some part of their creation in their current form 
to China’s historic influence (see Barnett, 2006, French 2003). This again acts to confuse the 
claims to sovereignty over Tibet. In addition, it is also important to remember the historic 
role of India in Tibet – without the influence of Buddhism from the Indian subcontinent, 
much of what is considered as uniquely Tibetan culture would not exist. 
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This unpacking of the Tibetan identity produces a more complex nation, but it is still 
important that this complexity is still marked by a relatively inward looking government 
before 1900. However, print media began to circulate through Tibetan society in the early 
20th Century (Samphel 2003; Stoddard 1994), and as discussed in the introduction, the 13th 
Dalai Lama, Thubten Gyatso (1876-1933), was noted for his attempts to ‘modernise’ Tibet, 
both in updating its armed forces and attempting to foster relations overseas, primarily 
with the British Empire in India (Goldstein 1989; McKay 1997). As a part of this, it was 
recognised that, in order to function as a ‘nation’, the territory of Tibet had to be marked 
out in order to separate it spatially from both China and the British Empire. Thus the Simla 
Conference of 1913-14 between Britain, China and Tibet came about. This conference 
attempted to resolve disputes about the various borders between the three groups of 
delegates, despite China refusing to recognise the Tibetan delegation. Initial documents 
produced claimed independence for Tibet. However, the Chinese refused to sign them, 
thus making them invalid. A second round of talks produced a document which recognised 
Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but not its sovereignty. This climb-down by the British 
Government of India meant that Tibet still had little international recognition, occupying a 
blurry zone where its independence and autonomy was dependent upon what suzerainty 
could be defined as (Shakya 1999). 
As a result of the diplomatic wrangling, the period from 1914 onwards was marked by 
attempts by the Dalai Lama to produce and maintain a distinct Tibetan identity. Thus 
overseas delegations were issued with passports to prove their ‘Tibetanness’ and increase 
the international visibility of Tibet (Goldstein 1989, Ch. 16). These actions, together with 
other symbols of national independence such as Tibetan monetary denominations (Bertsch 
1997), are now regularly produced by the exile community in order to claim independence 
in this period. In addition, the 13th Dalai Lama attempted to institute policies that would 
‘modernise’ Tibet. Thus, while attempting to update the army, British diplomats were 
invited to Lhasa, and eventually, after the 13th Dalai Lama’s death, radios were acquired 
that for the first time connected Lhasa with the outlying regions of Kham and Amdo, thus 
allowing a degree of sovereign control from the political and cultural ‘centre’ of Tibet for 
the first time.  
The period of 1900-1950 can be read as a period of developing nationhood and 
independence for Tibet. During this period, Tibet emerged from its perceived status as a 
‘pre-modern’ region and began to establish itself as something of an independent territory 
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according to Western standards of nationalist symbology. By ejecting the Chinese Amban 
(although another delegation from the nationalist Guomindang government arrived in 
1933) and by attempting to assert itself both through forms of territorial control and, more 
crucially, attempting to ‘perform’ being a nation through the use of symbolic objects like 
passports and money, Tibet began to attach itself to some of the geopolitical systems of 
modernity. This is not to say that such a transition was smooth, however. Many of the 
reforms put forward by the 13th Dalai Lama were bitterly opposed by traditionalists within 
the Tibetan aristocracy and, after the death of the Dalai Lama in 1933, many of his 
proposals and schemes were abandoned (Goldstein, 1989). In this way, while undoubted 
progress was made in producing ‘Tibet’ as a separate entity to China, it was through the 
lack of ability to establish concrete links with other nations that saw Tibet as ‘independent’, 
together with poor use of what technology was available, that eventually led to its inability 
to defend itself following the 1950 invasion by the People’s Liberation Army (see Shakya, 
1999).26 
Nation in Exile – Maintaining ‘Tibet’ after 1959 
Following the Chinese invasion in 1950, the Tibetan government led by the 14th Dalai 
Lama27 attempted to appease the Chinese government while attempting to gain 
international support for their cause. However, timed as it was with the decline of British 
imperial influence in the region at the end of the Second World War and given the lack of 
international recognition for ‘Tibet’ as an independent state, Tibet itself was left with 
relatively little support. The Tibetan delegation sent to parley with the Chinese army was 
                                                          
26
 Dunham, (2004) describes the famously shambolic, almost comical, conversations between the 
Lhasa administration and the defenders of Eastern Tibet in the following radio conversation: 
“Chamdo [the administrative centre in Eastern Tibet] to Lhasa: Look we have 
sent three urgent messages and haven’t received a single reply. What is going 
on? As far as we are concerned we see ourselves as virtually caught and every 
second is important to us. If you don’t give us a reply we don’t know what to 
do. 
Lhasa to Chamdo: Right now it is the period of the Kashag’s [the Tibetan 
Government’s Cabinet’s] picnic, and they are all participating in this. Your 
telegrams are being decoded and then we will send you a reply 
Chamdo to Lhasa: Shit on their picnic! Though we are blocked here, and the 
nation is threatened and every minute may make a difference to our fate, you 
talk about that shit picnic”. 
(Dunham, 2004, 72). 
 
27
 The 14
th
 (and present) Dalai Lama, Tenzin Gyatso, was sworn in to his official duties ahead of 
traditional schedule in an attempt to provide some stability while the Chinese invasion was 
underway. 
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coerced/duped28 into signing the now infamous ‘17-Point Agreement’ that essentially 
admitted that Tibet had always and would always be a part of China. Following from a near 
decade of diplomatic wrangling with the Chinese occupying forces and unsuccessful 
appeals to international bodies like the UN (Shakya 1999), the flight of the Dalai Lama into 
exile in March 1959 meant that there was a perceived need amongst exiled Tibetans to 
sustain and maintain Tibet in exile. This was done initially by the formal repudiation of the 
17-Point Agreement in order to revert back to the independent status of Tibet. But, in 
addition, there are a number of initiatives that have been established by the Government 
in Exile in order to more explicitly keep Tibet ‘alive’. Things like education and settlements 
were quickly put in place, as the Dalai Lama shows in his autobiography; 
“[W]e have established boarding schools in the foothills for about a 
thousand children, and we are preparing enough schools for them all. 
All refugee parents are eager to send their children to these schools, 
where they can grow up healthy, and as true Tibetans. They are taught 
Tibetan, religious knowledge, and Tibetan history as their main 
subjects; and also English, Hindi, mathematics, geography, world 
history, and science” (Gyatso 1977, 226, emphasis added). 
Thus education acts as a site of continuation of the Tibetan identity, but also as a site 
where Tibet now encounters the ‘outside’ world. The importance of education systems in 
maintaining and producing nationalisms has not been unnoticed by scholars of nationalism 
(Kaplan 1992; Resnik 2003), but mostly this is done in terms of solidifying the nation as 
distinct. Here, the ability of education to formalise what Tibet ‘is’, is combined with a 
broadening of students’ knowledge of the world. This also represents an explicit turn away 
from the ‘Old’ Tibet of isolationism towards an expansionist modern Tibet, where Tibetans 
can act and move in new and different ways. Thus, while preserving what is perceived to be 
important about being ‘true Tibetans’, the exile education system is notably different to 
education in ‘Old’ Tibet, but also in contemporary Tibet. Exile becomes a dualistic process 
of preservation and distancing from Chinese-ruled Tibet. Thus, the version of Tibet taught 
and practised in exile becomes hybrid and heterogenous – taking on different ideas while 
attempting to maintain some forms of ‘traditional’ Tibetan culture. 
                                                          
28
 This remains a point of contention – the role of Ngabo Ngawang Jigme, the defeated governor 
present in Chamdo, Eastern Tibet, and his perceived complicity with the Chinese in these 
negotiations remains a controversial topic for most Tibetans (see Shakya 1999). 
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This establishment of education systems has been combined with the growth of a modern 
‘state based’ system of democratic governance, which will be discussed in more depth later 
on. However, it is suffice to say here that the increasing systematisation and development 
of democratic goals has served to tie the Tibetan people together, but also to expand the 
range of people that Tibet in Exile can speak to, and that this has hybridised the Tibetan 
nation at the same time (Ardley 2003). By moving into exile, the Tibetan people, led by the 
Dalai Lama and the Government of Tibet in Exile, have had to attempt to speak to 
numerous other groups to legitimise themselves. First appeals shortly after the invasion of 
1950 attempted to speak to supra-national organisations like the UN. In this solidarity was 
sought with other ‘post-colonial’ nations such as the Republic of Ireland and Malaya who 
agreed to sponsor Tibet’s appeals to the UN Security Council. As a result, Tibet was 
effectively abandoned by many of the nations which it relied upon for support, namely the 
United Kingdom, India and the United States (Shakya 1999). 
However, in exile, while still lacking formal relations with the overwhelming majority of 
states, exile Tibetans themselves have attempted to reconfigure their political relationships 
by seeking to enter into discourses that are not explicitly anti-colonial in order to legitimise 
their claims. The most prominent of these are the attempts to attach the Tibet Issue to 
issues such as universal ‘Human Rights’ and western notions of civil society and democracy 
while moving away from representing the issue as one of present day ‘colonialism’, which 
saw the initial phases of international support from the Republic of Ireland and Malaya;  
“[E]xile leaders, having realised in the mid-1980’s that foreign 
governments had no strategic or political interest in raising the Tibet 
issue, decided instead to pressurize them by mobilising popular 
support amongst their constituents. The colonial concept, however, 
offered none of the easily communicable attractiveness of the vivid 
imaginary worlds conjured up by the models of specialness and 
violation. … The Tibetan exiles instead turned for support to former 
colonizers rather than the former colonized and chose public relations 
rather than political alliance as its form of politics. … [T]he Tibet issue 
in the international domain is thus not really a political debate, since it 
does not address the political interests of other social forces; it is more 
an attempt to achieve political effects by engaging people in a shared 
image or representation.” (Barnett 2001, 279, emphasis added). 
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Thus, crucially, the representation of Tibet becomes part of the politics of Tibet. Creating a 
specific realm of ‘Tibetanness’ that can appeal to the discourses of ‘human rights’ and 
‘democracy’ both produces and reproduces Tibet, but also spreads the message of Tibet 
beyond the Tibetan people themselves. It was with this in mind that the discourse of ‘Tibet’ 
shifted in the mid-late 1980s, as discussed by Barnett above, and presumably led to the 
Dalai Lama receiving the Nobel Peace Prize in October 1989. This was awarded in 
recognition of the continued message of non-violence and negotiation which the ‘Middle 
Way’ policy29 advocated. However, this led to one of the major nationalist protests that has 
occurred ‘inside’ Tibet since the 1959 Lhasa uprising.  
The political protests in the Tibetan Uprising of 1989 are well documented (Barnett 1994, 
2006; Barnett and Meysztowivz 2004; Schwartz 1994) with a series of riots and protests 
occurring in both celebration of the Dalai Lama’s award, but also in protest at the 
continuing occupation of Tibet by the Chinese. To Schwartz, these protests are, for 
Tibetans, “a means of articulating national identity” (1994, 218). They represented an overt 
expression of ill-will towards ongoing Chinese rule and the associated inability to express 
fully any ‘Tibetan’ identity. Thus they ignored protests about ‘minority status’ that would 
come as an admission of belonging to China, and instead explicitly targeted the apparatus 
of the Chinese state and its social control over Tibet (and in particular Lhasa). Thus, to 
Schwartz, the ethnic dimension of Tibetan nationalism is subsumed by a political 
dimension. Running contra to Gellner, rather than imagining the nation as emerging from a 
progression from pre-industrial society, Schwartz argues that Western notions of the 
nation must be treated with caution, as Tibet’s seemingly isolationist past and the recent 
emergence of Tibetan nationalism in response to Chinese occupation do not easily tally 
with Gellner’s productions of Volk. Nor have the Chinese attempts to invent a tradition 
(after Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) that incorporates Tibet into greater China been, 
according to Schwartz, particularly successful. These ideas continue to highlight the ways in 
which renderings of the Tibetan nation, which rely on traditional theories of nationalism, 
cannot properly understand the nuanced, heterogenous ways in which the Tibetan 
nationalist project emerged. Indeed, to some, it is arguable whether the riots in Lhasa in 
the late 1980s and in Lhasa and elsewhere in March 2008 were overtly nationalistic, and 
                                                          
29
 The ‘Middle Way’ policy called for ‘Genuine Autonomy’ for Tibet rather than independence from 
Chinese rule. As such it was a major concession by the Tibetan Government, representing the first 
climbdown by either side of the Tibet Issue. It still remains controversial amongst the Tibetan 
community today, with many hardliners seeing it as little more than ceding the homeland to China. 
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instead are expressions of more general social discontent with Chinese Communist 
government policies (Blondeau and Buffetrille 2008; Shakya 2008).  
These accounts of the Tibetan nation are particularly centred on what happens inside Tibet, 
yet there are obviously links here to events outside Tibet, particularly with Chinese claims 
of  the Dalai Lama acting as a major motivation for the protests to begin (Xinhua 2008). 
Indeed, with the Dalai Lama as symbolic of Tibet, combining as he does both the ‘Religion’ 
and the ‘people’ of Tibet, there are important processes of border crossing here. 
Schwartz’s account necessarily focuses on the interior of the territorial region of Tibet and 
the processes of national resistance going on, but this precludes wider accounts of what it 
means to be a ‘Tibetan’. It is into this category that much of the more recent research falls. 
In Bishop’s (2008) article on Tibet and the media, Tibet is produced by a Western-
dominated media that ‘Orientalises’ Tibet and produces a dominant account of what Tibet 
is that becomes all pervasive. Emily Yeh and Kunga T Lama (2005) have usefully explored 
this issue in their account of how diasporic Tibetans perform their identity, and how those 
who do not conform to the Tibetan identity, instead adopting behaviours of where they 
reside (in this case the Afro-American Hip-Hop 'Gangsta' culture) become more 
marginalised within a given culture. A similar exploration of diasporic Tibetan identity by 
Houston and Wright (2003) finds that Tibetan diasporic identity is malleable across space 
and place, with a distinction between home and exile, but it is also curiously static, with 
traditional class relations still remaining important, despite the movement into exile 
destabilising many other aspects of national identity. 
As a result, the Tibetan nation can be seen as a web of intertwining relations, symbols and 
objects, which both Tibetans and non-Tibetans have degrees of control over. In some cases, 
identity seems to be ‘nailed down’ to certain behaviours – going to a Tibetan school in exile 
to maintain ‘Tibetan values’ in exile, or the continuation of class boundaries in settlements 
and work patters in Nepal (Houston and Wright 2003). In others, identity becomes 
negotiable and fluid – becoming a Hip-hop gangster or adopting Nepalese citizenship. 
There thus emerges a gap between the representation of Tibet, as shown in the last 
chapter, and the actual production of the Tibetan identity. Thus, by examining the 
representation of Tibet, we have a focus on how Tibet is a territorial space which exists 
both as a present region of the People’s Republic of China, but also as an exile community. 
Counter this to the production of Tibet, and there are still some seemingly clichéd accounts 
of the Orientalism of Tibet, but in addition there are other identities and other symbolisms 
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of what it is to ‘be Tibetan’ at work. Diasporic behaviours that do not enact the three pillars 
of Bishop’s analysis are seemingly the liminal spaces that Bhabha (1994 [2004]) attempts to 
convince us of. It is with this in mind that I turn towards thinking through what this means 
for the empirical research of this project. 
Centralising the nation – producing and representing ‘Tibet in Exile’ 
“How rich our mutability, how easily we change (and are changed) from one 
thing to another, how unstable our place – and all because of the missing 
foundation of our existence, the lost ground of our origin, the broken link with 
our land and our past” (Said 1986, 26). 
When one thinks of the imagined geographies of India, sometimes, Dharamsala and 
Macloed Ganj leave a lot to be desired. Instead of the hot, dusty landscape teeming with 
people which forms my imagined geography of India, invariably I find myself on the pine-
covered ridges above the town of Dharamsala, standing in the rain and wandering through 
the muddy main streets of the smaller village of Macloed Ganj. While they bustle with 
activity, a two minute walk will find you walking through the forests and streams that run 
down the steep slopes to the Kangra valley below. In many ways, this reflects the diversity 
of the South Asian environment, but at the same time, Dharamsala and Macloed Ganj 
occupy a different place in my mental landscape. My research diary on this trip records my 
feelings adequately. It had not started well, with the overnight trip from Delhi on a rickety 
bus that needed to be push-started by the passengers only the beginning of my problems. 
Due to a ticketing mistake, which I still don’t quite understand, I found my seat was in the 
driver’s cabin, directly above the hot and noisy gearbox casing which threatened to melt the 
soles of my shoes and my belongings. The Tibetan family crammed in with me proceed to 
fall asleep on me, with a small child dribbling on my leg, while the Indian driver simply 
laughed at me and my predicament. Indeed, so sorry did he feel for me, that as the only two 
people who had been awake all night, he made it his special job to try and get me to drink 
chai with him on his occasional tea stops. While this made me remember some of the great 
pleasures of travelling through South Asia, by the time the bus rattled up the narrow roads 
to Macloed Ganj, the journey had made me a particularly tired and unhappy person on the 
morning of the 4th of March 2007. When I eventually found an overpriced room (most 
rooms had been taken in this height of pilgrimage season when the Dalai Lama gives his 
annual spring teachings), I found myself on a bright, sunny morning eating breakfast on the 
roof of my hotel, with kites and buzzards gliding on thermals above and the Kangra valley 
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and plains of India stretched out below, I felt able to relax for what seemed like the first 
time in days. Then, I wrote that “the madness of Delhi and the bus journey seem to pale 
already now that I’m actually here”30.  
However, memories of Macloed Ganj as wet and cold were swiftly reaffirmed when it rained 
heavily for the next four days. I’m sure I’ve read somewhere that Dharamsala advertises 
itself as the second wettest place in the world, and as I  got drenched walking along with 
the other protesters on the 10th of March, the anniversary of the 1959 Tibetan (or Lhasa) 
uprising, I didn’t feel very much like I was in India at all. But at the same time, I didn’t feel 
like I was in Tibet either. Never having been there, the Tibet of my imagination remained 
one of snow capped hills, grassy or barren plains and yaks, despite the fact I knew this was 
a stereotype at best. Here, despite the presence of the Tibetan style temple on the main 
street and the prayer flags strung between buildings was a hybrid space, with the last 
remains of the British colonial hill station31 still present in the name and the Christian church 
and a few colonial bungalows still sitting on the hillside. Indian-style buildings and shop 
signs are visible all around, and Tibetan cultural symbols seem to sit upon this landscape as 
the latest layer of its history expands and occupies the spaces around us. 
Dibyesh Anand argues that Dharamsala is primarily projected through one specific set of 
ideas, that of Dharamsala as ‘Little Lhasa’; 
“It is thus not surprising that Dharamsala is projected as the Little Lhasa in 
India, and several dynamics support such a depiction. Not only is this the 
residence of the Dalai Lama and (therefore) a place of pilgrimage for many 
Tibetans and non-Tibetan Buddhists, but it is also the focus for the individual, 
communal, and institutional practices of Tibetan culture. Earlier pilgrims used 
to visit Lhasa, which for them was a source of refuge from the everydayness of 
life with hope of good in the next life. Now refugee status is itself seen as a 
sort of pilgrimage during which a darshan (sight) of the Dalai Lama in 
Dharamsala provides compensation for hardship.” (Anand, 2007, 116). 
Thus, combined with the presence of the Central Tibetan Administration, Dharamsala and 
its surroundings provide a ‘centre’ around which Tibetan political life revolves. At its most 
basic level, ‘Dharamsala’ is a blanket term for the two settlements of Dharamsala, the 
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 Researchdocs/diaries/india/04/03/07. 
31
 In an example of the strange circularity of history, Sir Francis Younghusband’s parents owned one 
of these bungalows in Dharamsala in the mid-nineteenth century.  
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administrative capital of the Kangra District of the Indian state of Himachal Pradesh, and 
Macloed Ganj, a small hill station left over from the British colonial period which perches 
above Dharamsala on a ridge descending from the Dhauladar mountain range. Avedon’s 
(1994) writing on this period sums up the general situation of the hill station at the time as 
an area that had fallen into decline after the removal of the colonial regime. The arrival of 
the Dalai Lama into a small house in what has become the Tsuglukhang temple complex in 
Macloed Ganj (see Figure 5.1) has created, as hinted at by Anand above, an economic 
stimulus to the region through tourism. In addition to bands of tourists seeking spiritual 
enlightment, come tourists, from India and beyond, who are simply curious, combined with 
Tibetan and more general Buddhist pilgrims. Dharamsala, and more specifically Macloed 
Ganj, have become cosmopolitan centres which attract pro-Tibetan political activities 
throughout the year. 
 
This cosmopolitanism is reflected through the makeup of the towns themselves, 
particularly Macloed (see Figure 5.2). Restaurants promoting Amdo-French cookery 
(promising a blend of the best of Tibetan food with the best in world cuisine) nestle next to 
esoteric, ‘new age’ practitioners. Bookshops catering to the tourist trade sit with the Indian 
owned handicraft emporiums. While many of these experiences can be replicated in the 
many areas across India (see Blunt 2005 for an account of a different, Anglo-Indian, 
community settlement in India, especially Ch. 4), the Tibetan influence and the presence of 
the reincarnation of the Chenresig, the Boddhisattva of Compassion, mark out the area as 
different. There are obvious statements of Tibetan nationality – Tibetan national flags, 
replete with their own symbology32 are outnumbered only by the Buddhist prayer flags that 
cover buildings. Like Lhasa, Macloed Ganj in particular is surrounded by monasteries33. 
Rocks have been carved and painted to become mani stones, covered in Tibetan Buddhist 
mantras so that the prayers become part of the very landscape itself (see Figure 5.3).  
 
 
                                                          
32
 The flag contains, amongst other things, six bands of red for the six tribes of Tibet, six bands of 
blue to represent the clear blue skies above the Tibetan plateau, and a variety of specifically Tibetan 
Buddhist symbols. 
33
 Unlike Lhasa, these are not exile recreations of Sera, Ganden and Drepung, the ancient seats of 
conservative monastic power that surrounded the Tibetan city. These have been rebuilt in other 
settlements across South Asia in an attempt to create Dharamsala as a secular seat of power for the 
CTA.   
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Figure 5.1: The Tsuglukhang, or central Temple, sitting in a courtyard of the residence of the Dalai 
Lama (Author's Own, March 2007) 
It is therefore unsurprising that one finds Tibetan political posters and nationalist rhetoric 
written deep into the life of the area. The Central Tibetan Administration buildings sit 
halfway down the hill, between Dharamsala and Macloed Ganj itself. In these buildings are 
the Offices of most of the administration, but also the Library of Tibetan Works and 
Archives, which has the specific goal of preserving Tibetan culture in exile34. TIPA, the 
Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts, and the Norbulingka Institute, dedicated to preserving 
Tibetan crafts and arts, have similar goals. Posters and billboards call for, amongst other 
things, the release of the Panchen Lama (‘The World’s Youngest Political Prisoner’) in 
English and Hindi (see Figure 5.4). Thus, the Dharamsala area becomes an arena for a 
particular construction of what it is to be Tibetan. Implicit in this construction is a 
privileging of Tibetan Buddhism as the unique cultural heritage of Tibet in exile. The 
Norbulingka  
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 “Once safe in India, many of these sacred books were presented as gifts to the Dalai Lama. In 
order to preserve them, His Holiness conceived of and founded the Library of Tibetan Works and 
Archives.” (Library of Tibetan Works and Archives, N.D.). 
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Figure 5.2: Street Scene, Macloed Ganj. Tibetan-style Temple sits amongst retail outlets (Author’s 
Own, March 2007) 
Institute in particular trains people in the production of artefacts like Thangkas35 and 
Buddhist statues.  
These connections create a blurring between purely ‘nationalist’ projects and those that 
are political. The anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising on 10th March is a case in point. 
This begins with a ceremony in the Tsuglukhang Temple (see Fig. 5.1). In 2007, surrounded 
by monastic and lay dignitaries, together with sympathetic members of the Indian 
Parliament (or Lok Sabha), the Dalai Lama gave a carefully worded statement36 on how 
talks with Chinese officials aimed at a resolution of the Tibet Issue had both made progress 
and suffered setbacks in the previous year. Despite the conciliatory tone of the speech 
(Gyatso 2007), this official segment of the anniversary was swiftly followed by a more overt 
and antagonistic nationalism. Organised by the Tibetan NGOs and TSGs in the area, a march 
of an estimated 5,00037 Tibetan exiles and their supporters moved down the hill,  
                                                          
35
 Painted hangings incorporating Buddhist themes, most typically a representation of one of Tibetan 
Buddhism’s boddhisattvas or a Buddhist Mandala. 
36
 Available at http://www.tibet.net/en/index.php?id=d_tnud&rmenuid=1 (Accessed 16/10/07). 
37
 Estimate by a Tibetan NGO in Dharamsala – see interview ResearchDocs/India/Dharam04. 
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Figure 5.3: 'Om Mani Padme Hum', the Mantra of Chenresig, carved into hillside boulders, 
Macloed Ganj (Author’s Own, March 2007) 
 
from directly outside the Tsuglukhang towards the centre of Dharamsala. Directly outside 
the Tsuglukhang was a scene of pandemonium, as people were crammed into the narrow 
road. It took around twenty minutes to move the 150 yards from the exit of the temple 
onto the road from Macloed Ganj to Dharamsala. Groups of young Tibetans daubed the 
Tibetan flag onto their faces, a common practice amongst demonstrations. This seemingly 
harmless expression of national pride is (so I have had whispered to me) also deployed as a 
means of hiding one’s identity. Many young Tibetans in exile have family still inside Tibet, 
and face painting provides an effective means of hiding one’s identity to protect those who 
remain in Tibet from recriminations. 
Trucks full of similarly dressed young people from groups like the Tibet Youth Congress, the 
most militant and outspoken of the many Tibetan NGOs, led chants by loudspeaker. 
Crammed into the backs of these trucks, they present a curious parallel to images of 
imprisoned Tibetans being paraded around the streets of Lhasa by the Chinese authorities 
after the riots/protests of the late 1980s. 
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Figure 5.4: 'The World’s Youngest Political Prisoner' Billboard in Macloed Ganj (Author's Own, 
March 2007) 
 
In contrast to the Lhasa images, where passive, shackled Tibetans stand in Chinese military 
vehicles and are displayed to the rest of the population to reinforce Han Chinese authority, 
‘Little Lhasa in India’ sees young Tibetans packed into the back of an aged van. They scream 
and shout, expressing their support for the Dalai Lama, and their hatred for the Chinese 
regime that they see as occupying their country. Surrounded by other supporters, they lead 
the call-and-response chants, ‘Long Live – Dalai Lama’ ‘What do we want? - Free Tibet!’, 
galvanising marchers as the rain and wind batter them in the long, two and a half hour trek 
down the hillside. Small groups of Tibetans, predominantly young men, took this display 
even further – wearing torn clothes stained red in imitation of the bloodied clothing of 
political prisoners who had allegedly been tortured during their detention in Tibet.  
This march, despite the large turnout, was overwhelmingly attended by younger Tibetans. 
Later, activists told me that this was mainly due to the poor weather, and older Tibetans 
had not wanted to walk the long distance in such weather38. However, it is also 
symptomatic of what has been described elsewhere (Norbu 2003; Tethong 2003) as the 
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 See Researchdocs/Interviews/India/Dharam04. 
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split between old and young in the Tibet Movement. This, it is generally argued, is a result 
of the increasing democratisation of Tibetan society, where the education policies of the 
GiE have increased the younger generation of Tibetans’ knowledge of concepts like ‘Human 
Rights’ and ‘Civil Society’. This is seen as developing a younger generation of Tibetans who 
are more willing to question the Dalai Lama and, in particular, the Middle Way Policy 
directly associated with him. Thus, young Tibetans are more willing to express a 
commitment to nothing short of an independent Tibet. This gives rise to split in ideology 
between NGOs like the Tibetan Youth Congress, and the GiE. Thus, nationalism in practice 
becomes, for the GiE, about preserving Tibetan culture and a ‘correct’ version of it, while 
for groups like the TYC, it becomes about promoting a difference to China and agitating for 
Tibetan Independence. This obviously begins to blur boundaries between nationalism and 
activism (which will be covered in the next chapter). 
However, despite this ideological split on the aims of the Tibet Movement and its 
nationalist project, the actual practice of this split is harder to define. The TYC, despite its 
name, has no age-based barriers to entry of any kind, as Sherab Woeser, International 
Relations Secretary of the TYC Central Office in Dharamsala explained: 
“... although it is called the Tibetan Youth Congress it is not an organisation of 
the youth. Although we are compelled to call ourselves NGOs, we strongly 
believe we are not just an NGO or organisation. We are a movement for the 
freedom struggle of Tibet, and although it might sound a bit feebish sitting on 
a comfortable chair and talking about a freedom movement when really this is 
a place where elected people come, through meetings, through discussions, 
where people really pour out their hearts, where people really feel, where 
people really are confident that they and their friends and their families can 
sacrifice everything for Tibet. So of course, uh, when you come in the Tibetan 
Youth Congress, you realise the weight that this office holds, and so, because it 
is a movement for the Tibetan Freedom Struggle, it is not limited to just age. 
The recent working committee that we had in Mussoorie in August, we had 
the opportunity to meet a certain representative from Ladakh, [from] Leh, 
and, the person was 78 years old – [he was] still a member of the Tibet Youth 
Congress, and still a regional committee member of the Youth Congress. He 
had been a member since the inception of the TYC, and was still going very 
128 
 
strong and he still maintained that until there is freedom for Tibet, he would 
continue to work.”39 
This view was seemingly confirmed speaking to another activist in Macloed Ganj, Tenzin 
Choeying of Students for a Free Tibet’s regional branch: 
“AD - I was speaking to someone on 10th March, on the walk, and I was 
saying, everyone here is young, or under the age of thirty, it was rare that 
you saw someone over the age of thirty, and he said, ‘Yes, all the older 
people like to think that the Dharma40 will, help solve the problem, and they 
don’t want to do active things, or protests and things like that, they’d rather 
do Kora41, or whatever they think is best. So, not asking you about the 
religious side of things, but do you think that there is an age gap in terms of 
the younger people want more- 
TC – I don’t think so, because after my experience with elderly peoples [sic], 
what I have realised is, it is between people who have a more broad vision, 
and who have less vision. Even among older groups I have seen lots of people 
who really, can, when we talk, they always encourage us. But then there are 
lots of older people who have not seen the world view, who have not been 
very much educated [sic], it’s about more or less, a shorter vision and a 
broader vision. I think it’s not about religious, or about youngsters and old 
people, that’s how many, many people, you know, these days, observe us.”42 
Thus, to Choeying, the situation is more subtle than accounts suggesting older generations 
of Tibetans are less strident in calling for Tibetan independence. Instead, a number of 
differing influences interconnect to foster an individual’s relation to the concept of Tibetan 
nationalism and independence. Education and exposure to different ideas broaden 
someone’s worldview to increase their involvement within the movement. Those who have 
experienced the world and who attempt to understand it more are seen to be more 
committed to the project of Tibetan Freedom. 
                                                          
39
 ResearchDocs/Interviews/India/Dharam01. 
40
 Buddhist Scripture/Practice – one of the three ‘jewels’ of Buddhism, together with the Buddha 
and the monastic community, or Sangha. 
41
 Tibetan Buddhist ritual circumambulation of holy sites. 
42
 ResearchDocs/Interviews/India/Dharam04. 
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It is here again that the various projects of the Tibetan GiE come into practice (Bernstorff 
and von Welck 2003a). The establishment of the Tibetan Children’s Villages (Pema 2003) 
and other educational institutions give a degree of control and centralisation to the 
education of Tibetans. This conforms to the relatively normal practice of states using 
education to normalise certain procedures and indoctrinate new generations into a 
nationalist project (Paasi 1998). Indeed, the GiE actively promotes the idea of a particular, 
bounded geographical notion of Tibet. The administrative boundaries of today’s Tibet 
Autonomous Region roughly conform to the Tibetan region of Ü-Tsang, the central region 
(or Cholka) of Tibet. The outer regions of Kham and Amdo, which each have their own 
distinct cultural practices, are subsumed within the Chinese provinces of Qinghai, Gansu, 
Sichuan and Yunnan. However, in order to establish a pan-Tibetan identity in exile, Tibetans 
in exile are still assigned a home region to which they belong. Thus, while Tibet as the three 
regions did not exist as a functioning administrative entity due to the Lhasa government’s 
inability to extend its sovereignty much beyond Ü-Tsang, in exile this larger Tibet is held 
together through a series of administrative practices designed to maintain pan-Tibetan 
identity. The links to the governmentality of Foucault here are clear, with disparate 
Tibetans being sorted under a series of umbrella units in order that they can be categorised 
and ordered to suit the nationalist project. This practice of ‘sorting’ a population into its 
constituent parts is an effective overcoding of a population, and echoes the serialities of 
Anderson, where people become both Tibetan and Khampa or Amdowa depending on their 
place residence within Tibet. This continues with Tibetans born in exile, who are assigned 
the same category as their parents in order to continue this connection with the homeland. 
Thus, direct experience of living in Tibet is not a prerequisite of ‘Tibetanness’. Ethnicity and 
lineage become relatively more important in designating oneself as ‘exile’. However, these 
also give rise to racial and regional tensions persisting which existed in Tibet (for example, 
the perception that residents of Ü-Tsang felt superior to those from the other cholkas) 
through the Tibetan community (Kvaerne and Thargyal 1993). 
Thus, the very nature of ‘Dharamsala’ creates and enforces a standardised Tibetan national 
identity. In many ways, it is characteristic of a traditional reading of a nationalist project. 
Tibet is represented through a variety of clear cultural emblems, from the Tibetan flag 
through to inscriptions on stones that make the landscape a hybrid of Tibetan and 
Himalayan identities. The placing of the elite level organisations such as the Government in 
Exile, together with Tibetan NGOs like the Tibetan Youth Congress’s central office also act 
as particular centres of both exile political life, but also as a centre of circulation of what 
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the correct exile Tibetan identity is supposed to be. The long period of exile and the 
stability provided by the GiE and its measures to care for the exile community have meant 
that the Tibetan Diaspora has become ‘one of the most successful in the world’ (Bernstorff 
and von Welck 2003a). But, with the stability that these organisations have provided comes 
a homogeneity, even an attempted suspension, of time. Tibet in exile has chosen certain 
cultural practices as representative of pan-Tibetan identity. This is an attempt to recreate a 
still and calm Tibetan identity which can be held in place permanently. The policies of the 
GiE therefore represent an attempt at the suspension of the Tibetan identity, preserving 
what is left after the destruction of much of Tibet’s cultural history in the Cultural 
Revolution43 in the hope that one day, when the Tibet Issue is resolved, this culture can be 
reimported, relatively untainted, back into Tibet once again. But, as Said’s quote at the 
beginning of this section and the cosmopolitan cultures that have emerged in places like 
Macloed Ganj and Dharamsala show, the condition of exile creates ruptures and changes 
within any society. For the rest of this chapter, I move beyond these bounded and secure 
notions of Tibetan identity as it becomes visible in the rhetoric of organisations like the GiE 
and as it partially emerges through places like Dharamsala/Macloed Ganj to explore the 
‘actual’ spaces of the Tibetan nation in heterogenous time and networked space as it 
emerged and as I experienced it through the sites of this research. 
Hybridity, Liminality and Heterogeneity in Exile  
“No-one back in Tibet would understand us – we speak Central [Ü-Tsang] 
Tibetan which has been modified by Hindi and English – if I went back to Tibet 
and started speaking like this, it would be very difficult”44. 
The above was said by an activist to me towards the end of my month of fieldwork in 
Dharamsala. Thus, even in this, one of the Indian epicentres of Tibetan life, the project of 
preserving a true, ‘Tibetan’ identity comes apart under scrutiny. Brah (1996) argues that 
diaspora are configured by relations of power both internal to a specific diaspora, and in 
relation to other diasporic formations. They are 
“composite formations made up of journeys to different parts of the globe, 
each with its own history, its own particularities ... these multiple journeys 
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 The Cultural Revolution and alleged Tibetan complicity in the destruction of, amongst other things, 
Buddhist relics and monasteries, remains controversial. See Wang (2002) and Shakya (2002b). 
44
 Researchdocs/Diaries/India. 
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may configure into one journey via a confluence of narratives as it is lived and 
re-lived.” (Brah 1996, 183, emphasis in original). 
Thus, while Dharamsala forms one particular nodal point of stability and a particular zone 
of confluence in the creation of the Tibetan narrative of nationality, we must also accept 
that the travel done by this narrative, both to Northern India and beyond, creates different 
sets of particularities. Language, as shown above, is clearly one particular set of 
articulations of this travel, as dialects shift and change according to the spatial movement 
of people across the planet. 
While conducting parts of this research with the Tibetan community in the UK, the 
confluence of narratives within the Tibet Movement was clearly visible through 
performances of traditional Tibetan culture – whether the celebration of the Dalai Lama’s 
birthday, or the performance of traditional dance routines. Instead, here I concentrate on 
the emergence of different types of Tibetan nationalistic practices, and focus on one 
particular instance in Central London. 
The Forbidden Team – Football, Film and the Fundraising as constitutive of a liminal 
nationality 
In June 2006, one of the UK’s largest Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) put on one of its regular 
fundraising events. This one took over the Institute of Contemporary Arts (the ICA), which, 
situated on The Mall in central London, is one of the most prestigious centres for the Arts in 
the UK. The fundraiser was a film screening of The Forbidden Team, a small piece of 
independent cinema by two Danish directors who completed the project as part of their 
studies. The film follows the journey of the Tibetan National Football Team, from initial 
beginnings at team selection tournaments across South Asia, through various problems 
encountered in training, travelling and in finding a suitable international team to play. The 
screening of the film was preceded by a ceremony by two Tibetan monks who blessed the 
assembled audience and afterwards was followed by a question and answer session with a 
panel comprised of a member of the Campaigns Team of the TSG, a high level member of 
the international sportswear brand who sponsored the Tibetan National Team, one of the 
two directors, and the Danish individual who was first inspired to ‘create’ the Tibetan 
National Team. After this ‘formal’ element of the fundraiser, there was a social event after 
in the bar/café area of the ICA, which involved performance of contemporary Tibetan 
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music by a DJ together with merchandise sales from the TSG and a slideshow of ‘Tibetan’ 
images. 
The event in question represented one site in a particular network that had emerged 
around the Tibetan National team. This section of the chapter explores the ways in which 
Tibetan Nationalism and the politics of this were mobilised around the event, within the 
film itself, and how the themes and issues generated by the Tibetan national football team 
have continued to resonate in unlikely ways as the research has continued. It begins by 
exploring how the film itself fits into a ‘politics of football’, before going on to explore the 
event itself and the continuing reverberations that the Tibetan National Team has in the 
Tibet movement. 
The Film and Football: Enacting, reproducing and stretching the Tibetan Nation    
The Forbidden Team is presented as a chronological exploration of the emergence of the 
Tibetan National Football team. The title refers to the fact that as Tibet is not 
internationally recognised as a separate entity to Tibet, it is not allowed by the Fédération 
Internationale de Football Association (FIFA), the world governing body of association 
football, to participate in any of its tournaments. Thus, it is effectively excluded from the 
majority of ‘International’ football competitions. The film begins showing the selection 
process of the team, with a number of trials throughout Tibetan settlements in South Asia.  
The focus then shifts to Dharamsala, where the team is trained by a Danish coach. In the 
meantime, team management tries to organise a friendly match against another similar 
‘non-nation’, and given the Danish connections manages to organise a game against 
Greenland in Copenhagen. This then means that the management has to try to organise 
travel documents for the team members. According to the film, this then proves 
problematic, with layers of bureaucracy meaning that some members of the team are left 
in India as they cannot get the requisite Indian travel documents in time.  
The final stages of the film are concerned with the build up to the match in Denmark. Here, 
the Chinese Government becomes involved, as it tries to put diplomatic pressure on the 
Danish and Greenlandic Government. 45 This is resolved by the original Danish organiser 
                                                          
45
 This pressure was applied in economic terms, and manifested itself in shrimp exports. One of 
Greenland’s major exports is of shrimp to China. According to individuals at the fundraiser, it was 
implied by the Chinese that upcoming trade negotiations over the shrimp trade could be viewed 
unfavourably for Greenland if the game went ahead. 
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visiting the Chinese embassy in Denmark and arguing a counter point which is not 
elaborated in the film. The final scenes of the film show the match taking place in a small 
stadium in Copenhagen, with a grandstand full of Danish people waving Tibetan National 
Flags. Much pomp is accorded to the scoring of the first ever goal for Tibet during the 
course of the match, but the eventual outcome is Tibet being somewhat outclassed and 
losing by 4 goals to 1. A final, fairly comical, scene shows the directors handing the Dalai 
Lama his own Tibetan National Football Shirt. 
Throughout the film itself, there are numerous references by many of the participants to 
how ‘political’ the Tibetan National Team is. The team’s Tibetan manager states on 
numerous occasions that the football team has ‘nothing to do with politics’, instead, 
expressing the ability to play football as being about being free to do what one wants. 
However, it is of course impossible to extract the game and the creation of an explicitly 
Tibetan team from a nationalist discourse. Football has long been recognised as having a 
complex relationship with politics, and more specifically nations and states (Duke and 
Crolley 1996; Wagg 1995). However, this relationship with nationalism is always situated 
and often comes with an emphasis on the ‘tribal element’ of supporting a football team 
(Hughson 2000). The nationalist element of supporting the team of one’s nation is dealt 
with relatively unproblematically – the football nation coincides with the bounded nation-
state in most cases. Duke and Crolley (1996) touch on the problem of boundaries in 
examining how, in Spain, Catalan nationalism has played out in different ways to Welsh, 
Scottish and Northern Irish nationalisms in the UK. At a ‘club’ level teams can cross national 
borders, for instance, at the time of writing, Berwick Ranger’s headquarters were in 
England, but the team played in the Scottish league. But, overall, the issue of national 
boundaries in football is left relatively unexplored.  
More recently, Lechner (2007) has attempted to examine the influences of globalisation on 
the creation of a specifically ‘Dutch’ national identity. To him, the creation of a myth 
around a specific style of football that is said to represent a country’s characteristics (and 
therefore sustain its imagined community) both fits the national team into global patterns 
of established international norms, but also sets up barriers by excluding ‘non-Dutch’ ways 
of playing football. However, this myth is exactly that, a myth, and he argues for a more 
reflexive and fluid account of football as it has become increasingly ‘global’. Of course, it 
would seem to be jumping the gun to be arguing for a specifically ‘Tibetan’ style of football, 
but there is a clear circuit of representing ‘Tibet’ at work throughout both the film and the 
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team in general; players are shown meditating and incorporating aspects of Tibetan 
Buddhism into their ethos – at one point the team manager claims the winning is not 
important, it is getting better that counts, thus discounting the competitive aspects of sport 
and promoting more personal goals of attainment and improvement common to Buddhist 
practice (see also GlobalGame 2004a). In addition, the association of more mundane 
objects like the team’s kit or uniform with symbols that are uniquely ‘Tibetan’ such as a 
Tibetan Flag, a snow lion badge and even the colours46 of the kit become important in the 
maintenance of ‘Tibet’. Thus, the football team enacting certain representations of Tibet 
brings about solidification of a specific Tibetan National identity. 
But the ‘global’ elements of this ‘Tibetan’ sports team are hard to ignore as well. The initial 
impetus for the creation of the Tibetan National team is generally credited to one Danish 
individual, who freely admits that his desire to create the Team was down to a dream he 
had whilst in Tibet. This gives a seemingly mystical element to the creation of the team, but 
more importantly removes a degree of agency away from the Tibetan people themselves. 
Thus, rather than any desire by Tibetans for a national team to foster unity amongst the 
exile community, the seeming ‘outside’ influence of one Danish individual seems to carry 
more weight and thus begins the process of building the team. Thus, from its inception, 
football is not, nor has ever been47, something that Tibetans can claim ownership of. 
Throughout the film, this Danish presence remains a constant. The coach of the team is 
Danish, and the filmmakers are obviously Danish too. This influence would seem to extend 
to who the team plays as well, with the semi-colonial relationship of Greenland to Denmark 
allowing a match to be arranged between the two ‘non-nations’, notwithstanding the fact 
that the first game Tibet plays is in Copenhagen. The threatened trade dispute over the 
match (see note 45, p. 132) would seemingly stretch this network to the seas off Greenland 
and incorporates the political economy of international fish trading. 
A further complication to this network that is made explicit in the film is the Government of 
India. The requirement of Tibetans who wish to travel outside India is based around a 
system of travel documents, which, while not passports, act as much the same, but 
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 The original colours of the kit were red and blue, said by some to symbolise the original peoples of 
Tibet and the clear blue skies of the Tibetan plateau, as per the Tibetan flag. However, other sources 
have informally said that the kit was simply a copy of FC Barcelona’s kit, a team that is popular 
amongst the exile community, blurring the boundaries of the team’s ‘Tibetanness’ already. 
47
 It should be noted here the football in Tibet was largely imported by British soldiers during the 
1903-04 Younghusband Expedition, and was played by troops stationed at trading missions in 
southern Ü-Tsang province. So, while football has proved popular amongst Tibetans, its origins are 
distinctly colonial (McKay 1997, 2001). 
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explicitly show the Tibetans as refugees in India and not Indian nationals. They are 
therefore markers of Tibetan identity in exile, maintaining the difference between Tibetans 
and Indians within the borders of the Indian state and beyond. However, it is a notably 
drawn out and difficult procedure to go through the diplomatic channels to obtain one of 
these documents and, secondly, to ensure, once the documents are granted, that the state 
receiving the Tibetan in question will actually allow this to happen. The circuits of belonging 
and differentiation that are created through this material procedure are shown, but not 
necessarily examined in any depth within the film. Rather, the bureaucratic wrangling is 
shown as members of the team’s management attempt to get all the members of the team 
the correct documents and notify the Danish embassy in Delhi of the individuals who are 
intending to travel. In the event, some members, for reasons left unspecified, are not 
allowed travel documents or do not receive them in time for them to take part in the game.  
As a result, there is already a process of marginalisation of Tibetans at work here, with 
Tibetan exiles granted less freedom of movement than ‘regular’ citizens of a given nation. 
However, despite the problems that the ownership of an ‘Indian Travel Document’ creates 
for an individual Tibetan, it is still important as a marker of separation and maintenance of 
a distinct ‘Tibetan’ identity. This practice extends beyond the instances of the football 
match mentioned. Tibetans who form part of the diasporic community all have to face 
similar problems, as the following conversation from a later period of ethnographic work 
with a TSG in London highlights: 
“Volunteer – So were you born in Tibet? 
Tibetan– No, North India, so actually I’m Indian! 
AD – So do you have Indian nationality then? 
T – No, I have Indian Travel documents. 
Colleague – So is that like a passport? 
T – Well, yes, but not many countries recognise them. So for example, I 
was in Berlin for a meeting last month, and when I was going through 
passport control, it was at a very small airport, and there were only three 
or four customs officials, and they all had a look at the documents, none 
had seen them before, occasionally they’d just laugh at them, you know, 
when everyone else had gone through the queue, all four of them were 
just passing them round looking at them – it was amazing for them I 
think. I just stood there, I’m used to these things now, so I just sat down 
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and waited for them to finish. After about half an hour, I think they’d 
phoned the embassy or something, but they stamped them and let me 
through. I was lucky though, because I had some [Tibetan] friends who’d 
gone previously and who’d had the same problems and they told me it 
would take some time, and so I was able to plan for it – if I was in a rush I 
would have started to panic about the hotels and getting everything 
ready on time. 
C – So how does all that affect you here? 
T – Well, it’s fine here, because I have residency. I’ve lived here since ’82, 
and have had residency since ’94, so 12 years now. I could actually apply 
for citizenship! 
C – So why don’t you do that, wouldn’t it make your life easier? 
T – I don’t want to be British! Why would I want to do that! (Laughs).”48 
 
Thus, while the Tibetan in question here is fully aware of the problems and difficulties of 
‘being Tibetan’, which hinder his work as a Tibetan activist, he still finds these relatively 
unimportant compared to the perceived importance of being Tibetan and the symbolic 
importance of the Travel Documents as a marker of his Tibetanness. However, this means 
that to those who wish to steadfastly remain Tibetan, one automatically becomes relatively 
disempowered compared to other residents of India. The subaltern, marginal status of the 
refugee is therefore maintained, even amongst those who are relatively affluent members 
of the diasporic community.  
In addition, the site of the screening of the Forbidden Team is another site of particular 
relations to Tibet. While Tibetans were present at the screening, the location at what was 
the centre of British Imperial power, and the overwhelming presence of white, Euro-
American individuals at the event meant that Tibet was again being produced through a set 
of relations where Tibetans were unwittingly marginalised as exotic ‘others’. Tibetans were 
spoken for at the talk immediately after the screening by a variety of Europeans, and while 
Tibetans who were present were occasionally referred to or asked a question for 
clarification, Tibetan input was limited. Thus the film became the only ‘Tibetan’ voice, 
through the thoughts and ruminations of its characters/participants who were shown 
through the film. As a result, it is through screenings like this that the partial and 
fragmented imaginings of Tibet that were discussed in the last chapter emerge. Rather than 
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thinking about them in abstract theoretical terms, it is through the relations fostered by 
events such as this screening that Tibet as a land of passivity is truly mobilised and 
produced.  
However, to return to the production of the nation in the Tibetan national football team, 
what the above ideas about the involvement of ‘others’ in the production of ‘Tibet’ 
attempt to highlight is the fact that the nation is not necessarily constituted within the 
nation itself. It is the interaction of the nation at its boundaries with other different nations 
that is also crucial in the constitution of the nation. This liminal creation of the nation is 
important not simply because it creates a series of ‘others’ to define Tibetan identity 
against. The Tibetan national team, by borrowing from Danish ideas about sport (and 
presumably adopting some Danish football ‘styles’ in training), cooperating with 
Greenlandic expressions of difference to Denmark, and agreeing to work within a uniquely 
Indian system of individual representation creates a melange of different ideas used 
strategically as and where necessary in order to continue the idea that Tibet in exile is a 
coherent community that actually exists in a material world. While this section has 
focussed on The Forbidden Team as a film, a film screening and the associated 
representations of Tibet that can be drawn from this, the next section seeks to expand the 
Tibetan National Team outside the film and look at the ways in which the impact of a 
national football team continues to resonate in the oppositional politics of Tibet. 
Tibetan Football through the Network  
From the previous sections, we already have a picture of Tibetan nationalism being 
produced in hybrid and heterogenous ways in the various sites it is encountered in. This 
section attempts to uncover some of the ways that the research has encountered the 
Tibetan National football team outside of the Forbidden Team screening itself. Already in 
the section above, it has become clear that much of the film cannot be cleanly extracted 
from other elements of Tibetan, and indeed global, society,49 whether it is through the 
production and movements of documents through space that relate to the everyday life of 
a diasporic exile, or the repeated performance and signification of particular practices that 
are seen as ‘Tibetan’ both within and without the confines of the film itself. However, what 
this section sets out to explore are the ways in which the Tibetan National team has moved 
outside the representation of it that the film portrays. This to some degree is both an 
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 This is of course predicated on there being such a thing as ‘society’ to begin with, given Actor 
Network Theory’s arguments to the contrary (Latour 2005). 
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intensification and extensification of both the space and time of the Tibetan National 
Team. Firstly, it tries to look at how the Tibetan National Team has tried to establish and 
ground itself in order to become a solid part of the nation of Tibet. This is done through the 
establishment of a governing body, the Tibetan National Sports Association (TNSA), which 
acts for all sports, but is particularly focussed on the football team, but also in extending 
the boundaries of who the team interacts with, and thus it looks at the role of the FIFI Wild 
Cup, a world cup of alternative nations. Secondly, the ways that the notion of Tibetan 
Sports has recently become important in fomenting support for a current series of 
campaigns/protests around the Beijing Olympic Games in 2008 is examined. Thus, this 
section seeks to try to understand how the nation of Tibet as produced through football is 
‘latched’ onto other forms of political ritual in an attempt to promote one side of a 
discursive argument. 
The TNSA emerged as the organisational wing of the Tibetan National Football team. While 
information about its formation is vague,50 it is now the body which takes charge of 
organising the selection, training and fixtures of the Tibetan team, both for senior players 
and an under-13s’ youth team. This emergent systematisation gives the team an 
organisational core that will allow for stability, and presumably longevity. Indeed, 
something not mentioned in ‘The Forbidden Team’ is the role of the TNSA in organising the 
inaugural international match against Greenland – officially a Danish TSG, the Danish 
Tibetan Cultural Group, invited the Tibetan Team to play through contacting the TNSA. The 
organisation itself is based in Dharamsala, thus maintaining close spatial proximity to the 
centre of Tibet in exile and the links to international organisations based in the region. 
In addition, this stability means that there is now a reference point for outside 
organisations to refer to, and it is through these emergent linkages that the TNSA can 
attach itself to other causes. Here, the largest ‘movement’ that ‘Team Tibet’, as it is 
increasingly known, has become involved in is FIFI, an organisation that promotes itself as 
the alternative to FIFA, playing matches between nations without states. This led to the 
2006 FIFI Wild Cup. Played in Germany before the ‘official’ FIFA World Cup, this 6 nation 
tournament involved Tibet playing games alongside the likes of Northern Cyprus, Zanzibar 
and Gibraltar. While this attracted press attention (Hawley 2006), what I want to argue is 
that rather than spreading awareness of Tibet, what is more important here is the tying in 
of Tibet to other struggles. The Wild Cup was organised along similar lines to a professional 
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tournament, with draws of teams placing them into particular groups, the top two teams 
from a group moving on to a knockout semi-final and final.51 This semi-professional 
organisation created a system whereby these ‘non-nations’ were granted a degree of 
legitimacy, if only amongst themselves. By playing in such tournaments, Tibet is seemingly 
moved into a relationship of semi-solidarity with these other nations – playing them 
recognises each team’s various attempts to become more integrated with other networks 
that are seemingly subaltern to conventional ‘internationalist’ narratives of football as a 
global sport. As a result, new connections are played out across these alternative networks, 
which help to maintain Tibet as an issue that is of international importance, albeit an 
alternative, almost invisible, form of international struggle.  
To turn to the second issue, that of ‘Team Tibet’ as campaign material. This section of the 
chapter emerges from time spent in Dharamsala. Here, while there were a number of 
political protests taking place to mark the anniversary of the Lhasa Uprising in 1959, there 
were also a number of other meetings taking place to discuss plans for future protests. One 
of these was directly concerned with the plans for protests related to the 2008 Beijing 
Olympics. Here much of the talk was about linking themes like Human Rights and individual 
freedom of expression (and, by extension, the presumed lack of them in China) to the 
Olympics, and thinking up possible strategies to get as much attention as possible for the 
protests themselves. As a result, it was mentioned at these meetings and in some 
documents that The Forbidden Team could and should be used as a means of attracting 
people to the Tibetan cause. People at the meetings spoke of how ‘inspiring’ and ‘amazing’ 
the story of the Tibetan Team was. One activist claimed that one of the speeches by a 
monk in the film was “so powerful, if everyone heard what he had to say and the way he 
put it, I mean everyone would be on our side, y’know?”52 As a result, The Forbidden Team 
became a campaigning tool used for political ends, which to some extent is something that 
the creators and participants did not intend – throughout the film and during the course of 
the fundraising event it was made clear that the Tibetan National Team was something that 
was not political, instead it was an expression of unity and freedom.  
Of course, this is an area that is difficult to define clearly – where does an expression of 
independence start and the sporting team finish. But here the role of the film itself 
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becomes important. Once the film had been created, it became a commodity and object 
that could be used independently of the wishes of both those who are in the film and those 
who created the film. So, in the first case, The Forbidden Team being shown at a fundraiser 
for a TSG is a political statement that at least one of the directors was willing to go along 
with given that he was in attendance as a speaker, and a few members of the ‘cast’ of the 
film were also present. The film is also advertised for sale on the TNSA website on the 
Indian budget VCD (Video Compact Disc) format. The film has been reviewed as being 
‘overtly political’ (GlobalGame 2004b). The inclusion of it as an explicit means of promoting 
and garnering support for what eventually became in March 2008 some of the largest pro-
Tibet protests for many years shifts ‘the film’ as an object and translates it across space in a 
similar way to Law’s (1999) ideas about how objects and their uses alter and become 
actants of their own. Thus, by shifting the focus from Tibetan football and the nation as 
represented through the film to the movement and engagement of the film with other 
strands of Tibetan politics, some of the threads and tangles of this oppositional politics 
become clearer and more defined.  
This was marked by a broadening of ‘Team Tibet’ into a separate campaigning tool53 that 
would attempt to both create a team of athletes willing to compete for Tibet in the 
Olympics, but also to create a team of celebrities, former athletes and other notables who 
would be willing to speak out for Tibet while the Olympics were in progress. As a result, the 
following statements are already being put forward: 
“They want to march into the Olympic stadium with their flag raised 
along with the athletes from the other nations at the opening of 
Beijing Games on August 8, 2008. It is a greater vision of freedom for 
their country that gives them the strength to believe in his [sic] 
audacious mission. 
In August 2008, the eyes of the world will be on China when it hosts 
the 2008 Olypic [sic] Games. The Games are supposed to be a 
celebration of the power of sports to bring people together in peace to 
respect universal moral principles. Tibet and Tibetans have every right 
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to be a part of these celebrations, looking back on its long history as 
people, culture and nation.”54 
(www.supportteamtibet.org, accessed 21/06/07) 
These statements continue to promote the idea that Tibet is a distinct nation. One of the 
Tibetan athletes wishing to compete for Tibet states “I want to proof [sic] Tibet as 
independent nation through sports” (ibid.). As a result, the production of Tibet in the run-
up to the Olympics becomes easier to imagine as a process of unfolding potentialities. The 
Tibetan National Football team is obviously closely related to the series of ethno-
symbolisms of Tibet itself, but by following the flow of ideas, knowledges, peoples and 
materials through space, the nation becomes less and less ‘bounded’ in the traditional 
sense. The Tibetan nation both rubs up against other nationalisms and constructs itself 
according to its needs – adopting football as a particular way to help create a set of 
practices that inform and construct boundaries – but the ‘nation as politics’ expands this 
arena of practice and relations still further. Rather than adopting and changing systems of 
representing the nation, the spaces of performing the nation shift ever outwards, with the 
nation becoming almost unsaid as practices of resistance to Chinese rule over Tibet 
emerge. In this particular case, it is here at this liminal space at the edges of what we could 
consider ‘the nation’ that human rights and talk of democracy become enfolded with the 
struggle for something like a Tibetan nation. Performing ‘Tibet’ is done not through an elite 
or a subaltern class who are attempting to impose their own standpoint on the rest of the 
nation. Instead, it is through this process of mixing and strategic political decision-making 
that the nation moves through space and can be stretched across the boundaries we 
typically associate with the nation – playing football in a foreign country, establishing ties 
with other ‘nations’ who share similar circumstances, combining the nation with other 
issues in order to widen and deepen one’s cause. These all represent different ways in 
which various networks that spread out from an event like the film screening at the ICA can 
be produced, enacted and maintained. 
Conclusions 
This chapter has reassessed some of the ways we think about the Tibetan nation. The 
multiple ways in which a symbolic nation is created and maintained (the ‘rags and patches’ 
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of Gellner) are bound to introduce complexities and many ideas about what a particular 
nation is experienced as by its subjects. However, most of work that has attempted to try 
and get at these processes has tended to treat particular ‘places’ as distinct entities in a 
broader space. Rather than treating the nation as something immutable, that is held 
together in ‘homogenous time’, I have applied postcolonial and networked thought to 
argue for a heterogenous and mutable reading of the nation. In this case I have shown how 
Dharamsala, as one particular place, is both constitutive of some stereotypical and staid 
representations of Tibet, but how this and other places are, at the same time, also 
productive of new and different arenas of interaction. Tibetan Football and its 
representation within a film have solidified certain aspects of the Tibetan identity, but have 
also introduced new elements and strands. The attachment, translation and practice of 
these themes in different arenas become part of the socio-political nature of the wider 
Tibetan struggle for independence. It thus becomes necessary to consider nationalism not 
as something that is produced in ‘centres’, where certain acts become important and are 
then dispersed to the wider population, but to create a wider understanding of how (in this 
case a political) nationalism travels, how it is picked up, adopted, adapted and manipulated 
to be productive of one side of an argument. 
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Chapter 6 – Activism, protests and the everyday: the 
networked politics of the Tibet Movement 
“There’s many things you can do with a few clicks of a mouse.”55 
“I often say the pro-Tibet Movement is not just a ‘pro-Tibet’ movement – it is a pro-justice 
movement.”56 
 
Introduction 
By now, we can see that the pro-Tibet Movement is bound up with a series of contested 
and often contradictory imaginaries. I have argued that in order to understand these 
‘messy’ geographies of Tibet, we need to consider them in a networked and relational way. 
While politics has been very much on the agenda, the Tibet Movement and the increasingly 
contentious nature of the Tibet Issue have not been the direct focus of discussion. This 
chapter turns towards these overtly political areas, exploring the networks of activism and 
contentious politics that are mobilised through the Tibet Issue. It argues that Tibetan 
Activism is again productive of a series of networked relations that are present throughout 
the most mundane of tasks within the Movement. Thus, it examines ‘activism’ as more 
than simply the notion of being ‘on the street’, involved in protests or demonstrations 
(although these are important parts of the Movement). Instead, building on the ideas of co-
implication and relationality that have been present in the last two chapters, it also 
examines the ways in which mundane, everyday activities such as the sending of a TSG’s 
mail are run through with networked relations, and without these relations, the Tibet 
Movement would cease to function.  On one level, the chapter explores ways that activism 
is both a series of profile-building contentious political activities, and, at the same time a 
series of routine, in some cases unseen, power relations. On another, it argues that without 
a networked, relational understanding of contentious political action it is impossible to 
understand the Tibet Movement. 
The chapter builds on a number of themes within contemporary geographical work on the 
nature of contentious politics within justice movements. It argues that debates around 
scale and the spatial extent and territorial intensiveness of political action are relationally 
networked. In particular, it examines the ways that thinking relationally about these 
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connections can rework hierarchical and dominant relationships.  The empirical core of the 
chapter attempts to unpick a dual set of processes. Firstly, there are a range of activities 
that are trying to create stability within the pro-Tibet Movement. These include the 
marking of specific days as ‘traditional’ for the Tibet struggle, but also more mundane 
practices of attempting to extract donations from people to fund particular Tibet Support 
Groups (TSGs). The second strand is concerned with fluidity and change. Lofland  (1996) 
characterises Social Movement Organisations as “insurgent realities” and although the 
Tibet Movement and its associated activism are not exclusive to Social Movement-type 
organisations, the Tibet Movement is explicitly attempting to shape and alter its own 
idealised pro-Tibetan reality. In this, the ability to adapt and react to changing 
circumstances remains crucial. Activism remains the most likely arena for adaptation and 
innovation within this sphere, with the emergence of a more radical front in recent years 
led by the likes of the Tibetan Youth Congress (TYC) and Students for a Free Tibet (SFT).  
This constant flux between fixity and movement inside the Movement is what this chapter 
will concentrate on. As much of this activism is carried out by TSGs and Tibetan NGOs, the 
chapter will, by way of a theoretical grounding, begin by considering how geographers and 
other social scientists have thought about the role of networks within contentious politics. 
In particular, I want to examine the ways in which they have developed ways of thinking 
about the spatiality of politics and political action.  
Much of the literature on social movements concentrates on how transnational social 
movements are increasingly connected in a ‘globalised’ world  (see, for example, della 
Porta, Kriesi and Rucht 1999; Tarrow 2005). Similarly authors have also considered how 
relations between different connections/nodes in a network are important in 
understanding the maintenance of Social  Movements (see Diani 1992; Diani and McAdam 
2003; Oleson 2004). Broadly speaking these all reflect a shift in understanding that begins 
to question how ‘transnational’ or ‘global’ these new societies actually are and how 
solidarities between these spatially differentiated social groups can work. While this is 
undoubtedly a valuable question to be thinking about, David Featherstone has recently 
argued that these theories do not adequately consider the importance of space within 
these networks and their connections (Featherstone 2008). Differences between different 
places and scales seem to be transcended in ways that are often partial and do not 
consider the complexities of how these movements of people and things are actually 
played out in both expected and unexpected ways  (see Featherstone 2008, esp. Ch. 7).  
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This is not to say that there has not been a history in Geography and elsewhere of 
examining the power relations of domination and resistance that Social Movements and 
activists attempt to disrupt and alter to their advantage. For example, writers like Allen 
(2003a), Herod and Wright (2002), Hinchliffe (2000), Pile (1997), Sharp, Routledge, Philo 
and Paddison (2000a), Slater (1997) and Thrift (1997) have all written on how we can place 
power and its resistance within more contingent theoretical understandings.  
Here, I want to use Tibet and pro-Tibet activists to consider how collective actions in one 
place have resonance with other actors and places. I argue that understanding how the 
diffusion of knowledge, ideas and practices are actually played out within and across space 
is important to understanding how politics works on a day-to-day basis. A first section will 
deal with fixity in the Tibet Movement, looking at a particular set of practices mainly, but 
not exclusively, within UK Tibet Support Groups that seek to cement relations within a 
network. This process is an attempt to tie explicitly both people and items to the Tibet 
Movement and thus give a greater structural stability. It is this stability that then helps to 
foster a second section on fluidity and innovation within the Tibet Movement. The 
establishment of connections between different transnational groups allows the building of 
innovative demonstrations and global days of action. This will be illustrated through an 
account of the events surrounding a day of protest to mark the start of the countdown to 
the Beijing 2008 Olympics. These moves open up ground for a more nuanced spatial 
understanding of relational politics of contestation, where space becomes neither 
fetishised as fluid and mutable, nor closed and rigid. 
Spatially contentious politics – Space and Agency in politics today 
To begin, we must first explore the underpinnings of the relationship between the Tibet 
Movement and activism. The politics of contestation, and in particular, the examination of 
people mobilising in support of particular issues, is not a new trend in social sciences. In 
geography, the emergence of a more radically oriented scholarship around the social 
upheavals of the 1960s and 1970s was most prominent in David Harvey’s work in 
Baltimore, and the resultant growth in work on the themes of power, politics and activism 
within the social sciences has been unsurprising. While there are a number of streams 
within this broad scholarship that need to be identified and thought through in relation to 
the Tibet Movement as a particular expression of contentious politics, this section argues 
that adopting a networked approach to spatial politics of the Tibet Movement allows us to 
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understand the various sites of the Tibet Movement within a much wider and yet more 
detailed spatial environment than more typical social movement style studies would allow. 
The geography of social movements is at present an issue undergoing some contestation 
within academia. The arguments surrounding the scale of political action discussed in the 
earlier chapter on networks, power and scale resonate with many of these ideas. There I 
argued that scalar understandings of political action need to be readdressed in the light of 
critiques by Marston, Jones and Woodward (2005) to understand why the site is more 
deeply affected and run through with interaction than scalar accounts would allow. While 
this approach is not unproblematic (for critiques, see Collinge 2006; Escobar 2007; Leitner 
and Miller 2007), these site-led understandings of relations of power offer a more nuanced 
understanding of the ways in which actors take part in political movements. 
This has obvious effects on the ways in which we theorise social movements. While broad 
enough in its own right to include a number of sub-theories and disciplines, social 
movement theories incorporate a number of themes which are important to the Tibet 
Issue. The most obvious here is the development of so-called ‘New Social Movements’ 
(NSMs) since the 1960s. While associated with the rise of the New Left and a rejection of 
the economic/class based ideologies of earlier Marxist struggles, NSMs are also seen as the 
latest phase in what is a cyclical nature of political protests (della Porta and Diani 2006). 
Thus, rather than assuming that there is a changing global structure to politics (brought 
about by globalisation) we must also still pay attention to ‘traditional’ issues like class and 
anticolonial campaigning that remain of importance. In terms of the Tibet Movement, it 
becomes relatively easy to create an image of the Tibet Movement as a type of NSM – its 
goals are independence/autonomy for a region, and the mobilisation of the human rights 
based discourse has led to a different type of movement than the anti-colonial struggles of 
the immediate post-WW2 period (see Barnett 2001, for more here). However, class based 
issues are still important within the Tibet Movement. Work done within the Tibetan 
diasporic community has shown how elite level actors still function as such in exile 
(Houston and Wright 2003), and how certain behaviours are seen as ‘correct’ for Tibetans 
(Yeh 2007; Yeh and Lama 2005). 
There has been a growing recognition within social movement theory that globalisation, in 
its general sense of the quickening and intensifying of spatially extensive relationships, has 
become increasingly important to understanding how political action takes place. The work 
done by McAdam, Tarrow and Tilley (2001), which emphasises the dynamic nature of 
147 
 
political action as an interconnected system of various actors and organisations is 
important here. More generally, material has engaged with the increasing spread and scale 
of activism in social movements in a number of ways. Reflecting a trend in social sciences, 
in the late 1990s a number of edited collections (Cohen and Rai 2000; della Porta, Kriesi 
and Rucht 1999) began to examine transnational connections within social movements. 
These recognised that the growing quantity and intensity of transnational connections was 
allowing for a reshaping of the contemporary political sphere. While I agree that currently 
we are seeing an increase in the intensity of relations between political actors under 
globalisation, I see these transnational connections as nothing particularly new. Jones and 
Phillips (2005) have argued effectively that the politics of imperialism have long existed, 
and resistant transnational political identities have been highlighted by Lambert (2005), 
Lester (2001) and Featherstone (2008) – solidarity and political action across international 
borders has a long history. The present period is both representative of an increase in the 
number and intensity of these relations, but this increase in relational connectivity also 
necessarily means that new and different forms of political activity emerge. 
Indeed, what seems to unite most of these struggles is who the struggle is against – most 
often neoliberal globalisation – rather than any particular newness of struggle. Rather, it is 
a continuation of old struggles (Shukaitis, Graeber and Biddle 2007). This does not preclude 
an ability to employ social movement-led ideas to the Tibet Movement. Instead, problems 
of power, scale and spatiality are present in most social movement theory writing. The first 
of these problems is the presence of resource mobilisation as a means of establishing 
power within a relationship. Here, to put it simply, power is equated with the amount of 
resources one is able to gather and thus objects and people become imbued with an 
amount of power from this. Allen’s account of power as immanent and spatially diffuse 
neatly shows how these understandings of resistance as a form of resource claiming cannot 
fully understand the nature of power relations (Allen 2003a). Obviously, resources do form 
a part of the matrix of relations occurring within a political movement, but we must refrain 
from overemphasising the potential of resources to perform an action. Thus, this chapter 
looks at the ways in which human and non-human actors become part of the matrices of 
power and contestation and, crucially, it is their relations that determine how successful 
these networks eventually are. 
Some more pressing problems with some of social movement theories ideas about 
transnational political activities emerge when we consider some of the ideas of Sidney 
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Tarrow. Together with Doug Imig (1999), Tarrow argued that claiming of political territory 
by a social movement becomes increasingly hard at transnational and global levels of 
interaction. The argument is broadly similar to militant particularisms, with increasing 
complexity and distance from the initial political claim having a negative effect on any 
forms of activity that encourage incorporation into the movement. In his The New 
Transnational Activism (2005), he attempts to understand the expansion of ideas within a 
movement by promoting what he terms ‘scale shifting’. While diffusion of movements 
provides a way of explaining the spatial extensity of a social movement, Tarrow argues that 
in order to move ‘up’ a hierarchical level of organisation (i.e. from the local to the global) 
social movements need to enact a series of performances by agents. Thus, while 
transnational movements can spread through diffusion of their networks across space, they 
can also, by brokering and negotiating, incorporate new claims and claimants:  
“Whereas diffusion is a traditional process that moves horizontally between 
one initiator and one adopter and has done so since long before the idea of 
globalization gained ground, scale shift would need to be the first process in 
the work of building a global social movement” (Tarrow 2005, 139). 
It is at this point that the lack of a truly transnational political action leads to a breakdown 
in the process of scale shifting. Tarrow argues that many actors remain rooted in local 
politics, unable to break away from the constraints of their uniquely local circumstances – 
they are unable to become the ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ who are the truly transnational 
actors. Those who do begin to act at a ‘higher’ scale, according to him, are more likely to 
transpose some of their work upwards and still remain rooted in their particular 
circumstances.  
Tarrow’s ideas are problematic on a number of levels. Firstly, diffusion is not necessarily a 
visible or knowable interaction between an initiator and an adopter. As ANT has proved, 
there are any number of actants who can intervene in these processes of diffusion (Law 
1999). Thus, more actants become a part of diffusion, and more mutable and immanent 
relations occur between these actants, than Tarrow would seem to account for. It does not 
move ‘horizontally’, it can move in any direction – the posting of an activist weblog has 
rhizomatic offshoots that are unknown and its results are unknowable. That the concept of 
scale shift is a new idea can also be refuted in the work of historical geographers 
mentioned previously who have examined the ways in which networks of social activity 
acted at a number of scales at one and the same time. Finally, the conception of rootless 
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cosmopolitans as drivers of a seemingly purer form of transnational activism devalues the 
work of those who are engaged in many of these struggles. While many are rooted in place, 
their engagement across borders does not make them any less transnational. Indeed, the 
mundane and routinized performance of many ‘local’ practices is key to the functioning of 
many transnational networks. Paul Routledge’s work on applying networked and relational 
ideas to activist work is important here. Calling for accounts of activism that emphasise 
convergence spaces, where activists come together in solidarity for limited periods of time 
(Routledge 2000, 2003), and more recent work on ‘imagineers’ - individuals as relatively 
more-networked than their counterparts - within social movements (Routledge 2008; 
Routledge, Cumbers and Nativel 2007). Routledge’s work offers a more spatially sensitive 
account of how individuals and their associated movements become implicated within 
large, spatially extensive systems.  Transnationalism becomes not a case of cosmopolitan 
actors travelling on the benefit of others. Instead, it becomes bound up with concepts of 
solidarities and relations with others, often at a geographical distance. 
Following from Routledge, calls within geography on these topics have been varied. While 
there has necessarily been a turn towards thinking about the transnational and networked 
understanding of the social, whereby ‘territory’ becomes opened and connected with its 
wider surroundings (Amin 2004; Massey 2004), there has also been a turn towards 
imagining the social as dominated by flows (Castells 1996). This in turn has been critiqued 
for its emphasis on a smooth ‘space of flows’ at the expense of spaces of blockage and 
interruption and for possessing little in the way of an account which looks at how these 
networks are held together (Allen 2003a). As a result, emphases have emerged which look 
at the various ways in which processes of contentious politics are spatially contingent 
(Martin and Miller 2003). Beaumont and Nicholls (2007), for example, have called for the 
adoption of Michael Mann’s sociological approach, where spatially extensive networks of 
connection are co-existent with the claiming of territory by social movements. Thus, while 
some areas of a social movement are fluid and networked, they are at the same time 
working towards specific claims and actions that mark out certain political territories as 
‘theirs’. This develops an account of spatiality of social movements that is neither bounded, 
nor completely fluid. While this call for a more nuanced accounting of the process politics 
of social movements is useful, Beaumont and Nicholls go on to argue for an approach that 
privileges resource mobilisation at the expense of other accounts of contentious politics, 
and this is less convincing – while certain contexts of political actions undoubtedly privilege 
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the use of certain resources, these do not necessarily constitute a prerequisite for the 
success of a movement. 
A similar reworking of the spaces of activism is offered by David Featherstone’s reworking 
of the concept of ‘Militant Particularism’. Taking Raymond Williams’s (Williams 1989a; 
Williams 1989b) concept, and David Harvey’s subsequent work on it (Harvey 1995, 2000), 
Featherstone takes a relational reading of space that envisions militant particularism, not 
as bounded spaces of political activity which need uniting, but as the products of networks 
of interrelationships that vary over time and space. Featherstone’s work is explicitly 
engaged in trying to reconcile the relevance of past struggles to the relationships in the 
supposed global society. The role of militant particularisms both today and in the past can 
suggest some continuity in the struggles and resistances active in society. This is not to 
suggest an unbroken tradition of resistance, but rather to examine the commonalities of 
contestation that have occurred in the multiple and fragmented histories of resistance that 
can be uncovered, allowing resistances to be expansive and multiple, rather than 
conforming to the narrow frameworks put forward by neoliberal ideologies.  As a result, 
the ‘long histories’ of Williams can become more usefully engaged in, with aspects of past 
struggle becoming useful references and even building blocks for future acts of resistance. 
In addition, relational accounts allow for the inclusion of the various others left out by 
Williams’s own readings of history, and as a result engages more completely with the 
various aspects of society that are at work within contentious politics.  
More recently, Leitner, Sheppard and Sziarto (2007) have argued for a different account of 
the spatialities of contentious politics. While arguing for a conception of politics that 
privileges neither scale, place, networks, positionality nor mobility, they agree that, given 
the likes of Massey’s (2005) accounts of place as often messy assemblages of people and 
things which do not necessarily cohere, then at times, scalar politics with its associated 
bounded spatial entities, does not always work. However, their understanding of 
networked spaces of contentious politics produces only partial understandings of their 
nature. While they call, rightly, for networked accounts that can stress the hierarchies and 
power relations within networked spaces, their networked understanding of space 
produces peculiar renderings of ANT, critiquing the concept of the immutable mobile as not 
relating to contested politics. However, the immutable objects that move through Mol and 
Law’s (1994) topological reading of space are important. For example, Routledge’s accounts 
of activism taking place transnationally show how various actors move and connect social 
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movements together. So, while I agree with Leitner et al.’s assertion that the study of 
contentious movements is about more than simply a networked understanding of space 
and place, their version of a networked politics is limited and needs further exploration to 
understand how networks are important to the everyday workings of political action.  
By attempting to understand how networks of interactions are co-implicated, we can move 
beyond the idea that social movements need to simply shift scales or mobilise more 
resources to gain more political momentum. It is through the coming together of a variety 
of actors/actants and the specific relations that occur between these interlocking elements 
that politics either fails or succeeds. The workings of actors performing routinized tasks to 
hold these relations together are important in making these transnational political 
movements endure over long periods of time. Indeed, what I consider empirically in the 
rest of this chapter are the ways in which these networked understandings of politics run-
through the relational heart of the Tibet Movement. 
 Organising Relations – Creating and Maintaining Connections  
Tibet Support Groups and Tibetan NGOs are one of the main tools for the Tibet Issue to be 
mobilised. By attempting to influence civil society (in its general, not the Gramscian, sense) 
they, together with other organisations like the institution of the Dalai Lama, seek to create 
and maintain a reservoir of support for Tibet and use it to campaign for a resolution to the 
Tibet issue. Each TSG or Tibetan NGO has its own particular programme – some are 
interested in disseminating information about perceived human rights violations in Tibet, 
some are democracy awareness advocacy groups, some are pro-independence, some are 
pro-autonomy - however, all will see themselves as a part of the Tibetan struggle, or at 
least as supporters of the Tibetan struggle. This section looks at the specific sets of 
connections that help to maintain these Tibet Support Groups and Tibetan NGOs. In this, it 
will be necessary to separate the processes into two categories, those ‘internal’ (in the 
loosest possible sense) to the TSG and its immediate Office/surroundings, and those that 
involve interaction with elements that are ‘external’ to the office, i.e. those processes 
explicitly involving connections that range outside the Office and its surroundings. Of 
course, these distinctions are relative, as the networks that circulate ideas and things 
within the TSG always have some connection with the outside and vice versa, but here it is 
done to show the differing sets of practices that go into both stabilising the TSG’s internal 
relations and its relations with the ‘outside’ world. 
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“The transformation of organisation from arborescence to rhizomatic is 
performative as much as it is structural. Organisations, as they are 
encountered by the lonely travellers within them, do not appear as fixed 
things (in spite of their unmistakeable power) but rather as assemblages of 
ideas, experiences and representations.” (Kornberger, Rhodes and ten Bos 
2006, 67) 
As John Law’s explorations of both the techniques of organisation within a laboratory 
(Law 1994) and his wider ideas about the nature of space with Annemarie Mol (Mol 
and Law 1994) have shown, organisations take on numerous forms within 
themselves, and necessarily with those outside them too. While organisations are 
presented as coherent objects with coherent parts, the interplay between and across 
different elements within these networks highlights the nature of political action as 
embedded within everyday processes.  
‘Internal’ Dynamics 
… S is busy training B on how to use the office postal franking machine. Occasionally she 
speaks to me to see how I am doing as I am working in her ‘section’ of the office that 
afternoon. She asks what I am studying, and as I explain about the networks I’m trying to 
follow and how they reach out to different places and people she says “Yeah, and then you 
end up with people like me working here – I didn’t even know where Tibet was when I came 
here”. I hadn’t realised, but S has only been in the office a couple of months, and I get the 
impression she is an office ‘temp’ and this will be her last week…Later on, while I’m 
processing some cheques we chat about the amounts of money coming in. I remark about 
the largest amount so far [around £100] to which she replies “Yes, well I’m always amazed 
at people’s generosity. It always shocks me that places like this can actually exist”57 
The above extract highlights the difficulty of making assumptions of homogeneity about 
TSGs. While the Tibet issue is undoubtedly one that often arouses passionate responses 
and an active commitment to the cause from those who are members or workers for the 
organisation, it would be a gross over-simplification to assume that all those who work for 
or within Tibet organisations feel a deep commitment to the Tibet Issue or the Tibetan 
struggle for independence. Indeed, S shows a relative lack of commitment and goes some 
way to distance herself from the organisation as shown by her statement “It amazes me 
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that places like this can actually exist”. Even though she is an employee (albeit on a 
temporary basis) she obviously does not feel any intimate attachment to the organisation – 
it still remains relatively alien to her and her preconceptions of the type of organisation still 
filter into her understandings of it.  
The training process taking place also shows how different members of an organisation 
possess different skill sets, and thus differential power relations. So, while S is temporarily 
in charge of her section, she has to train B, a full time member of the organisation, in some 
of the more mundane office tasks so that the organisation will continue to function. Thus, 
while the office is divided into sections for smoother running, competencies are shared out 
across different sections to an extent to allow the office to continue to run as workers 
come and go. These tasks can be relatively mundane (as the franking machine example 
shows) as the basic workings of the organisation are played out no matter which member 
of personnel is directly doing it. So, in this case, the object of the franking machine 
becomes the centre of a particular network of individuals who have the skill to know how 
to make it work. This was, in practice, more difficult than it would seem, as the 
temperamental nature of this particular machine meant a degree of skill had to be used in 
order to make it work and function on a day to day basis. As a result, in subsequent weeks, 
I saw B and S’s replacement struggling with the franking machine and trying various 
previously acquired successful strategies (e.g. balancing the machine on a particular desk) 
to make the machine work. This seemingly mundane action becomes crucial to the wider 
running of the organisation, as the breakdown of the machine delayed posting of materials 
out of the office, from campaigning literature being sent to TSG supporters, to the posting 
of that day’s merchandise deliveries. If these were not delivered then the subsequent 
impact on the organisation, spatially, in terms of packages/letters taking up some of the 
limited office space, and financially, as merchandise and campaigning for funds both create 
much needed revenue streams for financially vulnerable organisations like TSGs.  
Organisationally internal skills and activities come to form a key set of networks to allow an 
organisation to continue functioning on a day to day basis. Relationships with particular 
objects, like the franking machine, build over time and develop into the particular working 
habits and structures of an organisation. While the relatively disordered practices of 
making the machine work emerge from previous experiences, they quickly become 
hardwired into the movement as a set of ordered and learned practices – “try putting the 
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machine there, it works better there for some reason” – which become an intrinsic and 
coded part of the organisation. 
Intra-TSG Dynamics 
TSGs do not exist in complete independence of one another. The variegated nature of their 
individual structures and strategies means that most speak for specific interests or 
segments of the Tibetan struggle, but with the rise of large scale ‘global day of action’-type 
events within the Tibet movement, it has become even clearer that the interaction 
between TSGs and TNGOs is productive of networks that are specifically ‘activist’. By this, I 
mean that they are productive of a unifying agenda that is mobilised by all the groups 
around a specific action or set of actions. Thus, mobilization around a key theme allows 
groups to cooperate and foster connections. The most obvious of these connections within 
the Tibet Movement occur around certain key dates, like the March 10th Anniversary of the 
Tibetan National Uprising in 1959, but there are occasionally other dates and events that 
mobilisation occurs around, such as the demonstrations that evolved around the One Year 
Countdown to the Beijing Olympics in August 2007. However, as within any network of 
different organisations, there are moments of tension as well as moments of co-operation. 
Many of these networks are, however, fostered in specifically local circumstances and 
emerge longitudinally from a history of action with Tibet. For example, Giovanni Vassallo of 
Bay Area Friends of Tibet and The Committee of 100 for Tibet, describes the somewhat 
messy situation in the Bay Area of California as follows; 
 “… like I said before, BAYFoT [Bay Area Friends of Tibet] was the original 
[group] so we had rather substantial membership, you know, over 4,000 
people were mailing us just for that group, but then as the Tibetans formed 
their own [groups], the Tibetan Membership kind of migrated. They, and all 
the lawyers (laughs), left BAYFoT to become members of Tibetan Justice 
Centre, and that’s why you sort of use that ‘mother’ terminology. I think one 
of our past BAYFoT presidents described BAYFoT as ‘the Redwood Tree’ where 
the mother Redwood tree dies, and by the time it dies there’s all these little 
redwood trees all around it (laughs) so I feel like, in some ways, from BAYFOT’s 
perspective that’s what sort of happened – we can point to our own success 
by looking at the seeds that happened around us. You also have this 
attachment (laughs) as you work for Tibet. You know, it’s not about, in some 
ways, one organisation, it’s about the overall cause, and it’s about the fight for 
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freedom, so, um, I don’t care what hat I really have to put on if it’s gonna 
really, you know, free Tibet, or work to help free a political prisoner, or 
something along those lines, I’ll put it on…”58 
Here Vassallo grounds the processes that are happening as natural and organic. 
Organisations flow from one another and give rise to one another, and in this sense, it 
seems like an evolutionary process of groups emerging from other groups as new situations 
and circumstances arise. However, like the Redwood trees he speaks of, they are also 
rooted in place – the Bay Area and its specific, local circumstances shape the growth and 
production of each group. However, the tree metaphor employed by Vassallo here is also 
curiously reminiscent of Deleuze and Guattari’s concept of the root tree. While there is a 
degree of fluidity between the groups, the organisations are standalone organisms. The 
various TSGs, while related, are seen as distinct from one another and, while the three 
groups he mentions are all Bay Area orientated, they all have their own specific goals. 
Crucially, this organic reference point allows Vassallo to place BAYFoT at the ‘centre’ of 
these groups, he builds this theme elsewhere: 
“…so working from BAYFoT’s perspective I felt I was sort of central - as best 
you can [be] with all these different groups…so, how do we stay together?  Uh, 
it comes down sometimes to just a few individuals reaching out and making 
contacts, in my role as Secretary and President of BAYFoT, you know I would 
often have to be on the phone or the email with the president of TANC  [Tibet 
Association of Northern California] or the President of the Committee of 100 
or the Tibetan Youth Congress, and host meetings to develop our plans for the 
years, I mean things like March 10th and Tibet day are sort of like on autopilot 
now (laughs) - we kind of do this every year. But, for instance with this 
upcoming Olympics Situation, um, you know there’s this need currently to try 
to get together and develop something, uh, cohesive, cohesively.”59 
Thus BAYFoT forms part of its own localised network of TSGs and TNGOs, which, while 
having become relatively decentred as other groups emerged from it, still remains 
important as some of its individuals form part of the ‘core’ of people who actually try and 
coordinate things. Important here is the realisation that while many people will be 
members of a group (i.e. the 4,000 members Vassallo speaks of earlier) crucially it is the 
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activity of a small number of activists who actually organise things. Also here, the ability to 
learn new skills and the experience of past events allows them to run certain annual events 
“on autopilot” compared to others. Thus as long as certain key actors remain in situ within 
these particular networks, they are more or less able to function coherently for certain 
‘key’ events or performances. These are the hierarchically more connected actors who 
range across the movement. While, in this case, not quite transnational ‘imagineers’, they 
provide the skills and experience that binds groups together and act as translators between 
various groups. As part of this act of translation, people become key nodes for the network 
acting as micropolitical actors who perform tasks of striation and overcoding. While the 
fluidity of the various groups who leak members and actors to each other provides a fairly 
rhizomatic imagination of San Francisco’s TSG community, these actors who run Tibet Day 
or other activities on ‘autopilot’ inscribe certain behaviours and striate the movement to 
behave in certain ways. The ebb and flow between organisation (i.e. overcoding) and free 
movement (i.e. rhizomatic fluidity) moves us between critiques of Deleuze and Guattari 
that emphasise the binary nature of this duality, instead showing how this plane of 
organisation is a spectrum of behaviours.  
This is highlighted where there are limits to this ability for individual actors to function (and 
overcode space as they would wish) however, and in these accounts Vassallo also seems to 
brush over tensions that can occur between groups and speaks of Tibet, the “overall cause” 
as being the decisive issue and the thing that overrides all other concerns. However, there 
are undoubtedly tensions, as he makes more explicit elsewhere: 
“Sometimes there isn’t enough communication, frankly, so there’s always 
when you get people together, uh, petty factionalisms that creep in. Part of 
the frailty of the human condition I guess (laughs) is, some of that happens 
and there is...occasionally I’ve found with some of the Tibet Organisations, 
[are] more concerned about their own organisation. But then ultimately, I 
think as a whole and overall, there’s this genuine sense that we all need to 
work together (chuckles) so then we all end up coming together. If you look at 
many of the events that have been posted in the ‘Past Events’ of the Bay Area 
Friends of Tibet website, or the Tibet Association of Northern California’s 
Website, or the Tibetan Youth Congress website, you’ll see the same five 
organisations that co-sponsored it, so I think we, in spite of many difficulties 
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and even language barriers in communications between Tibetans and Non-
Tibetans, uh, we do kind of tend to come together…”60 
However, where these tensions emerge they are again framed as somewhat organic – “part 
of the frailty of the human condition”. This attempts to shift blame away from individuals 
and ‘upwards’ towards a more abstract form of humanity where conflict, antagonism and 
individual ego are involved. This also ties in with Vassallo’s individual biography; a former 
Buddhist monk whose father was a Tibetan Buddhist Priest, this inscription of certain 
unifying values bears a certain resemblance to general Buddhist beliefs and ethical systems 
concerning the nature of being. Above all, this inscription of relations is optimistic, 
providing some sense of reality to the situation “petty factionalisms that creep in” etc. but 
the overall belief that when it is necessary, people will work together. 
This situation is mirrored somewhat by relations between TSGs in London. Here, during the 
course of ethnographic fieldwork, members of certain organisations have made claims 
about others that are rooted in factionalism. Late one day at an office, before heading to a 
protest event, one member of staff complained that “I love going to these evening long 
protests. We’ve got a campaign organisation that’s supposed to do this kind of stuff 
[organising protest events], but we [i.e. the organisation] end up sorting things out.” Once 
at the event, however, members of the two groups chatted and intermingled relatively 
freely. So, while tensions between groups surface at times, these are often forgotten when 
at the events themselves – as Vassallo puts it, the “overall cause” overrides any tension 
between groups, and this process of rationalisation helps to keep the movement ‘together’. 
At the same time, aspects of coordinated organisation also remained fragmented, so, 
whilst at this event, an anti-Beijing Olympics protest, members of different groups all wore 
differently branded merchandise relating to their specific group. This is despite the 
existence of a transnational umbrella organisation (the International Tibet Support 
Network, or ITSN] suggesting a specific style of merchandise to create a unified visual 
experience. The inability to coordinate between the various groups highlights the 
embedded and fragmented nature of the social organisations between these British based 
groups.  
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Extra-TSG Dynamics 
It’s my first day working with [a London TSG], and they are struggling to think of a task that 
is suitable for me. It’s mid-afternoon and the Office Manager, S, is struggling with 
processing the latest campaign appeal slips that have been sent in by members and donors, 
so I’ve been asked to help out. The work consisted of processing cheques for one of the 
campaigns which they’ve just started – one for two Tibetan brothers who’ve just been 
imprisoned inside Tibet. 
This processing consisted of sorting out postal donations into different piles of documents. 
Firstly the donation slip they had initially been sent and asked to fill in with their details. 
These coded to record what type of supporter they were and were marked with a date they 
had been received. These were sorted into those who had donated by card or by cheque. 
Occasionally I found a completed postcard written in Chinese which the individual was 
supposed to send directly to China, but obviously people had often returned them to the 
TSG instead. The completed forms were then sent along to the database section, where 
their individual records were updated to show what they had contributed and to which 
campaign. The cheques were then processed and put into this specific campaign’s account. 
The amount of money donated varied from coins taped to the form, through to hundreds of 
pounds, and while many had simply sent a form and a cheque, occasionally people had 
attached a note expressing their anger or sorrow at the situation. Some would say how they 
were praying to God for a resolution for Tibet and Tibetans. Once a letter spoke of how the 
individual could not afford to donate any more than a small amount at this time in an 
attempt to justify their donation to the organisation.61 
The above account attempts to highlight some of the deliberate systematisation that 
formed one particular network of an UK-based TSG. It is worth going through this exact 
process in some detail as it highlights the complicated series of connections that a 
campaign produces and forms. At one level this system is created to ease the process of 
dealing with a campaign about a specific issue and its associated paperwork, and could 
simply be read as a process of good and accountable housekeeping by a political 
organisation. However, there is a greater degree of both connection and separation going 
on here.  
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This process was done largely by the administrative section of the office. The campaigns 
team had been responsible for the production of the campaigns leaflets but once this initial 
production had been done, the leaflets are then sent out and returned to the 
administrative section. This is a discrete section of the office, where the three members, 
Office Manager, Finance Officer and Database Officer circulate these various objects within 
their discrete section of the office. Campaign Materials (i.e. postcard to send, an 
information leaflet which contains donation slip, a freepost envelope to TSG) are first 
packed into an envelope (often by giving them to a volunteer, allowing office staff to 
concentrate on other activities) and then sent off to the TSG’s members. Having negotiated 
the intricacies of the postal system and its own set of networked relations, they are then 
(presumably) opened and read by these individuals, who then decide whether they want to 
donate to this particular campaign. Some will send the postcards, some will donate money, 
some will do both, some will do nothing, but each will act in their own particular way to 
these mailings. As such these mailings act as a means of connecting the members to a TSG, 
and form an important part of maintaining the bond between members and the TSG, 
however temporary and partial this bond turns out to be. As shown by the notes attached 
to some donations, these contacts allow a point of emotional, affective connection – those 
people who write in to explain why they cannot donate more obviously display an affective 
connection to both the Tibet Issue, but to this particular TSG and this particular campaign 
that is strong enough to provoke the need to justify their position. This could be down to a 
sense of guilt or another moment of affective contact, but what is clear is that these 
mailings provide a moment of relative intensity in the relational networks between TSG 
and supporters/members.  
At the most basic level, these moments are a way of reaffirming and reproducing relations 
(both of connectivity and of separation) to the widest possible audience. Keeping people 
informed of the current struggles and campaigns helps to maintain a certain basic level of 
support. Members of TSGs can range in numbers from hundreds to tens of thousands, so 
mail shots like this serve to remind those who are less active that they are a member of the 
organisation, but also to provide a stimulus to those who are more active – the regular 
production of new campaigns and associated materials is also an attempt to show the 
members that the TSG is active and that progress is being made on the Tibet issue 
(something that is not always readily apparent given the deadlock on negotiations). Thus 
the targeting of small, reasonably achievable goals like a campaign to release two political 
prisoners in Tibet is a way of reassuring members that their money is not going to waste.  
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But in addition, the flows and connections created by the sending of this campaign leaflet 
also serve to highlight the immanent power relations built up within this particular TSG. 
The TSG, in sending out these flyers, is attempting to persuade people to conform to its 
campaign goals and commit to them. However, once the material has left the office, the 
power of these objects to elicit a response from people emerges from the circumstances 
they arrive in. Those people who felt compelled to give an amount, no matter how small, 
were willingly complicit in allowing the TSG to inform them of the issue (in this case the 
two political prisoners) and the best way to react to this. However, those who do not react 
in such a conformist way are playing out their own relationship with the objects and, by 
extension, with the TSG. This power only arises in their particular space or place, and thus 
helps to determine the extent of the network. Thus, each mail shot will give a different 
impression of the TSG and its influence. Those campaigns that are more effective at getting 
people to donate will give the impression of a much wider network of connections, while 
those that are less fruitful will obviously give the impression of a smaller, more incoherent 
system. 
However, the mail shot also becomes part of a system that produces connections to the 
Chinese and is therefore meant as a direct challenge to Chinese practices in Tibet. In this 
case, the inclusion of a postcard is also a way of connecting the individual to the struggle 
directly. Most campaign material asks people to write to the relevant Chinese authorities, 
the State Security Bureau or the Chinese Embassy, in order to make their grievances 
known. This spreads the map of grievance (Featherstone 2003), allowing non-Tibetan 
people to call for change in what China perceives as its internal affairs. Indeed, much TSG 
literature is explicit in its attempts to show that letter writing can force changes in the 
cases of individual political prisoners in Tibet. Here, though, the additional postcard is 
designed to simplify this process. The postcard removes the need for the individual to write 
a letter to the relevant authorities. Instead, all they have to do is attach a stamp and put 
the postcard in a post-box. By believing that they can influence and change the terms of 
struggle by writing a letter or sending the postcard, these individuals make a seemingly 
greater investment in the campaign than those who simply donate money. In addition to 
this, according to a different activist not associated with this TSG62, this was the first time 
that this TSG had used Chinese language in one of its campaign materials, which also shows 
a shift in strategy. The deliberate move to Chinese represents an attempt to ease 
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communication with the Chinese authorities, opening up new ground for grievances to be 
aired. Presumably this allowed everyday Chinese postal workers to read the postcards as 
well as the intended recipients and thus creates a whole new set of connections for Tibetan 
issues to be raised. 
A final element of this particular network I want to highlight, and one of the most obvious, 
lies in the act of performance. By sending out regular updates and campaign requests, the 
TSG is performing a prescribed role – that of a campaigning TSG – and by doing this, it is 
proving to its membership that it is a valid organisation that actually does things (whatever 
those things may be) and thus helps to ‘shore up’ people’s belief in the TSG and its role as 
an important player in the Tibet Issue. Thus, these micro-processes that occur within the 
organisation become constitutive of the organisation as a whole. The projection and 
performance of this constitution then helps to maintain the organisation as a stable entity 
– as mentioned in an earlier example, during my time at this particular TSG there had been 
lots of staff changes and a relative level of fluidity in the organisational structure of the 
group. However, the sending of the campaign material, which contained the TSG’s logo and 
other standardised information like addresses, meant that the TSG remained (to those who 
were not in immediate contact with it) a stable organisation. Thus, despite the movement 
of people and objects through the office, the perception and performance of the 
organisation remains the same as certain key markers are deployed and redeployed to 
maintain a semblance of order. 
This one example of mailing shows how the organisational networks that extend out from a 
TSG act as spaces of flows and movement that attempt both to extend and intensify 
relations within the TSG’s membership at the same time. Thus, while seeming to give 
stability to the organisation, in practice they are all about movement and change – the 
creation of rigid organisational structures are designed to help speed the flows of 
information between different networks. Each item of post constitutes its own assemblage 
that has different sets of relations as it moves through and around the TSG and its 
members. These relations are bound up with immanent regimes of power, as people 
dictate their compliance or resistance to the TSG’s campaign according to their own set of 
spatial relations. Thus, the simple mailing of information to members becomes an infinitely 
more complex process of connection and negotiation and the seeming coherence of the 
organisation becomes radically decentred and materially heterogenous (after Law, 1994). 
Rather than simply the TSG and its staff contained by the walls of its offices, the various 
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elements within and beyond this relatively intimate office space become complicit in the 
Tibetan Freedom Movement. Postal vans, the franking machine, the local postman and the 
letters themselves all become actant-assemblages who are passing Latour’s rugby ball 
(Latour 1988) through the networks of power, connection and association. 
Activism beyond the TSG – Relational Understandings of Demonstrations and Actions 
Barry (1999) argues that demonstrations work as both sites and sights of protest – the 
direct encounter with an action that can be witnessed at first hand becomes important in 
fostering a connection between the individual and the act they are witnessing and so the 
act of demonstrating becomes technical in its production and performance – by 
constructing a demonstration in a certain way, the claims made by a demonstration are 
mobilised in ways that are more efficient. Barry, for example, looks at broadcast media and 
the role it plays in trying to present itself as an impartial observer and broadcaster of a 
subject. Thus, if the demonstration wants the ‘truth’ of its situation to be made obvious, it 
must produce it in such a way that media reporters can easily disseminate the information. 
This can lead to reductivism, as Barry points out,  
“…in so far as they treat political disputes impartially, as a clash of parties, 
ideologies or interests, televisual news and current affairs may simply avoid 
engaging with the complexity of what is being demonstrated about” (1999, 
p.87-88)  
However, given the rise in the use and manipulation of Information and Communication 
Technologies (ICT), these networks of diffusion from a demonstration are also extending 
beyond the impartial coverage offered by traditional broadcast media that Barry talks 
about. I want to use this section to argue that the demonstration today is bound together 
with more extensive systems that can spread beyond the immediate surroundings of the 
demonstration site. So, witnessing the ‘sight’ of a demonstration, or any other action for 
that matter, is now something that is not necessarily bound up with an intimate experience 
of ‘being there’ although this is still an important factor. Instead, shared values and 
personal connections mean that information can be spread and disseminated more widely 
and quickly.  The growth of ICT allows images and documents to be shared and spread 
quickly across the world but, crucially, I want to try to think about the ways this extension 
of space is a mixture of both technology and personal connections that allow spaces of 
resistance to become fluid and relatively instantaneous. In addition, the Tibet movement 
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has long been international in its scope and scale, with connections by email and phone 
common and those connections involving the movement of objects occurring with some 
regularity, as shown here: 
“AD - …and then thinking about SFT, rather than inside India, thinking about 
it in terms of its global links, what kind of things go on with you with SFT in 
America and in Europe? How do you have your contacts with them? 
TC – Oh, we, we do most of our, correspondence through email, sometimes 
when it is important matter we just call someone, maybe twice a week, once a 
week, it keeps on coming [sic]. And also we have contacts with SFTUK, and also 
we have this organisation Tibetan Youth UK. 
AD – oh, yeah, yeah 
TC – So we just want to make it a global – so last time during 10th March, the 
banner - we made it here 
AD – oh, wow 
TC – Yeah. What do you call this, uh, where the police, traffic police wear? 
AD – oh, the vest? 
TC – the vest, yeah something, we made it here, because they don’t have 
much time, because most of them are just doing the volunteer work, so they 
can’t spend much time, because they have their work and also during their 
free time they go for protest [sic] and organise these meetings, and then 
earlier, because two years back we met here in India.”63 
Here, a Tibetan TSG in Dharamsala speaks of how, in previous years, they made objects for 
demonstrations in London, as those activists in London did not have time to do things. This 
internationalism is something that is prevalent throughout many pro-Tibet organisations, 
with the sharing of information and communication via email and phone taking place daily. 
However, recently there has been an intensification of these movements, both in speed 
and density. To explore this, I wish to look, in some detail, at the mobilisation of actors and 
activists that occurred on one particular protest event in August 2007. 
On Wednesday 8th of August 2007, the Tibet Movement attempted to conduct a worldwide 
day of action. This date marked the beginning of a one year countdown to the Beijing 
Olympics. The Olympics are contested by Tibetan and other Human Rights organisations as 
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they are seen as international legitimisation of the current situation in China. The Olympics 
themselves are also seen as an opportunity to put direct pressure on the Chinese regime in 
order to force change on the Tibet Issue. As a result, on the 8th of August there were a 
number of actions and events taking place simultaneously across the world. In and around 
Beijing itself two groups of activists had been at work for the previous week. One group 
had hung banners off the Great Wall of China which proclaimed, in a subversion of the 
official 2008 Olympic motto, “One World, One Dream, Free Tibet”. This was filmed by one 
member and then quickly distributed via the internet using both campaign groups’ 
websites and the online video distribution site Youtube.com. Those taking part, including 
one British activist, were quickly detained by the authorities. The other group spent their 
time in Beijing itself and documented preparations being made by the Chinese Government 
in the build up to the Official Countdown event and the building works and tourism 
developments being constructed. These were then put online as a blog on the website 
www.beijingwideopen.com and included regular video updates from Lhadon Thetong, the 
Executive Director of Students for a Free Tibet International. The website begins with the 
following statement by Lhadon, 
“China has invited the world to visit in August 2008. Exactly one year out, I've 
traveled [sic] to the heart of the nation that has brutally occupied my 
homeland for over 50 years. Follow this blog, as I share what I see, feel, and 
experience... leaving Beijing wide open.”64 
Accompanying Thetong was a British activist, Paul Golding, who was responsible for visually 
recording Lhadon’s statements and acted as her assistant. These two activists spent several 
days recording and posting onto the website before being detained on the 7th of August. 
Crucial to these actions was the ability to use technology to disseminate the message, as 
the blog states: 
“The importance of video, and YouTube specifically, to our countdown protest 
cannot be overstated. For people around the world to see the banner on the 
Great Wall and what I was doing in Beijing almost as it happened, had a huge 
impact on the action. It created excitement amongst our supporters, helped us 
get a response from the IOC, grabbed the attention of the media and may 
have protected us from a harsher response by the Chinese government. And 
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while we were doing our thing in Beijing, so many other Tibetans and 
supporters were using the same technology to create a buzz around the 
International Day of Action for Tibet on the 8th…To some, this technology is 
dangerous. It challenges the control the Chinese authorities have over people 
and the ideas they are exposed to. That’s why they try to block people from 
using it in China and Tibet.”65 
This strategy of disseminating as quickly and as widely as possible was clearly pre-planned; 
however, there was a degree of fluidity to the actual organisation itself. Golding, when 
interviewed, described how he was contacted only shortly before flying to Beijing as 
someone else had dropped out.  
“I was actually painting a fence, a friend’s fence, and I got a phone call from 
the States, saying “do you want to help out with this action in Beijing”, well 
they said “an action” in Beijing. Um, I said “Maybe, when is it?”, and they said 
“Three days time.”66 
This was also marked by a relatively free flowing strategy that was modified throughout the 
time in Beijing. Golding speaks how as they spent more time in Beijing, they became more 
bold as their routines became regularised, and so they began to perform more blatant 
actions, making themselves more visible to the Chinese authorities, but also seeking to 
expose how ‘free’ people were to make comments in and around Beijing.  
“We were initially very cautious, because we had no idea how this would be 
received by the authorities, because as far as we know, it had never been done 
before – there’s never been an activist blog directly from Beijing. Um, so yeah, 
we had no idea how it was gonna be received. Well, we didn’t even know if 
[we] would get in for a start... Over the days we became more and more open, 
we became more and more confident, as we were doing things, we were 
obviously refining our strategy as well – what we wanted to film, what we 
want to do”67. 
This development of a system and of an increasingly antagonistic performance and display 
of grievance implicitly involves the integration of technology (the need to get internet 
access and to use film) but is also marked by an iterative intensification of the system. 
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Golding talks about how every day they became bolder and, the more visible the Chinese 
security presence, the more determined they became to show their information to as wide 
an audience as possible.  
This distinctly active and confrontational form of political demonstration is seemingly at 
odds with the general perception of the Tibet Movement. The non-violent message of the 
Dalai Lama is often equated with non-confrontational politics, and often compared with 
Gandhian satyagraha struggles in the Indian Independence movement (Ardley 2002, and 
also the comments made by activists in Chapter 4). This has, I would argue, led to a 
construction of the Tibetan Struggle as something seemingly metaphysical and ‘New Age’ in 
its rejection of violent confrontation (Korom 2001). However, in reality, this is far from the 
case. The struggle had an armed resistance movement for twenty years in the 1950s and 
60s (Dunham 2004; McGranahan 2006), and elsewhere in this research activists have 
spoken variously  of the need to reassess what we mean as “non-violent” action and of 
their desire to struggle, violently if necessary, for the freedom of Tibet, as eloquently 
expressed by Lhasang Tsering in Dharamsala:  
“I have decided to dedicate my life [by] what I, uh, have outlined as my Four 
Humble Truths68. So, and these are firstly that, I find it strange that when we 
talk about our basic needs and necessities, we only refer to our physical needs, 
which we share with any other living creature - air, water, food and shelter. 
Are there, is there any need which is basic, is specific to us as human beings? 
My answer is yes and that basic need is freedom. And first and foremost by 
freedom, I do not mean freedom from this world, but freedom in this world – 
national political freedom. And secondly by freedom I do not mean the 
condition of just being in the wild and not in a cage, but national political 
freedom. However, national political freedom is man-made, it was not part of 
our original national state, so my Second Humble truth follows that unlike in 
the morning sun and the evening star, in the summer’s rain and the winter’s 
snow, national political freedom, will not, cannot come by waiting. The Third 
Humble Truth follows, freedom must therefore be fought for and won, and the 
Fourth Humble truth states that freedom is not free, there is a price of 
                                                          
68
 Tsering’s reworking of the Buddhist concept of the ‘Four Noble Truths’. 
167 
 
freedom, and the price for freedom is not paid in silver and gold, not in US 
dollars, it is paid in the currency of life and blood.”69 
As a result, there is a need to consider the varieties of ‘non-violence’ and the various types 
of activism that are taking place within the Tibet Movement. In this case, the concretisation 
of the system over time leads to the development of more explicit confrontations with 
authority. 
This however, is only one aspect of the demonstrations I want to consider. By the 8th itself a 
situation had arisen where two groups of activists had been detained by the authorities in 
Beijing, but such was the amount of information that had been disseminated from them, 
most Tibet activists had been kept fully aware of their situation. In London, the main UK 
campaigning organisations of the Tibetan Movement were organising the launch of Team 
Tibet. Team Tibet was the campaign launched by the International Tibet Support Network 
(ITSN), an affiliation of TSGs and TNGOs which acts as an umbrella organisation and 
attempts to co-ordinate global campaigns and initiatives. Team Tibet attempted to subvert 
the Olympic ideals of a non-political equality through sport and involved a number of 
initiatives that were due to occur throughout the build up to the Beijing Games. At these 
relatively early stages, most effort was going into promoting the idea that Tibet could have 
a sports team, and that this team could go to the Olympics and compete with all the other 
nations. This would demonstrate to the world that Tibet still existed as a nation, and also 
that it would compete in a peaceful and cooperative way with the Chinese athletes. Team 
Tibet was therefore to be made up of a number of athletes selected from various Tibetan 
diasporic communities. As a result, each country which had a recognisable Tibetan 
community was encouraged to select a group of people to act as that community’s 
representatives.  
In London, which has a relatively small Tibetan community of around 200 people, 4 athletes 
were chosen, and the events of the 8th of August initially centred on them. Firstly, they 
were unveiled to the public in Trafalgar Square at 5.30pm and, in celebration, did a warm-
up routine to show their athletic skills. Present were around 100 Tibetans and Tibet 
supporters, many of whom wore traditional Tibetan costume, TSG apparel or waved 
Tibetan flags. Many also wore specific ‘Team Tibet’ merchandise, which, given the relative 
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lack of coordination between TSGs and TNGOs in the UK, differed from organisation to 
organisation70.  
These events were cut short by the intervention of a number of ‘Heritage Wardens’71. 
These wardens would not allow Tibetan flags to be waved, and watched the protest for five 
minutes before deciding it was being too disruptive and asking people to move on. As a 
result, the group of people moved on to the pre-planned second part of the protest outside 
the Chinese Embassy on Portland Place. Here, a protest took place where people waved 
Tibetan Flags and lit two symbolic Tibetan Olympic Torches. These were in fact garden oil 
lamps, but were intended to symbolise the desire of the Tibetan people to take part in the 
Beijing Olympics. During this protest, which ran for about 1 ½ hours, standardised chants 
like “Free the - Panchen Lama!” and “China! China! China! - Out! Out! Out” were shouted 
and passersby on foot and in vehicles were given flyers and pamphlets.  
But more importantly, members of these two events in London were in contact with the 
Beijing activists support team in Hong Kong. The Beijing activists had made their actions 
extremely visible over the internet, and created a palpable sense of excitement amongst 
the protestors at the event – one supporter told me “This [what had happened in Beijing] is 
really exciting, so many people have seen it, I mean Canada is really kicking off about 
this”72. This both referred to the comparatively large amount of international press 
coverage that these actions had received, but also gives some idea of the excitement felt at 
these events. Some activists believe the Tibet Issue has stagnated in recent years and these 
events were reinvigorating for many campaigners.  
But in addition to these feelings of excitement and euphoria, it was also well known that 
the Beijing protesters had been detained for over 24 hours at this point. This information 
had been disseminated outwards from Beijing to Hong Kong and posted on various blogs 
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and Tibet Websites from there. This meant that friends and relatives of those in Beijing 
who were present in London had a relatively clear idea of what had happened, and indeed 
was happening, in Beijing. Certainly, during the course of the event, telephone calls 
between London and Hong Kong established that all the Beijing groups had been released 
from detention and deported. This relatively seamless and instantaneous transfer of 
information brought about a noticeable change in the atmosphere of the demonstration 
and, whereas some people had initially been worried, the mood of excitement returned. 
This whole series of events enacted a complex spatial network of connection and ruptures. 
Variable degrees of intensity and confrontation in Beijing led to information being 
transferred quickly around the world, but eventually being disrupted by the Chinese 
authorities. The severing of these connections had direct effects (and affects) upon the 
protests in London (and doubtless in other areas around the world). So, while the London 
events were caught up in their own distinctly local power relations, such as the Heritage 
Wardens or the Metropolitan Police outside the Chinese Embassy, the Beijing protests 
vectored into the centre of this network and had powerful effects on the nature of the 
protest.  
Interaction across borders is not something unusual in contemporary politics, as I have 
shown earlier in this chapter, but what I want to stress as unusual here was the relatively 
direct and simultaneous nature of these connections. The various connections here moved 
across spaces and, rather than ‘jumping scales’ from local to global activities, the various 
resistant political actions here were run through with connections and trajectories that 
were pre-existing and altered and shaped by this ‘global day of action’. Local actions in 
Beijing, Delhi and London produced a set of temporary networks that connected with 
international and national media outlets, TSGs and individuals to name only a few actors 
that were visible. These networks were heavily imbued with previously established 
relations, like Golding’s connections to the movement, but were radically altered for a 
short period of time – the global day of action caused a range of occurrences which were 
wholly contingent upon the day’s events, which in turn collapsed afterwards. For example, 
in Beijing, the lack of a sustained activist presence meant that any pro-Tibetan presence 
swiftly disappeared until the next activist interventions there. 
 Conclusions 
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The geographies of contentious political action have come under scrutiny recently with an 
increasing amount of debate about the nature of transnational action. These debates have 
concentrated on ideas like scale-jumping and the diffusion of ideas across space. This 
chapter has examined these debates in the light of the ideas of scale and networks 
presented in the initial chapters of this thesis. Here, we have looked at the ways that 
activism in the Tibet Movement is productive of a heterogenous set of relations that occur 
throughout its spaces. These occur at a seemingly mundane level through spaces like TSG 
offices, and more visibly (and explosively) at demonstrations.  
What has become clear is that these networks occur at levels that are both global and local 
at the same time. Rather than expressing a clear process of moving from small scale to 
large scale, we have encountered processes that are at once intimate and spatially 
extensive. Envisioning these political actions as located within sites that are run through 
with connections to different spaces and places (Marston, Jones and Woodward 2005; 
Massey 2005), we can build accounts of activism that both show how political actions work 
themselves through the spaces of everyday life, and also open up ground to develop 
thinking about the ways in which transnational political action can be mobilised effectively. 
The work of the activists discussed in this chapter is undoubtedly difficult, and organising 
transnationally is never easy (Tarrow 2005). But what I have attempted to do here is to 
stress the ways these political actions are infused with a mobile and mutable structure. 
While there is a constant ebb and flow between fixity and fluidity throughout the Tibet 
Movement, the potential for new political actions is always present, as the Beijing Olympic 
protests highlight, with new forms of activism and action being employed alongside 
traditional protest methods. It is this potential that occurs throughout the Movement, and 
in my view, throughout a spatially networked understanding of contentious politics, that 
can drive forward a progressive politics that is adaptable and productive of social justice.  
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Conclusions – Networking Tibetan Resistance 
 
To conclude this thesis, I want to reflect again on the theoretical and empirical 
interventions that the research makes. Overall, I have constructed an image of the pro-
Tibet Movement that is rooted more in the academic circuits of contentious politics, rather 
than in its traditional realm of Tibetan or Asian Studies. This is important as by positioning 
the Tibet Movement in an overtly political arena, we can begin to understand it in a more 
nuanced, yet also more contingent way. The Tibet Movement has gone through a series of 
changes since the bulk of this research took place. The emergence of protests in March and 
April 2008 that spread across Tibetan areas of China (see Fig 1.3) and beyond created a 
new set of connections which have yet to play out fully. Yet, in many ways, this is exactly 
what the networked nature of this research would lead us to expect. The sets of 
connections that were forged through the various sites of this research are inherently 
fleeting and temporary. They are nonetheless important. The networks that run through 
the pro-Tibet Movement combine to create a multifaceted political system that is more 
than simply ‘politics’, ‘nationalism’ or ‘representation’ individually. Indeed, the importance 
of a spatially networked approach to studying the political is it allows us a better 
understanding of the interlinked ways in which materiality and discourse are played out in 
reality.  
Theoretically, the thesis has been driven by a commitment to networked understandings of 
modern society. Networks and relations have clearly become important to our spatial 
understandings of the world. Indeed, materially heterogenous relations of power and 
action occur throughout all political action. It is these varied, temporary and mutable sets 
of relations that are productive of the array of political movements at work today. Without 
turning towards research that undertakes geographically contingent research, we are 
always in danger of missing some of the key elements of any political movement. While this 
contingency means we are by no means guaranteed to get a complete picture of political 
action (and more on this shortly), networked approaches create understandings that allow 
us to ‘fit together’ the various elements of a political movement in more nuanced ways. 
Indeed, empirically, one of the things I have done here is to shift understandings of Tibetan 
politics and, indeed studies of politics more generally, so that we can understand how 
there is no such thing as ‘pure’ political activity. Instead, discourses, cultures, 
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demonstrations, office practices, football teams and a whole host of other socially-
produced constructions come together to form the Tibet Movement. 
Yet, while the idea of the network is commonplace in academia, I have argued that we still 
need to think through what these poststructural ideas actually do for our research 
practices. As Massey (2005) has argued, the spatiality of these relational politics is not 
unproblematic, particularly when we think about the openness of ‘the site’. By thinking 
through some of these ideas more methodologically, I have argued for a more nuanced 
account of both ethnography and the site. What is clear is that there are so many different 
interlocking elements of the Tibet Movement, which we cannot hope to write legibly into 
one all-knowing account. Instead, we must think about how we are in particular places and 
how the connections to other sites and elements of the Movement have palpable effects 
upon our surroundings. If we are doing our job as researchers correctly, then the impacts 
we see upon a particular space can usually be traced somehow. In this thesis, the 
connections between the London protest in the activism chapter and my later interview 
with PG about his time in Beijing are an example of this. It is this act of following in a 
sensitive way that the best multi-sited ethnography performs. What I have written through 
this thesis is one attempt to perform a more spatially nuanced multi-site ethnography. 
Within geography, we should indeed be at the forefront of pushing these debates about 
the spatiality of ‘doing’ political research. While these theoretical interventions are 
important and key to the thesis as a whole, I wish to end on some empirical, indeed more 
practical, reflections on the thesis. 
The empirical findings of the thesis run from discourse mobilisation through to material 
practices and routines. Thinking about the prison of language that seems to dominate Tibet 
allowed us to think about the ways in which activists become embroiled within these 
dispersed discursive networks. Thus, seemingly postcolonial activists can still be entangled 
within languages of the colonial era. However, individual’s negotiations of these languages 
show how the practice of discourse is not uniform and not necessarily stultifying to the 
Movement. The discursive language may be prison-like, but how activists use and deploy it 
through the spaces of contention offers up different possibilities.  
By examining the nation, we began to see how discourse and material practice work 
together in different scenarios to produce competing versions of the Tibetan nation. Some 
networks attempted to create a stable identity, and were largely successful. The resilience 
of the Tibetan Diaspora is rooted within these networks, where the policies of the Central 
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Tibetan Administration create fixed and relatively bounded ideas about where Tibet is and 
what it means to be ‘Tibetan’. Other networks, like the ones that surround the Tibetan 
National Football Team, create a more fluid and dynamic form of Tibetan exile identity. The 
hybridity of these networks unfolds due to the relational spaces they occur in. The spaces 
of Tibetan Exile are dynamic and productive of new ways of being Tibetan. Thus, there is an 
ebb and flow of relational identity – at some times, Tibet and Tibetans are more fixed as 
certain objects and understandings, at other times, they are more ephemeral. Thus, rather 
than fetishising fixity or fluidity within a network, we must look at the ways in which 
processes like nationalism involve a movement between these two polar opposites. 
The final empirical chapter dealt most explicitly with the materiality of political action. It 
looked at the way that political networks are both spatially intensive and extensive and, 
crucially, need a lot of work to hold together. This work is rooted in the mundanity of 
modern life - things like where the franking machine is placed are seemingly unthought 
elements of contemporary office work. Nonetheless, these ideas show how the practice of 
politics is inherently mundane. Indeed, the everyday nature of political action, and the way 
that the most emotive and contentious of political subjects are held together and forced to 
work by routinized practices, such as the ones described in the preceding sections, is one of 
the points that I wish to emphasize.  
Crucially, all of the spaces, discourses and practices I have described are interconnected 
and relational. Indeed, while the Tibet Movement has not been successful in its ultimate 
goals, its continued existence is a marker of the resilience of its networks. These are 
important points to consider for activists, as the continued functioning of the network 
highlights the fact that there is still a perceived need for dissent against the current political 
situation in Tibet. What has become clear is that, despite the continued presence of 
thinking that the Tibet Movement is something like a new-age movement, this is now 
further from the truth than ever. Activists have been at work for decades in some cases, 
and all are highly skilled in the various roles that the Tibet Issue calls on them to undertake.  
Yet, there is still something of a lack in the thesis in understanding why the Tibet 
Movement has been relatively unsuccessful. Of course, I can make a number of well 
reasoned attempts to think this through, most of them being rooted in the perceived 
economic necessities and geopolitical fears of the governments that the pro-Tibet 
movement looks to for some form of salvation. I was also struck throughout the research 
by the lack of any real, meaningful attempts to communicate on a large scale with Chinese 
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people by the Tibet Movement as a whole. Yet, I am left with more questions than answers 
on this point. Indeed, as a researcher who believes that research should be a process that 
involves communication between participants and researcher on an equal basis, I will be 
somewhat intrigued to see what my participants make of the findings when I send them a 
report in the near future. The Tibet Issue at times remains something intriguing and slightly 
unknown at the edges of my vision. And this, I suppose, is what the networked approach I 
have undertaken ultimately means in reality. Fleeting glimpses of different segments of 
reality as they shift and reorganise themselves around us. Yet, I still find these glimpses far 
more useful and productive than any conceptions that attempt to treat Tibet specifically, 
and politics more generally, as something that can be disaggregated into discrete segments 
and understood completely.  The theory and methodology of ‘the network’ allows us to 
understand the resilience of seemingly marginal political groups like pro-Tibet activists and 
these understandings are important for activists and theorists alike. Relational and 
networked understandings, in my mind, open up political space and offer us new 
possibilities for a more just future, something that is important both inside and outside the 
academy. 
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Methodological Appendix 
This appendix outlines in more detail the specific research processes and methods that 
were undertaken in the course of the PhD. The research process discussed in Chapter 3 is 
summarised in Table 8.1. 
Date Activities 
 April - October 2006 
Desk-based research and Occasional meetings/visits with 
TSGs 
 October 2006 - February 
2007 
1 Day per week spent at TSG Office. Cultural and Social 
events attended on ad hoc basis. 1 London Interview 
Conducted 
 March 2007 Fieldwork in India/Dharamsala  
 April-July 2007 
Desk-based research and Occasional meetings/visits with 
TSGs. Interview in San Francisco 
 August - September 2007 
2 days per week in London based TSG. Cultural and Protest 
events attended on ad hoc basis. 1 London interview 
 October 2007 - August 2008 Attended protest and cultural events on an ad hoc basis. 
Table 8.1 – Research Schedule 
This schedule can be ordered into 3 chronological sections, as discussed below. 
Phase One – Exploratory Phase April – October 2006 
This phase of research was an intense period of ‘snowballing’, which involved desk-based 
research concentrating on identification of possible target Tibet Support Groups (TSGs) and 
activists and establishing contact with them. This had varied effects and had clear 
consequences for the transition into Phase Two. As mentioned in Chapter 3, initially, 
research was focussed on the very local circuits of potential activism in North West 
England. These were targeted with the assistance of a list of ‘Active’ Local Support Groups 
maintained by a London-based TSG. When contacted, many of these groups had stopped 
existing. By expanding my search parameters within this particular source, it became 
possible to contact some local groups. Indeed, during this phase, it became clear that most 
pro-Tibetan Campaigning was centred in London. Of the 20-30 local TSGs listed as affiliated 
to the particular London TSG, the only one conducting events on a regular basis in 2006 
was located in Scotland. As a result, I spent a brief period with this TSG and its organisers 
on one of their sponsored walks. During this time, I discussed with members how they had 
become involved in the Tibet issue, and how they perceived the TSG network in the UK to 
be working. In particular, members of the group complained to me of how they felt 
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relatively disconnected from events in London. Indeed, while this group had two or three 
events per year, London campaigning organisations seemed to be advertising events on an 
almost weekly basis. This reaffirmed my belief that most UK campaigning/activity was done 
in the London area, and so it was decided to focus my efforts on this region in the future. 
In addition, with the thesis’s clear need to understand some of the transnational linkages at 
work through the pro-Tibet Movement, I also attempted to initiate contact with some non-
UK organisations. In this case, I adopted Houston and Wright’s (2003) strategy of 
establishing contacts within the Movement before contacting any organisations in Asia, 
particularly as I was aware that I would probably be going to India in the next phase of the 
research and would thus be able to make contacts through traditional 
snowballing/gatekeeper recruitment strategies. However, during this time I also attempted 
to make contact with TSGs in the USA, as I knew I would be in the country on a short break 
during late 2006 and for academic conferences in 2007. This was before I could feasibly 
make contacts to act as informants/gatekeepers within the Movement, so I attempted to 
contact a New York-based TSG. However, this generated no response despite trying on a 
number of occasions, so as a result I could not make contact with this particular 
organisation, but also decided to concentrate fully on embedding myself within the UK 
movement for the period until at least December 2006. It is this period of embedding that 
constitutes the first section of Phase Two of the research. 
As a final stage of Phase One, I began to attend fundraising and other advertised events in 
London. This allowed me a period of networking and engagement with some of the key 
TSGs and leading activists. It was as a result of attending these events that I was able to 
make contact with both main London-based TSGs, and in particular to negotiate entrance 
into one of these TSGs as a volunteer in the Autumn of 2006.  
Phase Two – Detailed Longitudinal Engagement October 2006 – September 2007 
This phase was marked by a transition towards more routinised ethnographic practices. 
Having negotiated entry into a London-based TSG, I found myself spending one day a week 
for four months between October 2006 and February 2007. This involved performing 
mundane tasks as an entry level volunteer within the office environment. This meant I was 
able to observe and account for the everyday practices that took place within and around 
the TSG that were discussed in Chapter Six of the thesis. During this time, I was exposed to 
the workings of the TSG in times of ‘normal’ behaviour, but also at times of crisis – for 
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example, during one afternoon there was an alleged shooting on the China/Nepal border 
that the TSG had to respond to. However, at the same time, due to the limited access I was 
allowed during this period, it soon became clear that while I was able to take part in 
mundane activities, access to campaign issues and higher level decision making would be 
restricted. As a result, after a few months of exploring the workings of the TSG, it was 
decided that strategically, the best decision would be to move forward into different areas 
of the Tibet Movement. This was mainly done for practical reasons, as any further access at 
the TSG would have been restricted to workers who had been a part of the Movement for 
many years. Thus, rather than hope to commit large portions of research time to work with 
the possibility of further results not being forthcoming, I began to explore other research 
avenues. 
During my time with the TSG, I came into contact with a number of Tibetans who were a 
part of the Tibetan Community in the UK. Through these meetings it became clear that the 
Tibetan Community in the UK was an active organisation which performed and organised a 
number of cultural and political roles within the exile community in the UK. I thus began to 
attend a number of cultural events within the Tibetan Community, such as the Losar 
Tibetan New Year celebrations in February 2007. These events were something I attended 
throughout the rest of the research process. However, while they formed a part of 
maintaining the sense of community within the diaspora, most of the events were 
choreographed to certain Tibetan cultural standards. Thus, while they provided useful ways 
of meeting members of the Tibetan Community, their input into the more political aspects 
of the thesis was limited, and as a result, are not mentioned in any great detail in the 
thesis. They did however provide a useful way of snowballing and allowed me to develop a 
fuller engagement with the broader Tibet Movement within the UK, and in London 
specifically. In particular, these events allowed me to make contact with officials at The 
Office of Tibet in London. The Office of Tibet was one of a number of similar pseudo-
embassies run by the Central Tibetan Administration in countries across the world. Through 
these meetings, I was able to ascertain that March 2007 would be a useful time to visit 
Dharamsala – Tibetans in London provided me with a number of contacts to speak to, and 
officials at the Office of Tibet provided me with access to officials at the Central Tibetan 
Administration in Dharamsala, particularly Thubten Samphel, Secretary of the Department 
for Information and International Relations. As discussed in the body of the thesis, the 
month of March in Dharamsala also coincides with the Spring Teachings of the Dalai Lama 
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and the anniversary of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising. Thus, travel to Dharamsala was timed to 
coincide with this highpoint of the Tibetan Buddhist cultural year.  
During this period in Dharamsala, due to the more limited time spent within the 
community, traditional participant observation was not possible. Interviews therefore 
formed the basis of the research engagement. These interviews were with key individuals 
both identified through ‘snowballing’ in London, but also through informal contacts made 
during time in Dharamsala. The questions during these interviews focussed on how 
individuals and their groups perceived themselves to be a part of a ‘network’. The idea of a 
social network is common amongst activists, and most were able to comment upon how 
they saw connections at a variety of geographical scales, from global to local. Particular 
attention was paid to how the local circumstances of Dharamsala allowed various groups to 
communicate and organise amongst themselves. This was done in order to counteract the 
lack of research time spent in India compared to London. Through contacts made in 
Dharamsala it was also possible to arrange a meeting with a TSG based in Delhi, who were 
also interviewed upon my return from Dharamsala. 
On returning from India, it also became clear that in order to understand further the 
transnational elements of the Tibet Movement it would be necessary to uncover the 
workings of the movement in areas other than the UK or Dharamsala. Thus, while in the US 
for a conference I was able to conduct an interview with Giovanni Vassallo of Bay Area 
Friends of Tibet. This was achieved through desk based research on active Tibet groups in 
the greater San Francisco area. Again, while I contacted a number of organisations in the 
Bay Area of California, responses from other groups were limited, and as a result, I was only 
able to speak to Vassallo. However, his interview, which was conducted with the same 
emphases as the India interviews, also confirmed many of the ideas that had emerged from 
the interviews in India and the ethnographic engagement in London.  
The summer of 2007 was spent in the UK and returned to a similar pattern of ethnographic 
engagement. Having previously worked with one of the two office-based TSGs, the second 
was approached, who agreed to a period of volunteering in a similar fashion to the 
previous work with a TSG. There were a number of differences here, where I had previously 
worked for one day a week for a 4 month period, here I volunteered for 2 days a week for a 
two month period from August to September. This was to maintain a degree of longitudinal 
similarity between the two groups when I was beginning to reach the end of the in-depth 
research period, which was scheduled to end in September 2007. 
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The final part of the second phase of research was two interviews conducted with 
individual activists in the UK. While the other sections of this phase of the research 
followed each other relatively contiguously, these interviews were conducted on a much 
more ad hoc basis. This was based on the nature of these activists’ emergence within the 
research. On both occasions, while engaged in work in London, each of these activists 
emerged as actors who did not fit into the framework of the ethnographic research, 
working as they did outside the TSG system to some extent. Thus, their interviews were 
structured slightly differently to the rest of the in depth interviews conducted. The 
interview with T concentrated on similar issues as the others, namely, how local and global 
networks within the Tibet Movement were perceived by the activist, but focussed on why 
they chose to work outside this system to an extent. The second interview with PG was, in 
some regards, a follow up interview. It mainly concerned PG’s role within a global day of 
protest. Indeed, while I was present in London at this day’s events, PG’s actions in Beijing 
were an important part of these events, and as such the opportunity to interview him 
about exactly what happened represented an important part of trying to stitch together 
the various threads of a global network. These two interviews did not occur chronologically 
however, with the interview with T being conducted relatively early in the research process 
in December 2006, while the PG interview effectively marked the end of the second phase 
of the research, taking place in September 2007. This again highlights the emergent nature 
of these interviews within the overall research framework. 
Phase Three – Supplementary Data Gathering September 2007 – August 2008  
The third phase of the research reverted to less intense and more informal engagement 
with the Tibet Movement. This was a deliberate attempt to extricate myself from the 
Movement while writing up the research in order to gain a degree of critical distance. At 
the same time, events in Tibet, such as the series of protests and uprisings in March and 
April 2008 meant that I maintained a limited engagement with the Movement. This was 
mainly in the form of attending pro-Tibet rallies in London, such as the anti-Olympic Torch 
protests on the 6th of April 2008, but also included volunteering at events like an official 
visit to London by the Dalai Lama. Attending these events allowed me to see the partial and 
temporary nature of the research networks I had uncovered (as discussed in the 
Intermezzo) but also allowed me to continue some degree of engagement with the Tibet 
Movement at a crucial time in the struggle over the Tibet Issue. Thus, while it was 
important to develop an understanding of these events, they did not necessarily conform 
180 
 
to the overall findings of the research. These events occurred on average once every two 
months, reaching a peak during April 2008 when protest events reached their peak. By 
August, the focus of the Movement had shifted towards Beijing and away from London/the 
UK, so it was at this time that the field-based research process officially ended.  
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